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Abstract 
House Price Bubble in Urban China: Evidence from Eight Chinese Cities 
 
by 
Wang weizhuo 
 
China’s property prices started to pick up in 2001, where the nationwide property price index for 
residential building exhibited an increase of 23 percent from 2000 to 2004 (Peng et al., 2008). Cities 
such as Beijing and Shanghai have experienced annual land price growth rates of 20.2 percent and 23.7 
per cent since 2008 (Deng et al., 2012). This rapid increase in house prices has led economists to believe 
that a “bubble” has formed in the Chinese housing market. If the house price bubble bursts, house 
prices will plummet before economic slowdown, at a faster rate than the overall economic growth, 
inflicting greater impacts on economic growth than any other industry (Liu, 2007). Due to the ongoing 
integration of China into the world markets, China’s real estate bubble burst will also slow down the 
global economy. 
This study employs the simple price-to-income model, to more sophisticated econometric models such 
as Vector Auto Regression (VAR) and the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to investigate house 
price bubbles in eight Chinese real estate markets (Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun, 
Beijing, Qingdao and Nanjing) for the period 1999 to 2013. The study also estimates the relationships 
between macroeconomic fundamental variables and house price indices in both the short-run and 
long-run. The study results suggest that China’s housing markets did not experience a bubble. The 
fluctuation in the house price indices of the eight Chinese cities can be explained better by the 
macroeconomic fundamental variables (inflation, income and mortgage rates) in the long-run than in 
the short-run. Furthermore, the results reveal that housing markets are efficient in Kunming, Xian, 
Urumqi, Changchun and Beijing, but inefficient in Guangzhou. 
Keywords: house price bubbles, Price-to-income ratio, VAR, VECM, China 
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Figure 1.1 Nominal GDP and Real Estate Development Investment in China (Trillion RMB) 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
Property prices started to pick up in 2001, following declines in earlier years. The nationwide property 
price index for residential building increased by 23 percent between 2000 and 2004 (Peng et al., 2008). 
House prices have increased sharply in major cities and coastal provinces; in particular, the property 
price index of Shanghai increased by an average of about 13 percent per annum between 2001 and 
2004 (Peng et al., 2008). Wu et al. (2010) study compared land prices to the value of finished-home 
sales (i.e. land plus the physical unit) for recent transactions. The authors reported that from 2003 to 
2009, the ratio of land values to house values increased from between 30 percent and 40 percent. In 
early 2010, this ratio doubled to just over 60 percent on average (Wu et al., 2010). Deng et al. (2012) 
study on the quality of  the land-price index for thirty five major cities in China reveals that the average 
annual land-price growth rate is above 20 percent in eleven cities from 2011 to 2012.; for example, 
Beijing and Shanghai, which experienced real annual growth rates of 20.2 percent and 23.7 percent, 
respectively. The land markets of Changsha, Chongqing, Lanzhou, Nanjing and Tianjin are almost 
indistinguishable from Beijing and Shanghai in terms of the land-price growth rate. In fact, the city of 
Hefei, the capital of Anhui province has the highest land-price growth rate with an annual average 
growth rate of 30.1 percent (Deng et al., 2012). 
The property market boom in China is having a significant impact on the wider economy. In particular, 
real estate investment for residential building has grown strongly by an average rate of about 28 
percent per annum for the period 2001 to 2004. The real estate industry raised GDP growth from 1.9 
percent to 2.5 percent in the same period (Gu, 2005). The strong investment demand contributed to 
the sharp increase in producer and investment goods’ price inflation between 2002 and 2004. Chan’s 
(1999) study reported the housing component as the second largest contributor (after food prices) to 
the rise in the consumer price index. Sales of land and property development have become an 
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 2 
important source of income for local governments (Chan, 1999). Moreover, banks’ exposure to the 
property market has also increased. Liu and Huang (2004) estimate that in the early 2000s, about 60 
percent of real estate investment in China was financed by bank loans, with mortgage and 
development loans accounting for 35 percent and 25 percent, respectively. 
Many researchers have focused on the dramatic increases in house prices over the last decade which 
potentially will further inflate the house price bubble in China’s housing market. Shen et al. (2005) 
examined the house price bubble in the Beijing and Shanghai mortgage markets, and found strong 
evidence to support the existence of a house price bubble in the Shanghai housing market. Dreger and 
Zhang (2010) used time series data drawn from 35 major cities in China to investigate the size of China’s 
real estate bubble, and their results indicate that the house price bubble is particularly huge in the 
cities of the southeast coastal areas, and in special economic zones such as Shenzhen. Ning and Hoon’s 
(2012) study shows the real estate bubble in Beijing is bigger than that in Shanghai. Beijing exhibited 
serious housing bubbles in 2001, 2007, 2009 and 2010, compared to Shanghai’s bubbles in 2009 and 
2010 (see Figure 1.2). In response to fears of a bubble, in the summer of 2011, Standard & Poor’s 
downgraded its outlook for China’s real estate development sector, to negative from stable 
(http://www.chinesecrash.com). 
Figure 1.2 Level of Real Estate Bubble in Beijing and Shanghai (2001~2010) 
 
Source: Beijing Statistics Yearbook (2011); Shanghai Statistics Yearbook (2011) (arranged by the Ning and   
              Hoon’s (2012) study) 
 
 
Evidence of a housing bubble also includes significant numbers of vacant apartments in some Chinese 
cities, such as Sanya in the Hainan province, Ordos in the Gobi Desert, Kangbashi in Inner Mongolia, 
Zhengzhou New district in the Henan province, and Chenggong New District in the Yunnan province. 
In the Pearl River Delta, the New South China Mall is the world’s largest mall, twice the size of the Mall 
of American in Minneapolis. However, the New South China Mall is another example of a vacant 
project or a “ghost mall” (Alastair, 2012). Capole (2010) and Wenzel (2011) estimate that 64 million 
luxury units are vacant, and that “ghost cities” appear to exist in Yunnan province and Sanya city 
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(Gvovski, 2011). The vacant luxury units show that developers only build luxury apartments thereby 
strengthening their profits, at the expense of low and middle income housing (Rein, 2010).  
Public housing programmes in China include low-rent units (lian zu fang), public rental units (gong 
gong zu lin fang), affordable housing units (jing ji shi yong fang) and price-controlled units (xian jia 
fang) (Deng et al., 2012). In 1995 affordable housing was 15 percent of all construction; in 2008 it was 
only 5 percent, which places the low income sector of Chinese citizens in a difficult housing position 
(Guo, 2010). Housing affordability or otherwise has become a pressing issue due to factors such as a 
growing population, speculation in the housing market and an inadequate supply of affordable 
housing.  All these factors contribute to property booms. 
In addition, high housing price-to-income ratio signals the existence of a housing price bubble in China. 
On January 19, 2010, the National Bureau of Statistics of China published the 2009 National Real Estate 
Market Situation, which revealed that the national, new house price average was 4695 RMB per square 
metre (Shen, 2012). Thus, an apartment of 100 square metres would cost about 470,000 RMB. 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, the per capita disposable income of Chinese urban 
residents in 2009 was 17,175 RMB, resulting in an annual household income (average family of three) 
of 51,525 RMB for a household. Therefore, in 2009 the average housing price-to-income ratio was 9.1 
for urban residents in China. By contrast, the comparable national data ratios are 2.9 for the U.S., 5.1 
for the U.K., and 6.8 for Australia (Shen, 2012).  
China is a developing country with a population of 1.3 billion and housing is a basic need for people’s 
livelihoods as well as for the public good. The development of the real estate industry is closely related 
to overall economic growth. If a housing bubble bursts due to economic or political factors, house 
prices will plummet before economic slowdown occurs, at a faster rate than the overall economic 
growth falls, thereby inflicting a greater impact on consumer confidence and economic growth than 
any other industry can (Liu, 2007). Helbling and Terrones (2003) and Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) 
point out that house price bubble bursts are associated with output losses that are twice as large as 
equity bubble bursts. Shocks caused by a housing bubble burst might transmit through a number of 
channels, including credit crunches and fewer construction activities (Dreger and Zhang, 2010). Due to 
the ongoing integration of China into world markets, China’s real estate market will also be affected 
by the global economy and shocks. Killion’s (2009) study reported that Asian economic growth is likely 
to suffer constraints, due to an unexpected slowdown in the U.S. economy and a potential spillover 
from the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. For example, twenty-two U.S. banks failed in 2008, with banks 
rushing to conclude new deals as the Wall Street crisis deepened. On September 18th, 2008, the China 
Daily reported that at least three large Chinese commercial banks had disclosed their exposure to the 
worsening U.S. financial crisis, via bonds issued by the investment bank Lehman Brothers (Killion, 
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2009). Following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers bank, China’s nominal GDP growth rate fell from 
its peak of 24 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007 to a mere 3.6 percent in the first quarter of 2009; 
China’s GDP deflator fell from 12.3 percent to a negative 3.7 percent in the same period (Nakamae, 
2010).  
Since 2011, there has been growing concern that the housing bubble is about to collapse. For example, 
Seki (2012) reports that the number of real estate transactions has fallen since September 2011, even 
though September and October are normally the busiest months for house sales in China. Seki also 
argues that if sales contracts shrink by 30 percent, then over half of Chinese housing developers, 
including some major companies (e.g. Van Ke and Poly Real Estate Group) would be unable to repay 
their debts (Seki, 2012).  The issues discussed above mean that it is a challenge to investigate how the 
property market development has affected China’s overall economy. 
1.1 China’s Property Market 
The Chinese property market is directly linked to government revenue. The monetary Policy Analysis 
Group of the People’s Bank of China (2002) reports that the real estate sector accounts for 30 percent 
of China’s GDP growth rate.  Lai et al. (2009) report that the real estate industry is highly relevant to 
many other industries, for example, the construction material industries, furnishings, real estate sales, 
and mortgage businesses. As reported by the People’s Bank of China, at the end of 2010 the 
outstanding balance of residential mortgage loans reached 6.16 trillion RMB, or about 6.1 percent of 
total bank loans. Thus, the bursting of a housing bubble could send the overall economy into recession 
or depression such as that which happened with the U.S. 2008 subprime loan crisis.  The close 
relationship between the Chinese real estate growth rate and government revenue leads many 
analysts to predict that the government will not control property prices, as property price increases 
mean higher levels of public revenue. However, the property problems are not only economic 
problems, but are also social, class, generation, and urban-rural disparity problems, and the continued 
price growth may spark severe economic and social problems.  
The surge in property prices and rising real estate investment has raised concerns about housing 
affordability for ordinary Chinese people (Jung-Myung, 2010). For instance, Veneziani and Chanos 
(2010) report that the average annual median income in China is US$3,500 and is only slightly higher 
in the urban sector. In some second tier Chinese cities such as Dalian, Chengdu and Changsha, a typical 
100 square metre condo costs between US$120,000 and US$140,000. This means that for a dual 
income couple who make between US$7,000 to US$10,000 a year with a deposit of 20 percent, the 
monthly housing loan will cost between 60 percent and 100 percent of the couple’s total income 
before tax (Veneziani & Chanos, 2010). This mismatch of continuous increasing house prices, low 
average annual incomes and fewer affordable houses provided by the government, will cause 
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economic and social problems in China (Wu, Gyourko & Deng, 2012). In addition, accelerating house 
prices may indicate the presence of a housing price bubble (Dreger & Zhang, 2010). 
The Chinese government needs to come up with solutions to prevent real estate prices from 
undermining economic and social stability in the country (Jung-Myung, 2010).  This study examines the 
Chinese housing market, focusing on the price bubbles, in order to reduce the potential harm caused 
by boom and bust cycles of house prices, to China’s economy. 
1.2 Concept of a Bubble  
The term “bubble” is widely used but rarely clearly defined (Case & Shiller, 2003a). The term “bubble” 
was first used to describe well-known cases of speculative price movements such as the Tulip Bulb 
mania in Holland, the South Sea bubble in England, and the collapse of the Mississippi Company in 
France (Garber, 1990). From then on, the term “bubble” has been adopted to describe the dramatic 
process in which an economy sector prospers rapidly, and then declines rapidly (Kim, 2004).   
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2008) defines a bubble as a sharp rise in the price of an 
asset or a range of assets in a continuous process, with the initial rise generating expectations of 
further rises and attracting new buyers. Sometimes a bubble is caused by speculators who are 
interested in profits from trading rather than expanding the sociable housing supply. Kindelberger 
(1987) defines a bubble as a sharp increase in an asset price in a continuous process. Increased asset 
price is caused by an investor’s expectation of a future increase in asset price (Stiglitz, 1990). This leads 
to the purchase of an asset in anticipation that the asset can be resold to other people for a higher 
price (Blanchard & Fischer, 1989). The people who buy the asset also hold the same beliefs about the 
asset price in future (Blanchard & Fischer, 1989). 
Flood and Hodrick (1990) define a bubble as a deviation of the current market price of the asset (such 
as stocks or real estate) from the value implied by market fundamentals. Smith and Smith (2006) define 
a bubble as a situation in which the market price of the asset rises far above the present value of the 
anticipated cash flow from the asset. Camerer (1989) and Weil (1987) define bubbles as a change in 
the real economic environment. These changes that are caused by bubbles are described as a specific 
type of financial crisis (Knight, 2002). 
Lind (2009) suggests each bubble episode has unique features since it is possible to construct a smaller 
number of “ideal types” of bubbles, where a specific mechanism dominates. The author defines three 
ideal types of bubbles: 
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1) A pure speculative bubble: where buyers believe the price of the asset today is too high and 
that the price eventually will fall, but believe in continuing price increases for some time, 
planning to sell with a profit before the price falls (Lind, 2009).  
2) An irrational expectation bubble: where people in the market become over-optimistic and 
think the asset price will grow rapidly over a longer period of time. The growth is expected to 
be considerably higher than historical averages. Therefore, it seems rational to pay a high price 
today (Lind, 2009). 
3) The irrational institutions bubble: where the main mechanism behind this bubble is the 
principal-agent problem, where buyers have incentives to pay higher prices than what is 
supported by historical patterns or strong evidence (Lind, 2009). The buyers of the 
houses/apartments do not expect to suffer losses when prices fall dramatically, while the 
person who lends the money also expects to be able to shift the losses to someone else, maybe 
the government. Subprime lending is the latest example of this type of bubble (Wheaton & 
Nechayev, 2008). 
 
This current study adopts the irrational expectation bubble definition to investigate the housing 
bubbles in Chinese housing market. The massive saving rate (China’s gross national savings as a 
percentage of GDP surged over 50% in the 2000s), limited investment vehicles (the predominant 
investment vehicles are bank deposits and stock markets) and high average annual returns offered by 
the Chinese housing market (the lowest annual average return is 11% among the Chinese cities for 
the period 2003 to 2013) motivated the Chinese household to invest in the housing market (Fang et 
al., 2015).  This study employs the long-term equilibrium house price to detect deviation of housing 
prices from macroeconomic fundamental variables.  
1.3 Speculative and Historical Bubbles in the Housing Market 
“That is what bubble is all about: buying for the future price increase, rather than simply for the 
pleasure of occupying the home.” 
 
---- Karl E. Case and Robert J. Shiller (2003) 
 
According to Stiglitz (1990) the asset price is high today only because investors believe that the selling 
price will be high tomorrow. When “fundamental” factors do not seem to justify such an increase in 
price, then a bubble exists. The “bubble” is defined in terms of how asset prices behave (Lind, 2009). 
In real estate research, the concept of bubble is defined as an unusually sharp rise (deviation) in the 
asset price at extraordinarily high levels from the market fundamentals (Kritayanavaj, 2008). The 
definition of market fundamentals is “an unmodified set of variables that help to determine an asset’s 
price which include the current values, dividends, and expectations about the asset value in the future” 
(Garber, 2000, p.4).  
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In the real estate market, the buyer of a property is prepared to pay a price which he/she thinks is 
similar to the “fundamental” values based on two criteria; the information on rental flows and the 
expected changes in the future price of the property (Xiao and Tan, 2007). Therefore, people have 
expectations of future house price changes during different economic conditions such an expansion 
(boom) and recession (bust).  
House-price bubble crises occur frequently in most housing markets. For instance, in 2007 a big 
housing-price bubble burst in the U.S. and the contagion of the subprime crisis spread from the U.S. to 
many other emerging countries, such as those of East Asia, and the Euro Zone countries of Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Ireland (Kim & Kim, 2009). According to Pugh and Dehesh (2001) the real estate 
bubble is not a new phenomenon. The impact of the recent U.S. subprime crisis differed in size and 
magnitude compared to past housing bubbles, such as those in Florida in 1929 and Japan in 1989. 
Therefore, to better understand the current house price bubble, this study also describes two historical 
bubble events, one in Florida, U.S. (1929) and the other in Japan (1989). 
1.3.1 Florida Land Boom of the 1920s 
By the 1920s, the prosperity of the U.S. economy allowed people to invest in the property market. 
Miami has an image as a tropical paradise and outside investors across the U.S. began taking an interest 
in Miami real estate (Allen, 1931). Due to an outstanding marketing strategy, property prices rose 
rapidly due to speculation, and a land and development boom ensued (Allen, 1931). Furthermore, the 
boom and bust of the Florida real estate market is believed to have been caused by speculative bubbles 
that were in turn caused by the American middle class, who saw Florida as a wonderful residential 
place (Galbraith, 1954). 
However, in the spring and summer of 1926, the boom in the Florida property market ended with the 
bursting of the bubble, leaving behind the remains of failed development projects such as Aladdin city 
in south Miami-Dade County, and Isola di Lolando in north Biscayne Bay (Allen, 1931). The story also 
includes similar property boom parallels in the modern real estate era, as well as the forces of outside 
speculators, easy credit access for buyers, and rapidly-appreciating property values, all of which 
directly contribute to the bursting of the real estate bubble (Galbraith, 1954). 
1.3.2 Japan’s 1980s Asset Bubble Crisis 
Cargill et al. (1996) describe the 1986 Japanese economy as a “bubble economy” due to the higher 
appreciation of the Japanese yen and easy mortgage financing. After World War II, Japan implemented 
stringent tariffs and policies to encourage the people to save their income. The large amount of savings 
in Japanese banks caused the Japanese economy to boom, with development in the banking sector 
leading to cheaper financing costs, a trade surplus and a stronger yen. During this period, Japan 
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experienced the most inflated property prices of the 20th Century with asset prices doubling and then 
tripling within a few years (Cargill et al., 1996).The Japanese bubble peaked with rumours about the 
higher cost of land beneath the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. The land was assumed to be worth more than 
the state of California. By 1989, Tokyo’s Giza district had recorded the highest price in Tokyo’s real 
estate market at US$1.5 million per square metre (Cargill et al., 1996).  
Then, in 1990, the bubble burst. The Tokyo stock market collapsed with stock prices declining over 70 
percent and real estate losing an estimated 80 percent of its inflated value. Asset prices in Japan finally 
came down in the first half of the 1990s and as a result the stock prices declined from 1990 to August 
1992, and land prices halved for the period 1991 to 1995 (Cargill et al., 1996). After the bubble collapse, 
the yen appreciated to mid-1995 coinciding with a sharp drop in economic growth (Yurichuk, 2011). 
The country took an enormous amount of debt, borrowing overseas, in an attempt to stimulate the 
economy.  
The bubble collapse in Japan lasted for more than a decade and the 1990s is commonly referred to as 
the “lost decade” in Japan. Stock prices bottomed out in 2003, and then went even lower amidst the 
global crisis in 2008 (Yurichuk, 2011). The economic future of Japan still remains uncertain two decades 
on from the collapse of the bubble economy (Yurichuk, 2011). 
1.3.3 The U.S. Subprime Loan Crisis  
The U.S. subprime loan crisis was a set of events and conditions that led to the late-2000s financial 
crisis, characterised by a rise in subprime mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures, and the resulting 
decline of securities (Krinsman, 2007). 
The percentage of new longer-length subprime mortgages rose from the historical eight percent or 
lower to about 20 percent from 2004 to 2006. The subprime loan crisis was caused by the lowered 
lending standards and higher-risk mortgage products. According to Unterman (2009), the short-term 
interest rates were cut from 6.5 percent to one percent while the interest rates on 30 year fixed rate 
mortgages fell 2.5 percent. In addition, the interest rate on the one-year adjustable mortgage rate fell 
three percent (from 7 percent to 4 percent). 
After U.S. house sale prices peaked in mid-2006 and began their steep decline forthwith, refinancing 
became more difficult. On March 13, 2007 the Mortgage Bankers Association reported that 13 percent 
of subprime borrowers were delinquent on their payments by 60 days or more (Krinsman, 2007). 
Between June 2007 and November 2008, Americans lost more than a quarter of their net worth (Roger, 
2009). Total retirement assets which is Americans’ second-largest household asset, dropped by 22 
percent, from US$10.3 trillion in 2006 to US$8 trillion in mid-2008 (Roger, 2009). During the same 
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period, savings and investment assets (apart from retirement savings) lost US$1.2 trillion and pension 
assets lost US$1.3 trillion. Taken together, these losses total US$8.3 trillion (Altman, 2008). 
The U.S. subprime loan crisis and the historical bubbles of Florida and Japan present good examples of 
a property market meltdown, and demonstrate that the asset price bubble can grow rapidly and the 
cost of the bubble bursting can be extremely expensive for the economy (Belke & Wiedmann, 2005). 
Jung-Myung (2010) warns that the formation of China’s property bubble appears much like that of 
Japan in the 1980s (see Table1.1). China has become the world’s second largest economy and careful 
monitoring for a possible Chinese housing bubble collapse is all the more important. 
Table 1.1 Comparison of China –Japan Asset Bubble Economy 
 Japan’s  Economic 
indicators 1986-1991 
China’s Economic Indicators 
2008-2010 
Domestic Growth 
%GDP 
3-4% 8-10% 
Domestic savings Strong Very high: 20-40% of income 
Central Bank 
Interest Rates 
Lowered 5 times essentially 
to zero rate 
2008: loan rate: 7.41% 
deposit rate: 4.41%;  
2010: loan rate: 5.31%  
deposit rate: 2.25% 
Loans/GDP 50% of GDP 40% of GDP 
Local Currency vs. 
the U.S. dollar 
Volatile Yen, strong 
appreciation followed by 
strong depreciation 
Stable RMB, minimal 
appreciation against the U.S. 
dollar 
Growth initiatives-
domestic and 
export 
Decreased due to 
appreciation in the Yen  
Decreased due to global 
economic financial crisis 
Source: Yurichuk, (2011), “Bubbles and monetary policy: can China avert a Minsky moment?” the ISM  
Journal of International Business 
1.4 Research Problem Statement  
The Chinese housing loan reforms started in 1980. The main direction of China’s housing policy over 
the last twenty years has moved away from the traditional system of welfare allocation (fulifenpei) to 
a system of monetised allocation (huobifenpei) of housing benefits. This policy encourages people to 
buy apartments and become home owners (Burell, 2006). These changes in housing policy have 
resulted in privatisation of public housing and the monetisation of housing benefits, which places new 
entrants to the housing market in a vulnerable position. In the early 1990s, according to the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, the annual urban housing investment in China increased from 523 billion 
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RMB to 2309 billion RMB. Investment in commercial housing increased from 27 percent of the total 
urban housing investment in 1991 to nearly 60 percent in 1994 (Wang & Murie, 1999). From 2000 to 
2004, China’s annual investment in real estate averaged about US$109 billion and accounted for 
almost seven percent of the nation’s GDP (Ye et al., 2006). Houses have become the most important 
new form of private property for urban Chinese (Feng, 2003). 
In the year 2010, the private housing sector accounted for over 40 percent (40.8 percent in 2008 and 
42.6 percent in 2009) of the buildings under construction; the construction industry being one of the 
most important industries in China (Wu et al., 2010). Its output constitutes 5.7 percent of Chinese GDP; 
it employs 14.3 percent of workers in urban areas; and it consumes about 40 percent of the steel and 
lumber produced in China (Wu et al., 2010). Therefore, the impact of a possible housing bubble burst 
would be staggering and significant for China’s economy. 
In 1988, Hainan province experienced an economic bubble fuelled by a housing boom. In Hainan, the 
floor space under construction surged by 750 percent between 1990 and 1998, and exceeded 50 
square metres per person, while that of Beijing was only nine square metres per person in the same 
period. Hainan’s housing bubble burst at the end of 1998 and left 7.03 million square metres of housing 
unsold,  a tenth of the national total in that year (Chen et al., 2011).  
Empirical research confirms that the bursting of housing market bubbles seriously impacts on the real 
economy more than that of the stock market (Helbing & Terrones, 2003, Bordo & Jeanne, 2002). 
According to the study of Ivana and Lubos (2011), the effects stemming from the sudden bursting of 
property market bubbles generates higher output losses and lasts longer on average (about 4 years) 
than in the case of stock market bubbles (around 1.5 years). Helbling and Terrones (2003) also found 
that during the period 1970-2002, the output effects associated with housing price bubble bursts were 
twice as large as those of equity price bursts, and that the economy slowdown after a housing market 
collapse lasts about twice as long as the slowdown after a stock market crash (Goetzmann & Ibbotson 
1990; Liang et al., 1996). Therefore, a bubble is not just an increase in house prices; real resources are 
involved in the bubble which have been misdirected during the bubble and have to make painful 
adjustments in the aftermath of the bubble burst. This involves unemployment, foreclosure, and 
bankruptcy for many people, especially those in the construction and construction-related industries. 
The macro-economy will go into recession or depression, such as that which happened during the U.S. 
subprime housing crisis.  
Since 2002 many government officials and economists have advised that some cities in China should 
be aware of the signs of housing price bubbles (Hui & Yue, 2006). For instance, the house price growth 
rates are 13.1 percent for the first tier cities, 10.5 percent and 7.9 percent for the second and third tier 
cities, respectively. These growth rates easily surpass the house price growth rate during the U.S. 
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subprime crisis in 2007 and are comparable to that during the Japanese housing bubble in 1989 (Fang 
et al., 2015) Given the potential volatility impact of the property market on the economy, it is 
important to investigate whether bubbles exist in the housing market in China.  
1.5 Research Objectives 
This study has developed a dynamic model for investigating house price bubbles in the Chinese housing 
market. 
The objectives of this study are to: 
• estimate the relationships between macroeconomic fundamental variables and Chinese house 
price index in the short-run and in the long-run. 
• investigate whether a house price bubble exists in the Chinese housing market from 1999 
quarter one (Q1) to 2013 quarter four (Q4), and identify the size of the bubble using 
macroeconomic fundamentals (such as interest rates, inflation and income). 
• examine the efficiency of the Chinese housing market (by investigating the period adjustment 
correction mechanism; which converts house prices back to equilibrium prices). 
• suggest a new technique for modelling house price bubbles in the Chinese housing market, 
that is the Vector error correction model (nonlinear method). 
1.6 Significance of the Study  
In the past few years the effervescence of the Chinese real estate market has surged rapidly. Guo and 
Huang (2010) noted that since 2005, in an effort to quell the speculation on residential properties, the 
Chinese central government has imposed, along with other supply regulations, an idle land tax, a land 
appreciation tax, and a business tax, on properties held for less than five years. Unfortunately, the 
benefits of these measures have been minimal as real estate prices have continued to rise. The house 
is the largest single asset for most Chinese households and it is also a very important component of 
the aggregate portfolio of financial intermediaries, such as banks. In addition, housing policy has 
pervasive economic and social effects in China and much recent domestic policy attention has been 
focused on housing price stability and mortgage affordability (Guo & Huang, 2010).  
In general, a slump in real estate prices is more harmful than a stock market crash, because real estate 
is the most important collateral that underlies bank loans, and house ownership is more widespread 
across the population (Goodhart & Hofmann, 2008). However, in China, because of the low leverage 
level, the risk with respect to people not being able to fund their mortgage commitments might not 
be very high. Never-the-less, housing investment is an important pillar for economic growth (Liu et al., 
2002). Chen and Zhu (2008) conclude from their analysis that an increase in housing investment of one 
percent will cause a rise in GDP of 0.2 percent in China. A housing bubble might also have an 
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international dimension due to the ongoing integration of China into world markets. A decline in house 
prices in China would contribute to lower output growth, and negative spill-over to other countries 
would occur (Dreger & Zhang, 2010). 
Studies on China’s real estate market have so far mainly focused on the vertical process, which is the 
transition of land and housing systems from centrally planned market-oriented economic systems, to 
the regional housing market economic systems (Sun, 1998). Some researchers have studied the new 
legal framework and its implications on real estate development (Lim, 1995; Walker, 1991). Other 
researchers have examined the stages of land and housing reforms (Wang & Murie, 1996; Qu, Herrink, 
& Wang, 1995; Tolley, 1991; Walker, 1991; Tang, 1989). Still others have investigated the nature of 
this young market in terms of land and housing prices, and the continuous influence of the state on 
market operations (Li, 1997; Chen, 1996; Li & Walker, 1996; Walker & Li, 1994). However, there is a 
lack of research regarding modelling the house price bubble in China and therefore this study 
contributes several new insights into the Chinese housing market, as follows: 
• Few studies focus on the Chinese housing bubble, and the data periods for the existing literature 
regarding China’s housing market are mostly before 2007. For instance, the data period for Shen 
et al. (2005) study is from 1997 to 2003; Hu et al. (2006) study is from1990 to 2005; and Hou’s 
(2010) study is from 2000 to 2007. This current study fills a gap in the Chinese housing market 
literature by investigating the housing markets of six Chinese cities, by drawing data from the 
period from 1999 to 2013 which includes the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the period of the 
U.S. subprime loan crisis. These two important events are expected to have dramatic effects on 
house prices in China, which in turn significantly impact on China’s economic growth. 
• By providing a better picture of the Chinese housing market and facilitating an understanding of 
the boom and bust process so that adequate preventive measures against the boom and bust 
process can be designed. 
• By increasing awareness in housing market players (investors, sellers and buyers) of the house 
price bubble process and its impact on the economy. 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter One provides the introduction and background of the 
study, problem statement, research objectives and significance of the study. Chapter Two presents an 
overview of the real estate market in China. Chapter Three discusses the literature review on “bubbles” 
in housing markets and the real estate cycle. Chapter Four presents the proposed house price bubble 
model used in this study. Chapter Five discusses the data and methodology of the study and Chapter 
Six presents the analysis and findings. The conclusion and recommendations are presented in Chapter 
Seven. 
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qualify for EAH. However, because an efficient income and asset monitoring system has not been 
established in China, it is difficult to verify the true income level of most families (Gao & Asami, 2011). 
The central government of China has budgeted and spent huge amounts over the past decade to fund 
affordable housing projects. In 1988, the government spent a total of 80.6 billion RMB, which was 
about 0.99 percent of annual GDP at that time, to build affordable housing. In 2003, government 
expenditure on affordable housing construction increased to 157.8 billion RMB, which amounts to 1.35 
percent of annual GDP (Jin, 2006). The central government also encouraged real estate developers to 
get involved in real estate by allowing them to acquire land at much lower cost on condition that a 
certain percentage of the acquired land was developed for price-limited housing projects. 
However, the results of these measures have not been satisfactory. The summation of government 
funded affordable housing projects completed each year are insufficient to meet the needs of large 
middle-to-low income populations. Some developers even find ways to replace the ‘on condition’ 
“affordable housing” on lower-cost land, with other projects such as luxurious apartments (Gao, 2010). 
Developers’ reluctance to provide affordable housing is evidenced by the fact that while total 
construction volume has skyrocketed, the percentage of affordable housing construction has 
decreased (see Table 2.1) (China Year Book, 2009).  
Table 2.1 Total Building Space of Newly Built-Up Residential Houses for Middle- and Low-Wage  
                 Earners in China 
Year             Construction                          Construction                          Affordable Housing 
                      Floor Space                    for Affordable Housing                   Construction 
             (10,000 square metres)               Floor Space                                        (%) 
                                                               (10,000 square metres) 
1997              10,996.60                              1,720.60                                            15.6 
1998              16,637.50                              3,466.40                                            20.8 
1999              18,797.90                              3,970.40                                            21.1 
2000              24,401.20                              5,313.30                                            21.8 
2001              30,532.70                              5,796.00                                            19.0 
2002              34,719.40                              5,279.70                                            15.2 
2003              43,853.90                              5,330.60                                            12.2 
2004              47,949.00                              4,257.50                                              8.9 
2005              55,185.10                              3,513.50                                              6.4 
2006              64,403.80                              4,379.03                                              6.8 
2007              78,795.51                              4,810.26                                              6.1 
2008              83,642.12                              4,336.97                                              5.2 
Source: China Year Book 2009. National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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2.2 Development in the Chinese Property Sector 
2.2.1 Housing Reform 
Urban residential housing units in China were nationalised and owned by the central government at 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 (Wu et al., 2012), resulting in the Chinese 
government completely monopolising the land market and controlling land quantity and the timing of 
developments (Deng et al., 2009). In the following three decades, the State determined the national 
economic plan and was the monopoly provider of housing. State-owned housing developments were 
financed by an annual State Budgetary funding, with the units built then allocated to individual 
households at low rents through their work units (Danwei), which often were state-owned enterprises. 
During this period, the private housing market was non-existent (Zhao & Bourassa, 2003, Wu et al., 
2012). 
The State’s monopoly of the residential housing system started to change in the late 1970s (Wu et al., 
2012). In 1979, a trial privatisation of state-owned residential housing units began in several coastal 
cities, and was soon expanded to over 100 cities and then the entire country. This reform led to the 
emergence of a private housing market (called “commodity housing”) in China (Wu et al., 2012). From 
1980, the role of the Chinese government in housing and also how the housing problem can be 
resolved, has been the subject of continuous debate. The introduction of economic reforms have 
allowed market forces and private enterprise to play an increasing role in the economy and in the 
production and consumption of housing in particular (Wang & Murie, 1999). In 1988, the government 
initiated the Ten Year Reform Strategy. One of the major objectives of this reform was to encourage 
urban residents to buy their houses, to establish housing development funds, and to reform the rent 
system in the public sector (Liu, 1989). In the mid-1990s, the government virtually stopped all direct 
housing funding; the role of the work units (Danwei) in housing provision was also eliminated (Zhang, 
2001). Although the state still exerts its influence on the urban development process, the power of the 
market has increased rapidly, driving land market reforms, and restructuring the system of housing 
provision (Wu, 2003; Ma, 2004; Qian, 2012). 
2.2.2 Urbanisation and Migration 
Compared with other countries, China differs in migration and urbanisation patterns due to its unique 
‘Household Registration System’ (Hukou) and huge population base (Zhang et al., 2011). Chen et al. 
(2011) have explored the possible effects of rural-urban migration and urbanisation on China’s urban 
housing prices and have found that the different processes of provincial urbanisation and the migration 
situation have significant effects on urban house prices in China. 
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Urbanisation refers to the expansion in the proportion of a population living in urban areas, and is one 
of the major social transformations sweeping the globe. Now, more than half of the world’s population 
live in urban areas, and by the year 2050, 70 percent of the world’s population will be city dwellers 
(Yu, 2010). Although China has the largest urban population in the world by number, it never-the-less 
has a comparatively low urbanisation level, approximately 10 percent lower than the world average 
and 30 percent lower than more developed regions (United Nations, 2004).  
Since the mid-1990s, China’s new round of market-oriented economic reforms has driven the 
population migration and urbanisation processes at an extraordinary pace, mainly through massive 
rural-to-urban migration and the development of new urban centres (Wang & Murie, 1996; Ma, 2002). 
Between 1996 and 2005, the urban population increased by over 50 percent from 373 million to just 
over 562 million. Since 2005, there have been about 15 million new people entering urban areas each 
year (Wu et al., 2012).  
The large internal migration is regulated by the Household Register System (Hukou). A household 
migrating to a new city without Hukou would suffer from not being able to readily access health, 
education and other public services. Many housing units are being purchased by people migrating with 
Hukou from other areas. For example, Table 2.2 shows that in 2009, about one-third of the newly-built 
private housing units sold were purchased by internal migrants (Wu et al., 2012). 
Table 2.2 Composition of Commodity Housing Unit Purchasers 
 From local 
urban area (%) 
From local rural 
area (%) 
From other 
domestic areas (%) 
From other 
countries /regions 
(%) 
2005 70.1 5.8 22.7 1.4 
2006 62.1 8.2 28.4 1.3 
2007 62.4 10.3 26.5 0.8 
2008 64.8 10.2 24.3 0.7 
2009 54.1 11.8 33.5 0.6 
Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
 
The strength of real demand in small- and medium-sized cities is driven by the dynamism of 
urbanisation. Urbanisation generates substantial new-housing demand in cities (Seki, 2012). The urban 
population has risen dramatically because of migration from rural to urban areas. Between 2006 and 
2009, China’s urban population grew by 44.8 million. The population of small- and medium-sized cities 
increased by a total of 42.29 million during this period, compared to a total increase of 2.51 million in 
the populations of Beijing and Shanghai together (Seki, 2012). 
Rapid economic growth and massive rural-to-urban migration are expected to continuously fuel the 
demand for housing in mainland cities. In 2003, the State Development Planning Commission 
announced that it is government policy to achieve an urbanisation rate of over 50 percent by 2020, 
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and the annual demand for urban housing space is projected to increase to about 300 million square 
metres when the urban population reaches 650 million in 2010 (Xie & Liu, 2004; Gao 2010). In the 
meantime, China has also undergone an evolutionary process of urban housing commercialisation 
(Wu, 1996). With China facing simultaneous rapid urbanisation and an urban housing transition, many 
researchers have expressed their concerns about the urban problems caused by speedy urbanisation 
(Yang, 1993; Kojima, 1995; Yeung & Shen, 2004). Yang (2002) reports that in 2002, China found itself 
with not only one of the highest rates of economic growth in the world, but also one of the highest 
rates of rural inequality in urban income in the world. 
Although the housing shortage has been partially addressed through the privatisation process, a big 
income gap has developed between the rich and poor among urban Chinese residents (Zhao & 
Bourassa, 2003). According to the National Statistics Yearbook (NBSC, 2009; MLR, 2007), citizens in the 
first tier cities often find the ratio between housing prices and their household annual income to be 
around 20. This ratio is significantly higher than the recommended range of two to five by the World 
Bank (World Bank, 1996). In western countries such as the United States, the median-house price to 
income ratio is rarely over eight in most regions. 
In most major Chinese cities, the ratios between average housing prices and the incomes of the lower-
to-middle households are much higher than those in developed countries. In 2005, the average 
housing price was 22.69 times that of the lowest income household’s annual income (the bottom 20 
percent income households), while the housing prices were only 2.45 times that of the highest income 
household’s annual income (the top 20 percent income households). Compared to the global average 
ratios, these two ratio values for low/middle income and high income households are 9.7 and 5.6 
respectively. Furthermore, in recent years it has been observed that the difference between housing 
prices and annual income has enlarged for the low/middle income families, while reduced for the high 
income families (Jin, 2006). The absence of proper housing policies for meeting the need for affordable 
housing means that skyrocketing housing prices may cause a deterioration in social and political 
stability in China’s urban regions. 
2.2.3 Urban Land Supply System and Land Market 
After the land reforms of the early 1950s, urban land in China was owned by the state (the city 
government directly) and rural land was owned collectively by rural communities. In the urban areas, 
land management was characterised by direct allocation of land by the state to various state-owned 
land-users such as the state-owned enterprises’ administrative bodies and public institutions (Wang & 
Murie, 1999). Under the planned economy, the majority of urban land-users’ land was held in public 
ownership. After 1978, urban economic reforms changed the composition of the urban economy 
dramatically and there was an increase in non-public ownership (enterprises with foreign investment 
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or purely private investment) (Wang & Murie, 1999). Land transfers based on market or price signals 
became inevitable and in 1987, the first land auction was held in Shenzhen. However, in subsequent 
years, most land parcels have not been sold publicly via auction or bidding. Instead, the developer has 
contacted the local government about a land parcel in which it was interested, and then negotiated 
the price (Wu et al., 2012). 
In 1990, a Provisional Ordinance for urban State-owned ‘Land Use Right Transfer’ was issued to guide 
the urban land market. Under this new system, there was no change in land ownership or in the 
arrangements for state acquisition of collectively owned rural land for urban construction (Wang & 
Murie, 1999). Rural farmers did not and still do not have the right to sell agricultural land to other 
users. However, urban authorities were given the power to acquire and sell land-use rights to 
developers. The representatives of the state for urban ‘land-use right transfer’ are the city or county 
governments (Wang & Murie, 1999). The transfer of the right to the use of a piece of land means 
tenure of the land for an agreed time-period is guided by the contract between the land-user and the 
state. The central government established time-limits for different categories of land uses (State 
Council of China, 1990) as follows: 
• Residential use: 70 years; 
• Industrial use: 50 years; 
• Educational, scientific, cultural, health and sport uses: 50 years; 
• Commercial, tourism and recreation uses: 40 years; 
• Comprehensive (mixed) and other development: 50 years. 
Another important point about China’s land supply process is that land auctions are an important 
source of revenue for local governments. In fact, revenue from the land market has become local 
governments’ most important off-budget income source (Wu et al., 2012). The local governments’ 
gross income from land sales grew from 542 billion RMB in 2003 to 1.6 trillion RMB in 2009 (Wu et al., 
2012). As the monopoly supplier in the new urban land market, local governments’ behaviour clearly 
can affect the price and quantity of housing. 
In addition to financial advantages that the real estate market development has brought to local 
governments, the real estate market has gradually become a strong engine for local economic output. 
Since the mid-1990s, GDP growth has been taken as an important evaluation factor where promotion 
of local officials is concerned. From this perspective, it is understandable that local officials regard real 
estate development as an important political tool for enhancing their own political interests and 
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reputations within the governing system (Gao, 2010). As a consequence, the partial self-interest of 
central government to maintain social stability, and the self-interest of local governments to promote 
rapid economic growth, are not completely aligned (Gao, 2010), and in some instances are quite 
different.  
2.3 Housing Finance in China  
China’s housing finance system has been completely restructured by the housing reforms. Before the 
reforms, all economic power was concentrated in central government. Housing was financed solely by 
the government through budgetary funding which had led to serious housing shortages. The 
restructuring of China’s housing finance system was very unbalanced in its early stages. Most of the 
funds were distributed as development loans for production, with little left for housing consumption 
(Deng et al., 2009). In the early 1990s, the easy availability of development loans was one of the 
reasons for an oversupply of commercial housing in several regional real estate markets. For example, 
in the 1990s in the Hainan province, the oversupply caused many development companies to go 
bankrupt and a large number of properties to remain vacant for years (Deng et al., 2009). Since then, 
the Chinese government has been more careful to prevent localised real estate bubbles.  
In 1994, as part of the housing reform package, the Chinese government started to introduce mortgage 
loans to home buyers nationwide (Di et al., 2008). However, banks were not comfortable providing 
loans to individual households and often imposed strict conditions on loan originations. For instance, 
mortgage loans were only available to those who had bank savings equal to 30 percent of the house’s 
value. Moreover, the loans had to be paid back in five years, and the first payment had to be no less 
than 30 percent (Zhang, 2000; Deng et al., 2009). Most urban households could not meet banks’ 
lending criteria. As a result, individual mortgages remained only a small portion of all bank loans. In 
June 1998, Chinese banks originated housing loans worth a total of 264.3 billion RMB, but most of 
them were development loans. Only 35 billion RMB (about 13 percent) were used for home purchase 
mortgages (Han, 1999). Another significant development of the 1994 reforms, was the establishment 
of the Housing Provident Fund (HPF). Since then, urban households in China have been able to expect 
to get both subsidised HPF loans and commercial mortgage loans (Deng et al., 2009). 
The HPF is a long term, compulsory, indemnificatory and mutual-aid housing fund. It is a programme 
that was established by the government to assist home financing for people working in different social 
organisations. Such organisations include state organisations, state enterprises, foreign investment 
enterprises, urban collective enterprises, urban/private enterprises and other urban enterprises, 
public institutions and in-service workers (Chen & Wu, 2006; Nie, 2004). The HPF aims to ease the 
financial stress of home purchasers and improve housing affordability for low-income classes.  
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In the HPF programme, both the work unit and the individual make monthly obligatory contributions 
of a defined proportion of the employee’s salary into the HPF account, which is deposited to a bank 
selected by the Provident Fund Management Centre (Deng et al., 2009). The People’s Bank of China is 
responsible for the determination of interest rates applicable to HPF, while the Ministry of 
Construction and the Ministry of Finance are responsible for overseeing the scheme at the strategic 
and national levels. At the local level, Housing Committees determine policies in association with 
Management Centres and designated banks are responsible for the daily operation of the HPF 
programme (Yeung & Howes, 2006). The designated banks also further supplement the fund with 
individual housing loans through a mortgage system (Chen & Wu, 2006). 
2.3.1 Commercial Mortgage Loans 
Five State-owned banks dominate the commercial housing mortgage-loans market in China: the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BC), 
China Construction Bank (CCB), and Bank of Communication (BOC), all supervised by the People’s Bank 
of China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). Together they account for over 90 percent of the 
commercial mortgage market share (Deng et al., 2009). Although the small- and medium-sized 
commercial banks are allowed to provide commercial mortgages, their market share is very small. 
Table 2.3 shows the classifications of Chinese mortgage loans.    
Table 2.3 Classified Real Estate Loans in China 
Classification Purpose of the loan  
Personal housing loan  Used to support individuals in cities and 
towns of mainland China to buy/build 
houses and for housing repairs. 
Second home loan  Used to support individuals for purchasing 
secondary market-traded houses. 
Housing provident fund (HPF) loan Bank credit and housing accumulation funds 
available for HPF participants, and used to 
buy various types of housing. 
Sources: Construction Bank of China, 2009 
 
The Chinese housing loan reforms started in 1980. The main orientation of China’s housing policy over 
the last twenty years has moved away from the traditional system of welfare allocation (fu li fen pei) 
to a system of monetised allocation (huo bi fen pei) of housing benefits. This policy encourages people 
to buy apartments and become home owners (Burell, 2006). These changes in housing policy have 
resulted in the privatisation of public housing and the monetisation of housing benefits, which places 
new entrants to the housing market in a vulnerable position. 
Traditionally, the Chinese people have relied on their own earnings and have tried to save enough 
money to purchase houses (Burell, 2006). In addition, people’s salaries have increased, but the prices 
of new houses have risen much faster. For example, the price for urban housing in China was set 
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between 500 RMB and 2,000 RMB per square metre in 1992 (Wu, 1996). However, in the late 1990s 
most houses in the large cities had reached 3,000 RMB per square metre. In large cities such as 
Shanghai and Beijing, housing prices are higher and rise more rapidly (Burell, 2006). The majority of 
urban households have had their wages increased, but these increases have not kept up with the 
increase in housing costs (see Table 2.4) (Burell, 2006), which mean an increasing demand for housing 
loans.  
Table 2.4 Average Annual Per Capita and Household Earnings and their Housing 
                  Purchasing Power in Beijing and Shanghai for the year 2003 
City  Individual 
average annual 
earnings 
( RMB) 
Couple 
average 
annual 
household 
earnings 
( RMB) 
Time needed for a 
60,000 RMB down 
payment. 30% of 
household earnings 
(years) 
Time needed to 
purchase a 300,000 
RMB apt. 30% of 
household earnings 
(years) 
Beijing 18,157 36,314 5.3 27.7 
Shanghai 21,957 43,914 4.7 22.7 
National 11,152 22,304 9.0 44.7 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2003  
 
Growth in the Chinese housing loan market has been rapid over the past decade, especially after 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2002, foreign lenders became permitted to participate in the Chinese 
banking markets and both domestic and foreign banks recognised the business opportunities 
developing in the housing loans market in China. According to statistics from the People’s Bank of 
China (2003), the balance of personal housing loans topped 1.18 trillion RMB in 2003 (US$142.51 
billion), 26.64 times the figure in 1998 (Wang, 2004). At the end of October 2007, outstanding 
residential housing loans reached 4.69 trillion RMB, a growth rate of 30.75 percent, up 1.01 trillion 
RMB from the beginning of the year 2007, accounting for 28.9 percent of total new RMB loans from 
commercial banks during the same period. Also at the end of October 2007, outstanding individual 
housing loans reached 2.6 trillion RMB, 619.2 billion RMB more than the beginning of 2007 (Liu, 2007). 
This has led to a large demand for housing mortgage loans.  
2.4 Chinese Housing Policy 
After twenty years of reform, China now has more or less a complete set of policy systems covering 
land management, investment, circulation, transaction and property management, public finance, 
taxation, planning, construction and sales (Ye et al., 2006). The parties involved in China’s housing 
policy include government/private enterprise, and service agencies.  
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2.4.1 Chinese Major Housing Policies Over the Last Decade 
The central government has used various measures such as monetary policy, budgetary policy, land 
regulation policy, legislative policy, and administrative policy to curb rapid housing price appreciation 
(Wang & Liu, 2007). After June 2003, there were three major intervention policies that greatly changed 
the conditions of housing supply, and housing demand, and the expectations of the market 
participants. 
Lending Control Policy  
On the 5th June 2003, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) issued notification No.121, which started a 
new round of macroeconomic controls. The major objective of this notice was to make the lending 
behaviour of commercial banks towards housing developers more prudent, as well as control the 
financial risks of China’s banking sector. Notification No.121 required that 30 percent of the total 
housing project investment should be equity investment when obtaining commercial lending, but also 
required that commercial banks be prevented from lending to developers to pay off land-use fees. 
Before the issue of Notification No.121, many developers had quite large debt-to-asset ratios, and a 
large portion of them relied on bank loans to acquire land (Wang & Liu, 2007). 
In addition, on 23rd August 2003, the PBC issued another notice to increase the deposit reserve rate 
from 6 percent to 7 percent after 21st September. This was the first attempt to increase the deposit 
reserve rate in 15 years, (recent market policies reveal that changing the deposit reserve rate is one of 
the best commonly used intervention instruments for restraining a bank’s liquidity). Such a policy was 
intended to restrain the excessive money supply in the economy, and therefore cool down the 
investment momentum (Wang & Liu, 2007). Data from the China Real Estate Yearbook shows that in 
2003 about 23.8 percent of real estate development investment was made up of domestic commercial 
bank loans. Another 38.7 percent of investment was from presale housing units the sale of which also 
relied heavily on commercial bank loan programmes for individual households.  
Land Supply Regulation Policy 
On 3rd April 2002, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) promulgated the Interim Regulations of 
the People’s Republic of China, on granting and transferring the right to the use of state-owned land 
in cities and towns. On the 31st March 2004, Notification No.71 of the MLR was issued; it stated that 
after 31st August 2004, all state-owned land should be transacted through biddings, auctions, or land-
leasing centres. Due to the deadline set by Notification No.71, the transaction volume of land-use 
rights popped up in the short run before 31st August 2004. The expansion in the number of land 
transactions caused an increase in the land-bank reserves of developers; this regime change also 
pushed up housing prices (Wang & Liu, 2007).  
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Comprehensive Control Policy 
Because house prices continued to rise in Shanghai, Beijing, and the coastal cities in 2004 and 2005, 
the Central Government again tightened its regulation of the housing market. Policy measures were 
adopted to discourage speculative activities, as well as control housing investment. On 17th March 
2005, the PBC adjusted the preferential mortgage interest rate from 5.31 percent, to the benchmark 
long-term loan interest rate of 6.12 percent, and initiated a lower limit management scheme that 
allowed commercial banks to give borrowers a maximum discounted rate of 5.51 percent (10 percent 
off the benchmark rate of 6.12 percent). The ratio of down payment for house purchase was also 
increased by 10 percent (from 20 percent to 30 percent) in those cities where housing prices were 
growing at a faster pace. On the 12th May 2005, seven ministries jointly issued a notification designed 
to stabilise rising housing prices. For instance, property owners who resold their properties within two 
years of occupancy would be charged sales tax of 5.5 percent on the gross resale price (Wang & Liu, 
2007) and vacant land would be charged an extra fee after the original commencement date of its 
development. Also, if the vacancy period should surpass two years, the land-use right would be 
confiscated. Buyers of presale units would not be allowed to resell their properties before completion. 
These series of policies were mainly used to improve the supply structure, regulate excessive demand, 
and limit housing speculation (Wang & Liu, 2007). 
The Development of Affordable Housing Policy 
In the 13 years from 1994 to 2006 (inclusive 1994), the affordable housing policy experienced three 
development stages. The main cause of the changes brought about by the three development stages 
was the policy whereby the government controlled the land supply, and the construction plans for 
affordable houses, and thus played an important role in the programme (Niu, 2008). 
Initial Stage 
The initial stage of the affordable housing policy started in the second half of 1994 and lasted four 
years (Niu, 2008). In June 1994, a circular from the State Council “Deepening the Housing Reform”, 
proposed the construction of affordable housing for the first time. This action marked the 
implementation of the affordable housing policy. The area under construction increased by almost 90 
percent between 1996 and 1998, but the proportion of total housing was still low. Therefore, the 
features of the initial stage can be summarised as having a high development speed and small 
construction size (Niu, 2008). 
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Fast Development Stage 
In July 1998, the State Council’s circular “Further Deepening the Urban Housing Reform and 
Accelerating Housing Construction” proposed to establish a housing market that would mainly consist 
of public houses. Following this, the construction of affordable houses began to rise significantly. Table 
5 reveals that the affordable housing under construction and total housing under construction both 
grew rapidly between 1998 and 2000. The development of affordable housing in the early 2000s can 
be summarised as a process of fast growth of a relatively large size (square metres) (Niu, 2008). 
Table 2.5 Housing Construction in China from 1998 to 2003 
                                     1998         1999         2000         2001         2002         2003 
Affordable housing   
under construction      13,327.6     17,700.0     18,575.5      22,552.7     20,950.1    20,023.0 
(1,000 square metre) 
 
Total housing under 
construction                 36,223.0      42,590.3     50,498.3      61,583.0     73,208.7    91,390.5 
(1,000 square metre) 
 
Ratio                                36.79%        41.56%        36.78%       36.62%        28.62%       21.91% 
Source: The Ministry of Construction, 2004 
 
Adjusted Stage  
In August 2003, the State Council issued a circular called “Promoting the Stable Development of the 
Real Estate Market” which proposed a new housing supply structure, where “ordinary commercial 
housing” was supposed to be the main constituent. In 2004, the “Management Rules of Affordable 
Housing” was promulgated, and included more restrictive regulations. For example, the floor area of 
affordable housing units would be required to vary from 60 square metres to 80 square metres, and 
the profit rate of developers would be required to be less than three percent. However, in December 
2007, the central government announced that the affordable housing unit size must be limited to 60 
square metres and provided to low-income families only (Niu, 2008).  
Table 2.6 China’s Major Housing Regulatory Policies 
Date of Issue             Issue Authority                    Main Contents 
July 1998          The State Council                   Finalize the establishment of the commodity  
                                                                             housing market 
Feb. 1999         People’s Bank of China         Encourage personal consumption loans to boost  
                                                                             housing demand      
Oct. 1999         People’s Bank of China         Reduce housing loan rate, extend duration to 30  
                                                                            year period 
Oct. 1999         State Administration of        Exempt taxes on housing provident funds 
                           Taxation 
June 2000       People’s Bank of China          Developers’ capital requirements raised to 30%  
                                                                            for economic and commodity housing investment  
Sep. 2000        State Administration of         Reduce taxation on rental income  
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                          Taxation               
June 2001       People’s Bank of China          Residential loans without down payment                                                                                                                          
                                                                             forbidden 
Feb. 2002        People’s Bank of China          Housing provident fund loan rate reduced 
June 2003       People’s Bank of China          Down payment level for house purchasing raised 
                                                                             to 20% 
Apr. 2004        The State Council                   Developers’ capital requirement raised to 35% for  
                                                                            economic and commodity housing investment 
Aug. 2004       China Banking                         Personal housing instalment income ratio  
                                                                           commission controlled to less than or equal to 50% 
Mar. 2005      People’s Bank of China          Favourable policy for residential loan rate  
                                                                           cancelled, down payment level for house 
                                                                            purchasing raised to 30% 
Mar. 2005      The State Council                   Install for the first time the notice on preventing  
                                                                           property prices from going up too quickly 
Apr. 2005       The State Council                   National eight regulations: 1) stabilize property  
                                                                           prices; 2) local governments should take charge of 
                                                                           controlling property prices; 3) increase land supply 
                                                                           for affordable housing; 4) strictly control  
                                                                           resettlement projects; 5) encourage rational  
                                                                           consumption; 6) closely monitor property market; 
                                                                           7) strengthen policy execution; 8) establish  
                                                                           censorship for price control 
Apr. 2006      People’s Bank of China          Raise residential loan and housing provident fund 
                                                                           loan rates 
May 2006     The State Council                    National six regulations: 1) encourage constructing 
                                                                           middle-sized housing; 2) raise self-owned capital  
                                                                           requirement for bank loans; 3) forbid mortgage  
                                                                           loans to commodity houses vacant for three years; 
                                                                           4) raise down-payment for large-sized housing; 5) 
                                                                           charge higher taxes for vacant land; 6) 
                                                                           encourage affordable housing construction 
May 2006     State Administration               Fully charge business tax on second-hand housing 
                       of Taxation                                 transactions within the five year holding period 
July 2006      State Administration               Charge individual income tax on second-hand  
                       of Taxation                                 housing transactions 
Sep. 2006     Ministry of Foreign                  Foreign purchases of domestic commodity housing 
                      Exchange & Ministry                 forbidden 
                      of Construction           
Mar. 2007    People’s Bank of China            Raise residential loan rate six times continually  
                                                                            over a period of time 
 
Based on the above observations, the housing bubble in China is like the sword of Damocles, 
threatening balanced and sustainable economic development. The government is in a difficult position 
as it tries to strike a balance between sufficient housing development to avoid economic recession, 
and constraining the housing bubble for the social welfare of the public (Gao, 2010). This is indeed one 
of the big challenges that a transition country can face. 
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The Chinese government has raised concerns about the rapid growth of house prices, via a series of 
policy interventions produced over the past years. These include: (1) increased equity down-payment 
shares from 20 percent to 30 percent for first homes of more than 90 square metres in size; (2) 
increased equity down-payment shares from 40 percent to 60 percent for second homes; (3) general 
discouragement of the use of any leverage on third homes or by external buyers (i.e., those not living 
in the market of the interested purchase); (4) new rules to prevent developers from hoarding housing 
units; and (5) the pilot implementation of property tax levies in Shanghai and Chongqing since in 
January 2011. These changes are very important because they raise the cost of carry-on speculative 
investments in housing; and in some cities such as Beijing, new policies prohibit local households from 
purchasing more than one unit of housing, and prevent households from buying any homes in cities if 
they have not been long-time (5 years or more) residents and cannot provide tax or social insurance 
certificates to show their length of residence (Wu et al., 2012).  
2.4.2 New Policies and Guidelines by the Chinese Government to Restructure the 
Real Estate Market after the 2007 U.S. Subprime Crisis 
In response to the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese government declared a stupendous 
stimulus package of 533.2 billion RMB (US$86 billion), around 17.8 percent of China’s GDP. In order to 
promote real estate lending and development to boost growth, the stimulus package was combined 
with policy measures that emphasised the importance of stimulating domestic demand by encouraging 
more housing investment (Gao, 2010). On 27th October 2008, mortgage down-payments for residential 
housing purchases were reduced to 20 percent. Mortgage criteria for buyers of a second property 
requiring mortgage lending were loosened in November, 2008. At the beginning of 2009, the holding 
requirement for residential housing sales tax free-term was reduced from five years to two years. The 
reserve requirement for local real estate developers was also lowered to 20 percent. Meanwhile, some 
of the huge increases in bank lending to support the government’s economic stimulus efforts found its 
way to property speculators, contributing to the boom in home buying and property values (Gao, 
2010). As a consequence of the stimulus given by the housing investment policies, the total sold houses 
and prices rose rapidly. The National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) recently announced that from 
January to June 2009, the house units sold nationwide reached 341.09 million square metres, an 
increase of 31.7 percent from the previous year. The People’s Bank of China also reported that new 
home mortgage loans quadrupled in the first nine months of 2009. Such rapid housing price growth 
rates serve as an undeniable sign of a housing bubble (Gao, 2010). 
In 2009, new policies were introduced designed to tighten loans to discourage real estate speculation, 
as the housing boom in China was due to the easing of loan restrictions that were in support of real 
estate investment. People had taken advantage of this economic stimulation policy to purchase houses 
as an investment in order to hedge against possible inflation. As a result, housing prices were driven 
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upward as a reflection of the increased demand. Unfortunately, the huge increase in housing related 
debt could potentially lead to greater financial instability and potential collapse (Fung & Forrest, 2002). 
Fearing that the housing market was becoming out of control, the State Council issued policies that 
would confine housing price growth rates (Gao, 2010). On 11th January 2010, the State Council issued 
guidelines that raised the down payment requirement to no less than 40 percent for families applying 
to take out a mortgage loan for any property beyond their primary residence; and mortgage rates were 
required to be settled strictly on the basis of loan risk. Financial leverage came into play at the 
beginning of 2010. On 12th January 2010, the PBC announced that it would raise the deposit reserve 
requirement ratio by one-half of a percentage point (see Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7 China’s Major Housing Policies Post the 2007 U.S. Subprime Crisis 
Date of Issue            Issue Authority                         Main Contents 
 
Sep. 2008        People’s Bank of China        Reduced residential loan rate and housing  
                                                                           provident fund loan rate twice 
Dec. 2008        People’s Bank of China        Lowered the minimum mortgage loan rate to 70% 
                                                                           of the benchmark rate, and the down-payment  
                                                                           ratio to 20% 
May 2009        People’s Bank of China        Reduced developer’s capital requirement to 20% 
                                                                            for economic and commodity housing investment 
Dec. 2009      Ministry of Land and              Required developers to pay at least 50% as the  
                        Resources                                  initial payment for land purchases 
Jan.2010        State Council                            Increased mortgage down-payments for  
                                                                           households’ second residential housing units to  
                                                                           40%. 
Jan.2011        State Council                           “National eight” regulations increase minimum 
                                                                            down-payment for second mortgages to 60% 
Gao (2010), People’s Bank of China, State Council 
The Chinese government’s policies toward the housing market fluctuate as the economic climate 
changes. Several stages of government policy changes are generally recognised and are shown in Table 
2.8. During the cooling-off period in 2010 and 2011, many municipal governments banned non-
residents from obtaining mortgage loans, and declared that house buyers must put down 60 percent 
for a second house. All policies were aimed at limiting a household’s demand for more than one house 
for investment purposes.  
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Table 2.8 Government-Promoted Booms and Cooling-off Periods in the Housing Market 
Time Period  Policy Climate 
1998-2002 Boom (encourage the development of private housing markets) 
2003-2007 Cooling off (higher interest rates and bank-required reserve ratios; 
administrative measures to stabilize home prices) 
2008-2009 Boom (lower interest rates and the required reserve ratios; administrative 
measures and guidelines to encourage the development of housing 
markets; economic stimulus packages; pilot securitisation programmes; 
personal home mortgages) 
2010-2011 Cooling off (higher interest rates and required reserve ratios; new 
restrictions on home purchases and mortgage down payments; 
administrative measures and guidelines to encourage the development of 
housing markets 
2012 Boom (lower interest rates and required reserve ratios; lower interest 
rates on mortgages) 
Barth, Lea and Li (2012), p18 
 
2.5 Current Status of Affordable Housing in China 
Currently, there are three major affordable housing programmes that the Chinese government has 
developed to improve housing affordability for its citizens. The programmes are: (1) the Economical 
and Comfortable Housing (jing ji shi yong fang) Programme; (2) the Housing Provident Fund 
Programme; and (3) the Cheap Rental Housing Programme (Deng et al., 2009). Urban households can 
purchase either economically affordable or commodity houses. To qualify for the lower cost category, 
applicants must have “hukou” and meet various requirements, including those pertaining to average 
living area, household income and household net assets. Once purchased, an economically affordable 
house cannot be sold for five years (Barth, Lea & Li, 2012). 
2.5.1 The Economical and Comfortable Housing Policy  
The programme aims to serve lower-middle and middle income urban families who may not be able 
to purchase market-rated housing (Zhang, 2002). According to Di et al. (2008), The Economical and 
Comfortable Housing (ECH) policy differs from both the previous public housing policies and the private 
housing initiatives in two ways. First, affordable units are developed for sale, not for rent. Thus, the 
government does not need to subsidise their operation. Second, most of the ECH units have been built 
by real estate developers for profit and sold to eligible families through market transactions. The ECH 
relied heavily on the generosity of local governments to provide most of the development subsidies 
(Rosen & Ross, 2000). In addition, Zhang (2002) reported that local governments were expected to 
provide free or low-cost land to ECH developers as well as reduce or even waive various development 
fees and real estate taxes. In turn, local governments regulated the sale price of ECH units, keeping the 
profit margin to no larger than three percent. Nationwide, the prices of ECH units were usually 15 
percent to 20 percent lower than market prices (Liu et al., 2008). Table 2.9 shows the differences 
between ECH and commercial housing (Zhang, 2002).   
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Table 2.9 Differences between ECH and Commercial Housing 
 Economical and Comfortable 
Housing ( ECH) 
Commercial Housing 
Nature  Low-profit commercial housing Profit-driven commercial 
housing 
Property rights Partial property rights Full property rights 
Land acquisition Allocated by the state according to 
approved annual land-use plans 
Obtained through bidding, 
tenders and negotiations 
Housing prices Controlled by the state Decided by the market or 
developers 
Housing standards Guidelines for housing types, floor 
space, and standards, set by the 
state  
Decided by the market or 
developers 
Planning and 
design 
Bidding Bidding or negotiation 
Development  Bidding ( no sub-contracting 
allowed) 
Bidding or negotiation 
Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, Zhang (2002) p.15 
 
Table 2.10 shows the differences between low-rent housing programmes and economically affordable 
housing programmes (Barth, Lea & Li, 2012). 
Table 2.10 Comparison of Programmes that Assist Low-Income Households 
 Low-rent 
housing 
programme 
Public rent 
housing 
programme 
Economically affordable housing 
programme 
Target  Lowest 
income urban 
households 
Low-mid income 
urban 
households, new 
employees and 
select residents 
with stable jobs 
but no hukou* 
Urban households that cannot afford 
commodity houses 
Restrictions <50 sqm Need 
to leave when 
own home is 
purchased 
<60 sqm 60 sqm which may only be owner 
occupied while paying off the 
mortgage. If buying other homes, 
need to leave or pay the difference 
between affordable house and 
commodity house 
Owner Government Investor (can be 
transferred, but 
not to owners) 
Limited ownership, but can become 
full ownership after satisfying certain 
criteria 
*people with official registration at cities of residence 
Source: CITIC (2011), Barth, Lea and Li, (2012) p.7 
 
The ECH programme was significantly expanded in the 1998 reform. According to the 1998 reform, 
ECH housing would be accessible to most urban residents (70% to 80%) (Deng et al., 2009). While critics 
have questioned the rationale for providing subsidised housing to a majority of the population, the 
Chinese government believed that such an incentive was necessary to push most urban households 
into the market after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Thus, it is clear that the primary goal of ECH was 
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to stimulate housing consumption, not to help needy families (Deng et al., 2009). According to Cai’s 
(2009) and Zhang’s (2007) studies, wealthy households often purchased the ECH units, pushing higher 
quality housing and housing prices beyond the reach of middle and lower income families. In Beijing, 
for example, a recent study found that the median housing value among ECH units is about 780,000 
RMB, higher than the average value of the entire housing stock (Deng et al., 2009). 
Throughout most of the programme’s history, there were no national standards. Local governments 
were asked to implement their own development standards based on housing conditions (Liu, 2009). 
Unfortunately, local governments were subject to pressure from both developers and wealthy local 
buyers. As a result, local development standards for ECH housing were often too high, making the 
housing unaffordable to its targeted group (Liu, 2009). 
2.5.2 Housing Provident Fund  
The Housing Provident Fund (HPF) based on Singapore’s Central Provident Model, was introduced in 
Shanghai in 1991 and became a nationwide housing savings programme after 1994 (Zhang, 2000). HPF 
is a compulsory housing savings programme in which both employer and employee contribute a 
certain percentage of the employee’s salary, initially set at five percent, to the employee’s HPF 
account, administered by the China Construction Bank. HPF has played a major role in facilitating the 
transformation of China’s housing system. It allows work units to contribute a cash subsidy instead of 
directly building public housing units for their employees. In addition to a home purchase, HPF can also 
be used for other housing related activities such as home improvement, housing repairs and self-
construction (Zhang, 2000).  
The interest rate of HPF loans is lower than that of commercial housing mortgage loans. For example, 
for a five year loan, the interest rate for a HPF loan was set at 8.1 percent in 1997, while the interest 
rate for commercial loans remained at 12.42 percent. Between 2002 and 2006 (inclusive), the PBC 
steadily increased the interest rate of commercial loans from 5.04 percent to 6.39 percent (over the 5 
years) in order to control the overheated investment and the soaring housing prices. By contrast, the 
interest rate of HPF loans (over the 5 years) increased from 4.05 percent to 4.59 percent. Currently, 
the interest rate for HPF loans (over the 5 years) remains at 4.5 percent, which is 2.1 percent lower 
than the interest rate for commercial loans (The People’s Bank of China, 2013).  
In 2006, the HPF programme covered 60 percent of all salaried workers in urban areas, but the 
participation rate varied widely across cities (Ye & Wu, 2008). In more developed coastal regions such 
as Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, the participation rate reached approximately 90 percent. In the less 
developed inland areas, however, the participation rate was below 50 percent (the Yearbook of China 
Real Estate Market, 1997; Wang & Murie, 1999). The poor participation rate was partially due to 
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employers not wanting to contribute to employees’ HPF accounts. An additional difficulties was that 
since the contribution was salary based, workers with higher salaries received larger employer 
contributions (Deng et al., 2009). For example, studies show that government institutions offer better 
HPF opportunities than collective enterprises, and higher-level government institutions offer even 
better opportunities than municipal and district-level institutions (Lee & Zhu, 2006). 
The Chinese government took great pride in the success of the HPF programme in accumulating 
housing savings. By 2008, the HPF had accumulated over 2 trillion RMB, with over 73 million urban 
employees participating (Deng et al., 2009). As the fund grew, it became more challenging to manage. 
Like other housing programmes, the HPF is locally administered, with central government setting the 
principles and rules (Deng & Fei, 2008). For example, the fund is deposited in the China Construction 
Bank, its daily operations (such as approving withdrawals or originating loans) were conducted by an 
HPF management centre set up by local governments (Deng et al., 2009). According to Chen (2009), 
the strong local government involvement is what distinguishes HPF from the commercial mortgage 
sector. In the commercial mortgage sector, the availability of mortgage capital and its terms are 
determined by commercial banks and are strictly monitored by China’s Central Bank. Local 
governments have no control over it. In contrast, local governments are responsible for local real 
estate markets. For example, in 2008, in view of the weak economy that resulted from the global 
financial crisis, many local governments relaxed the requirements for HPF loans through measures 
such as reducing the minimum down payment or raising the maximum loan limit in order to promote 
housing consumption (Deng et al., 2009). 
The management and operation of the HPF Scheme has followed three guidelines: 
(1) Individual savings complemented by work unit subsidy; 
(2) Administration under a single authority; 
(3) Use for specified housing purpose only. 
The guidelines require that both the employers and the employees, from both the state owned 
enterprises and the private/joint venture companies, set up and contribute to the HPF. The HPF is an 
important source of finance for housing production and consumption, for both the state-owned 
institutions and non-state owned enterprises workers (Yeung & Howes, 2006). 
There are basically three components in the operation of the HPF: 
(1) Housing Committee - which is responsible for the planning of residential housing in the 
city/province; 
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(2) Provident Fund Management Centre - which is responsible for the operation and management of 
the Fund; and  
(3) Designated Banks - interest rates charged on loans by HPF were lower than the mortgage rates 
charged by commercial banks. Thus, potential home buyers preferred to use loans from HPF which has 
resulted in continued heavy reliance on HPF (Yeung & Howes, 2006). According to the Mortgage Units 
Director of the HPF Centre, applications for mortgages from the Centre became increasingly popular. 
From 1999 to 2004, the Centre provided HPF loans amounting increased from 0.6 billion RMB to 7.2 
billion RMB in Beijing (Burell, 2006). 
2.5.3 Cheap Rental Housing 
In 1998, reform of the cheap rental housing (CRH) system was undertaken, for people who could not 
afford to purchase ECH units or to rent market housing. The target groups included seniors, people 
with disabilities, and extremely low-income households (Ye et al., 2006). The aim of this reform was to 
improve the living quality for urban poor and local governments were asked to reserve some old public 
housing units as CRH. According to the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China, as 
a consequence, the average living space among urban residents rose from 6.7 square metres in 1978 
to 28 square metres in 2008. However, over 10 million urban households still live in less than 10 square 
metres (Deng et al., 2009). 
In 2004, China’s central government had increasing concerns about urban poverty and how it might 
threaten both social stability and economic prosperity. As a result, China’s central government issued 
an order called “ways to provide cheap rental housing for the poorest urban residents”, with the goal 
of strengthening the social rental housing system and renaming it the “Cheap Rental Housing” (CRH) 
programme (Deng et al., 2011). In 2006, China’s central government mandated that every municipal 
government dedicate five percent of its net gain from land conveyance fees to the CRH programme. 
But there is no enforcement mechanism, and many local governments are reluctant to contribute. 
From 1998 to 2006, only about 550,000 low-income households benefited from either the CRH or the 
former social housing programmes, and the two programmes together have produced only about one 
percent of the total housing units built during the same period (Tan, 2009). 
In 2009, the Chinese government decided to expand its affordable housing production significantly. 
On 22nd May 2009, the central government issued an ambitious plan called “Cheap Rental Housing 
Guarantee Plan” for 2009 to 2011. According to the plan, the government would take three years to 
solve the housing problem for 7.5 million low-income urban households. Three-quarters of the low-
income urban households (about 5.6 million) would live in new developments, and one-quarter (about 
1.9 million) would be accommodated in existing housing through the support of rental subsidies (Deng 
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et al., 2011). The goal in 2009 was to build 1.8 million CRH units and provide rental subsidies for 
830,000 new households (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China, 2009d). 
To ensure implementation of the CRH programme, the central government also allocated a fair-share 
goal to each individual province. Officials at lower government levels would be evaluated on how well 
they implemented the plan. In terms of funding, in 2009 the central government allocated 7 billion 
RMB to subsidise CRH projects in less developed areas (such as middle-east provinces) (Deng et al., 
2011). Currently, the central government requires that at least 10 percent of the net gain from land 
conveyance fees, together with the capital gains in HPF investment, are to be used for CRH (Deng et 
al., 2011).  
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1993, the accumulated losses of the Swedish banks were equal to five percent of Sweden’s GDP for 
that year (OECD, 1994). A common striking feature of many financial crises around the world is that 
the most seriously affected economies often first experience a collapse in real estate prices and a 
consequent weakening of their banking systems, and then a business cycle bust (Herring & Wachter, 
1999).  
According to Collyns and Senhadj (2002), Davis (1993), and Davis and Zhu (2009), there are three 
dimensions of interaction between the real estate cycle and the credit cycle. First, property prices may 
affect the volume of bank credit, not only directly through the wealth effect for property owners and 
the changes in the volume of real estate loans, but also indirectly through loans that are collateralised 
by real estate assets. Second, bank lending may affect property prices via liquidity effects. Changes in 
credit availability and lending attitudes have a sizable impact on the demand for real estate and 
investment decisions on new construction. Third, credit and property cycles can be driven by common 
economic factors, such as volume of bank loans and interest rates. Credit cycle behaviour is largely 
determined by economic conditions and prospects (e.g. GDP and interest rates) (Davis & Zhu, 2009). 
Theoretically, there is potential bidirectional causality between property prices and bank lending such 
as, the movement in property prices may change the borrowing capacity and credit demand of 
corporations and households (Bernanke & Gertler, 2000; Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997). Aoki et al. (2004) 
presented a general equilibrium model that describes how the credit channel may form part of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. The authors’ research focuses on the macroeconomic effects of 
imperfections in credit markets, and their results show that property that influences the availability of 
bank lending prices, may also influence the availability of bank lending via the wealth effect, as a 
household’s borrowing capacity can be raised by an increase in house prices. Koh et al. (2005) found 
that the Asian property prices ran-up and then collapsed in the 1990s and suggest that excessive bank 
lending caused a housing market bubble. Banks competed by increasing loan amounts, and by reducing 
interest rates for certain customers, and also by extending renovation loans. Bank managers often 
underestimated the default risk of their loans, made in order to capture a larger market share (Koh et 
al., 2005). When the value of the underlying asset falls below the outstanding balance of the loan, the 
borrowers may simply “put” the asset back to the lender, and walk away from any future payments of 
the principal or interest on the loan (Pavlov & Wachter, 2004). Koh et al. (2005) study found that the 
presence of incentives to under-price real estate loans was prevalent during the Asian real estate 
bubble, and that the incentives were a major factor in fuelling the asset bubble in the Asian financial 
crisis. Krugman’s (1998) study shares similar findings and notes that the excessive risky lending of 
financial institutions created property price inflation.  
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On the other hand, credit availability may also affect property prices, as increases in credit availability 
may expand the demand for property. Previous studies have documented the coincidence of property 
price cycles with bank lending cycles (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997; Allen & Gale, 1997; Bernanke & Gertler, 
2000; Zhu, 2003). For example, Shimizu (2000) uses the theory of bank lending and collateral to explain 
banks’ lending and the important role played by rising land prices in Japan, and Shimizu’s (2000) 
empirical study on the relationships between land prices and bank loans indicates that in Japan, the 
loans to small- and medium-sized firms were significantly affected by land prices. Gerlach and Peng 
(2005) investigated the long-run relationship between bank lending and property prices in Hong Kong, 
using a vector autoregressive framework with multivariable such as, property prices, bank lending, 
interest rates and gross domestic product (GDP). The authors reveal that the strong correlation 
between property prices and bank lending appears to be due to bank lending adjusting to property 
prices. In a similar study, Hofmann (2003) analysed the direction of causality between bank lending 
and property prices in 20 industrialised countries over the last two decades, using both time series and 
panel data techniques. The findings of the study suggest that property price cycles reflect changing 
beliefs about future economic prospects, and therefore drive credit cycles rather than excessive bank 
lending as the major cause of property price bubbles. 
Home mortgage loans have played a significant role in the financial sector as they account for nearly 
one third of the total lending activities  such as purchase of commodity houses in Guangzhou in 2005 
and Shanghai in 2006 and 2007 (Li, 2010) . Hofmann (2003) investigated whether there is any potential 
two-way causality between bank lending and property prices, which may give rise to mutually 
reinforcing cycles in the property and credit markets. For example, more optimistic expectations about 
future economic prospects could increase property prices and raise the borrowing capacity of firms 
and households by increasing the value of collateral. Allen and Gale (2000) explained that real estate 
bubbles result from the proxy relationships in the bank loan sectors. Investors use money borrowed 
from banks to invest in risky assets, which are relatively attractive because they can avoid paying off 
the loan by defaulting. This risk shifting leads investors to bid up asset prices. Collyns and Senhadji 
(2002) found that credit growth has a significant contemporaneous effect on residential property 
prices. The authors conclude that bank lending contributed significantly to the real estate bubble in 
Asia prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Gerlach and Peng (2005) analysed the direction of causality 
between bank lending and property prices in Hong Kong based on standard regression techniques, 
controlling for potential simultaneity problems. Their study shows that short-run and long-run 
causality goes from property prices to bank lending. 
Apart from bank lending, international capital flows (hot money) also increased the money supply for 
Chinese housing market since 1998. The inflow of international capital can lower the credit risk for 
Chinese banks, enlarge the housing supply and demand, and strengthen the real estate companies’ 
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business competition, as well as boost the whole industry (Song & Gao, 2007). In recent years, the real 
estate industry has attracted overseas investment which mainly focuses on trading in housing as well 
as real estate development. The inflow of international capital into the Chinese real estate market 
promotes public demand for commercial housing, thus making house prices rise (Song & Gao, 2007). 
“Hot money” refers to the flow of speculative funds (or capital) from one country to another in order 
to earn a short-term profit on interest differences and exchange rate shifts (Chari & Kehoe, 2003). 
Martin and Morrison (2008) estimate that the aggregate hot money that flowed into China from 2003 
to the first quarter of 2008 amounts to about 1.75 trillion dollars, about 104 percent of China’s total 
foreign exchange reserves as at the end of March 2008. The speculative capital inflow is believed to 
have fuelled inflation, driven up stock prices, and helped to accelerate a worrisome bubble in the real 
estate market (Zhang & Fung, 2006). 
3.1.2 Keynes and Shiller Theory 
“The idea that there has been a speculative bubble is inherently a statement about some less-than 
rational aspect of investor behaviour”  
---- Robert Shiller (2001, p.1) 
Keynes was a proponent of behavioural finance which believes that bubbles exist because of 
psychological factors. For example, a burst bubble implies that many people will deny the real factors 
and psychologically believe that the “disequilibrium” will quickly return to what they consider normal 
(Thornton, 2006). This view is supported by economists including Paul Krugman and Robert Shiller 
(Thornton, 2006). From Krugman and Shiller’s perspectives, housing bubbles are fundamentally caused 
by psychological factors. The business cycle is seen as the ebb and flow of mass consciousness and 
emotions, and the important factors for deviations in the business cycle are psychological factors. Case 
and Shiller’s (2003) study shows positive relationships between housing bubbles and consumer 
psychological factors. For example, a housing bubble occurs when there is a sharp rise in housing 
prices,  and an expectation of future housing price rises, which will attract new buyers (generally 
speculators) who are more interested in profits from trading rather than in the use of the house (Sun 
& Zhang, 2008). A speculative bubble in many housing markets, including Los Angeles and San 
Francisco and the large swings in single-family home prices are poorly explained by fundamental forces 
such as income, population and interest rates but could well be explained by the speculative forces 
such as consumer psychological factors.   
Rising profits and rising property prices lead to “speculative behaviour” where economic decisions are 
no longer based upon economic fundamentals (Thornton, 2006). Housing market booms develop 
because people exhibit over-confidence in the economy and investors likewise increase their tolerance 
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for taking risks. Their investment mania will cause the housing price bubble to inflate (Thornton, 2006). 
Asset markets can become increasingly jittery when a boom is strong. A discontinuous shift from boom 
to crash may thus come from some investors crossing a psychological threshold in terms of 
nervousness about the sustainability of the existing price structure (Earl, Peng & Potts, 2007). 
Several studies have investigated the relationships between the psychological factors and house prices 
(Roehner, 1999; Raines & Leathers, 2000; Shiller, 2000; Shiller, 2004). Shiller’s (2004) study shows that 
a speculative contagion undermines any bubble, and the author employs psychological factors such as 
whether a buyer’s expectation is optimistic or pessimistic about the future direction of house prices, 
to explain housing bubbles. If people emotionally believe that the house prices will continue to rise, 
they will be willing to spend even more, and this drives house prices higher. Shiller (2004) explains that 
once people form a speculation expectation on house prices in one city, then this expectation spreads 
to other cities, creating a contagious effect in the housing market. Raines and Leathers (2000) and 
Shiller (2000) found that behavioural finance could explain the existence of speculative bubbles such 
as systematic biases in risk preference, framing effects and systematic departures from rational 
behaviour. This is consistent with Roehner’s (1999) study which shows that speculative behaviour 
results in an increase in house prices for other districts in the Paris housing market. 
3.1.3 The Austrian School of Thought 
The Austrian business cycle theory believes that there are changes in both economic fundamental and 
psychological factors during bubbles that cause the changes in the business cycle (Thorton, 2006). A 
unique feature of the Austrian approach is that it does not see a need for prices to increase uniformly 
across markets, or for prices to increase to extreme levels in all markets. In this theory, Austrian 
economists ( Krugman, 2005; Thorton, 2006), emphasize that misallocation of resources could cause a 
bubble boom, which means that if more resources are allocated to housing construction, fewer 
resources are available to other areas of the economy, such as manufacturing. This mismatch of 
resources across industries would soon be corrected however and the resources would be channelled 
towards more efficient uses through a process of “bust” or recession (Thorton, 2006).  
According to the Austrian Business Cycle (ABC) theory, the central bank creates the business cycle by 
driving up the supply of money, which in turn lowers the interest rates and leads to a “boom”. Interest 
rate cuts lead to higher home prices, and a construction boom and higher consumer spending results 
in an increase in debt. If the government implements an expansionary monetary policy, then a bubble 
could develop somewhere in the economy; and if the new money is directed towards housing, a bubble 
will develop in the housing sector (Thornton, 2006). According to the ABC theory, the housing bubble 
also fuels the construction of new homes causing the wages of the construction workers to rise, and 
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resulting in labour reallocating itself to other construction and related industries. The housing market 
bubble also increases construction material prices and land prices (Thornton, 2006).  
3.2 Price Expectation Theory 
“The price expectation theory is “a sharp rise in price of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous 
process, with the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting new buyers 
(generally speculator) interested in profits from trading rather than in its use or earning capacity. The 
rise is then followed by a reversal of expectations and a sharp decline in price, often resulting in severe 
financial crisis—in short, the bubble bursts.” 
---- Kindleberger (1987, p20) 
Real estate price expectation is central to the efficient pricing of real estate. If price expectations are 
based on an extrapolation of past price increases, then this is likely to lead to classic speculative 
bubbles. Investors “speculate” on a continuation of the past high rates of price appreciation (Malpezzi 
& Wechter, 2002). Investors’ self-fulfilling expectations generate a rational bubble regarding future 
asset price growth, which is not directly related to macroeconomic fundamentals. A rational bubble 
grows at a rate that produces the expected rate of return, it gains in size as investors expect the asset 
to be sold at a profit in the future (Kubicova & Komarek, 2011).  
Krugman (2005) suggests that a housing bubble builds on the expectation of a capital gain. For 
instance, if people think house prices will continue to rise, they will willingly spend more, thus driving 
the prices higher. This means that the return on assets grows faster than the historical average returns, 
based on the investor’s assumption that the asset price will continue to rise and generate the required 
expected rate of return. If investors believe the bubble will burst in the future, it will indeed burst as a 
result of self-fulfilling expectations (Kubicova & Komarek, 2011) 
In general, as prices increase in the housing market, more people become willing to participate in the 
housing boom due to the increasingly higher returns expected from their investment. The expectation 
that prices will continue to rise leads homebuyers to pay far more for homes than they otherwise 
would have (Baker, 2008). The subsequent increase in the demand for housing triggers a housing 
bubble because in the short-run the supply of housing is relatively fixed and an increase in demand 
leads to an increase in housing prices in the intermediate term (Baker, 2008). There are several models 
extant of how expectations are formed: (1) the myopic expectation model assumes investors are 
“flying blind” going forward. At the other extreme, perfect foresight assumes that people know the 
future; (2) the rational expectation model states that people use all available information to make 
optimal forecasts about changes in future prices; and (3) the adaptive expectation model assumes that 
people are backward looking; that is, the future will be like the past (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2002). 
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Understanding the expectations of buyers, sellers and investors, helps to improve the efficiency and 
impact of sudden shocks in the housing market (Smart & Lee, 2003). The reactions of property prices 
toward different economic shocks can be explained using two types of price expectation theories; 
rational expectation hypothesis (REH) and adaptive expectation hypothesis (AEH). 
3.2.1 Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH)                          
Expectations of individuals are rational if investors are exposed to the same set of information about 
the prediction of relevant economic theories (or the “objective” probability distributions of outcomes) 
(Muth, 1961). Rational expectation happens when investors use the available information to estimate 
future events or future economic conditions. Such an estimation of future events is essentially the 
same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory (price expectation theory), and such 
expectations are called “rational” (Muth, 1961). There are three good reasons for assuming rationality. 
First, it is a principle applicable to all dynamic problems. Second, if expectations are not moderately 
rational, then there would be opportunity to make profits in commodity speculation. Third, rationality 
is an assumption that can be modified (Muth, 1961). 
Smart and Lee (2003) used the concept of expectation to explain how the efficiency of the housing 
market in Hong Kong can be determined. In the efficient market hypothesis, expectation of future 
prices is similar to the rational expectation hypothesis assumptions (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2002). The 
efficient housing market hypothesis is related to the concept of a “random walk”, in which changes in 
asset prices follow a random pattern and are unpredictable. This implies that if real asset price 
formation follows a random walk, it is not possible to earn excess investment profits, and there is no 
incentive for speculation (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2005). Under the rational expectation hypothesis, a the 
house price only follows a random walk when there is a random movement in the behaviour of 
exogenous variables (Meen, 2003). 
Several researchers (Clark, 1995; Capozza & Seguin, 1996; Clayton, 1997) in housing market studies 
have adopted the REH. The formula for REH is given as follows (Clayton, 1997). 
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p tHsg +  is the forecasted house price in one year,  
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pHsg  is the equilibrium house price and 
pHsg   is the current house price. However, if the housing market follows the REH, the house price 
forecast one year from now, using all available information about the housing market’s operation will 
be: 
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Where  tInf  is the information available to people in the housing market at period t. Equation (3.2) 
implies that people have full knowledge about the factors and parameters which cause the movement 
of current values, and caused the movement of past values of house prices (Dong-An, 2005). Therefore, 
the difference between house price expectation and real house price occurs by a random error (see 
equation 3.3) 
          , 1 , 1 1p t t p t t tHsg E Hsg Inf ε+ + + = +                                             3.3 
Clayton (1997) explains that house price expectations rely on an understanding of house prices, rents 
and other exogenous variables in the current market. Holding other things constant, the future 
expectations for house prices are positively associated with house prices and negatively related to 
rents (Dong-An, 2005).  
Kerr (2002) found that house price violability is not affected by capital evaluation, lending and taxation, 
but that investors’ individual decision-making can create remarkable bubbles. For example, the impact 
of expectations about land prices caused the property bubble burst in Japan in 1989. The result of the 
collapse of land prices wiped out the nation’s wealth equivalent to US$5.85 trillion, and securities by 
US$4.44 trillion, with security sinking to about one third of their 1989 level (McCormack, 2002). 
Eugene (2006) explains the rational expectations based on twin assumptions. First, individual investors 
use all available information to forecast future prices as they have perfect information about the future 
without any information cost (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2002). Second, individual investors have a correct 
model of the fundamental structure of the economy. Bubbles or manias may arise if either of the 
assumptions are violated. If the first assumption is violated there will be an irrational bubble and if the 
second assumption is violated there will be a rational bubble. The asset prices will deviate from 
fundamentals (Blanchard & Waston, 1982). The bubble will be rational as long as the bubble 
component in the stock price is equal to the expected discounted value of the future bubble (De et al., 
1990).  
The market participants in such bubbles also believe that, based on rational expectations, house prices 
may be different from the economic fundamentals due to the uncertainty of prices in the rational 
model. The rationality of the bubble in house prices is determined through the bubble component, 
which is the expected discounted value of the future bubble (Eugene, 2006). 
Malpezzi and Wachter (2002) addressed the definition of an efficient market where the value of real 
estate market prices should be equal to what property purchasers are willing to pay for it. A capital 
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market is said to be efficient if it fully and correctly reflects all relevant information in determining 
prices. An efficient market requires expectations to be formed rationally. If expectations are “backward 
looking” instead, it is possible to predict prices based on past trends, and excess profits that could be 
earned (Xiao & Liu, 2010).   
However, some researchers suggest that the real estate market may be inefficient (Arrow, 1986; 
Garzlaff & Tirtiroglu, 1995; Rosenthal, 2008). Because the information is incorporated into prices, the 
investor is unable to make profits by trading on the information. Thus, an efficient capital market is 
one where economic profits do not exist (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2002). Clayton’s (1997) study of the 
real estate market efficiency shows that the housing market is inefficient, and house prices deviate 
from fundamental or intrinsic values. In this case, a sharp run-up in house prices is partly due to 
irrational expectations such as fads, noise traders and trend chasers. Moreover, there is difficulty in 
estimating the observed patterns of rational expectation in the housing market (Arrow, 1986). This is 
due to the irrational assumptions underlying the REH (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2002).  
There is further evidence for rejecting the rational expectation hypothesis. If local house price cycles 
are driven in part by irrational expectations or psychological factors rather than changes in market 
fundamentals, then house prices would exceed the intrinsic value in market upswings where a market 
correction is inevitable, and the irrational bubble will collapse (Clayton, 1998). The intangible 
expectation leads prices to race ahead of fundamental or intrinsic values. Thus, housing booms are 
driven primarily by irrational house price expectations and investor psychology, rather than housing 
market fundamentals (Clayton, 1998). Specifically, the slope estimates are negative and statistically 
significant. House price changes move in the direction opposite to that predicted by the asset-based 
rational expectation model of house price dynamics (Clayton, 1997). Brook et al. (2001) employ a 
variance bound test to test the rationality of real-estate share prices in the U.K. and indicate the 
existence of irrational speculative bubbles. Xiao (2007) suggests the real estate market to be inefficient 
due to the high transaction costs, collateralised lending processes, loan under-pricing, myopic pricing 
and restrictions in supply. The author also argues that markets with more responsive regulatory 
environments or less natural constraint will experience less speculation and house price volatility.  
3.2.2 Adaptive Expectation Hypothesis (AEH) 
Speculation can be used to describe a world in which investors’ expectations are formed in some 
inaccurate ways. Speculative bubbles based on adaptive expectations imply that speculators enter the 
market when prices are rising which leads to an increase in demand. When prices are falling, 
speculators bail out (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2002). The adaptive expectation hypothesis (AEH) assumes 
future house prices are determined using past information and trends in house prices. The AEH is also 
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known as backward-looking expectation and depends on extrapolating past price changes (DiPasquale 
& Wheaton, 1996). 
Shiller (2001) explains that investors’ psychological and behavioural factors could help to better 
understand speculative bubbles in the financial market. The essence of a speculative bubble arises 
from price increases which increase the investor’s enthusiasm which leads to an increase in demand 
for housing, and hence further price increases. The high demand for housing is generated by the public 
memory of high past returns, and the optimism of those high returns can enlarge positive forces 
affecting the housing market (Shiller, 2001). According to Hoyt (1933), speculative influences may push 
real estate activities far out in advance of real economic growth. However, investors who believe in 
AEH are optimistic during the rising prices of the property market. Such optimistic beliefs are held even 
when property market values are decreasing, as market participants are still willing to pay higher prices 
(Davis & Zhu, 2004).   
Based on the AEH or backward-looking expectations, the expected house prices in each period are 
associated with past trends in house price movements, and it could also be assumed that expected 
house price will be the same as the moving average of the current price appreciations (Dong-An, 2005). 
Several studies such as Hamilton and Schwab (1985), Levin and Wright (1997) and Malpezzi and 
Wachter (2002) argue that AEH can be used to explain house price movements. The house price 
movements of U.K. from 1974 to 1994 are believed to be associated with the historical movement of 
house prices, or AEH (Levin & Wright, 1997). Malpezzi and Wachter’s (2002) result is derived using 
previous changes in the U.K. real estate house price market to predict future changes in the U.K. real 
estate house price market.  
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) show that the peak in house prices is reached when there is an 
overflow of housing stock supply from the construction sector. This causes speculators to exit from the 
market immediately (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2002). A speculative bubble is frequently used to explain 
persistent overvaluation followed by market collapse (Kindleberger, 1987). According to Stiglitz (1990), 
“if the housing price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling house price will be 
high tomorrow and when fundamental factors do not seem to justify such a high house price then a 
speculative bubble exists” (p.13). The identification of speculative bubbles in the housing market 
requires accurate estimates of both the contemporaneous “fundamental economic value” and housing 
purchasers’ expectations of future price appreciation (Goodman & Thibodeau, 2008).  
Ott et al. (2008) research supports the finding that real estate markets often violate the random walk 
and rational expectations hypotheses. In addition, Hwang and Quigley (2002) found that condominium 
prices in Singapore from 1990 to 2000 also did not follow a random walk hypothesis. If real estate price 
formation follows a random walk, then it is not possible to earn excess investment profits, and there 
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will be no incentive for speculation (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2005). Malpezzi and Wachter (2002) explain 
that in an AEH, the real estate market does not follow a ‘random walk’ because it draws on past 
information. Hence, the efficient market hypothesis is rejected in the property market, because of less 
efficient information available to all people. 
3.3 Review of Housing Bubble Studies 
The real estate market has the longest and most reliable history of boom and bust cycles stretching 
back to the early 1800s. There are a large number of studies on real estate or housing bubbles. 
Researchers point to speculation as a prime force behind these real estate developing cycles (Malpezzi 
& Wachter, 2002). Evidence of speculative bubbles in the real estate market has been found in 
countries worldwide. Several researchers have found quite modest housing bubbles in countries such 
as Australia (Bourassa & Hendershott, 1995), Sweden (Hort, 1998), and New Zealand (Bourasa et al., 
2001). The housing markets in London (Levin & Wright, 1997), Paris (Roehner, 1999) and Dublin 
(Roche, 2001) are also reported to be affected by regional housing market speculative behaviour. 
Abraham and Hendershott’s (1994) study shows there was a 30 percent “above market” premium in 
prices in the northeast of the U.S., and a 15 percent to 20 percent premium in prices in the west coast 
of the U.S. at the end of 1992. During the middle and late 1980s, U.S. house prices experienced 
significant real rates of appreciation. In three northeast cities (Boston, Nassau-Suffolk and Newark), 
housing prices rose by 92 percent between 1983 and 1988. House prices rose over 50 percent in eleven 
west coast cities between 1984 and 1990. Goodman and Thibodeau (2008) examined house price 
bubbles in 84 metropolitan statistical areas in the U.S. from 2000 to 2005. The comparison of 
computed nominal appreciation rates with observed appreciated rates from the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight data indicates that only 39 metropolitan statistical areas experienced a 
house price bubble. Only California reported a rate of house price appreciation at 149.7 percent. 
According to Sornette, Woodard and Zhou (2009), from 1995 there were two major housing bubble 
episodes; the real estate surge peaking in the U.S. in mid-2006 and the subprime boom in the U.S. 
which topped in 2007. Abraham and Hendershott (1992) integrate two proxies in the real estate 
market; (1) the tendency of a bubble to burst; and (2) the tendency of a bubble to swell. These proxies 
were found to adequately explain the large cyclical swings and speculative pressures in the real estate 
prices on the west coast of the U.S. (Abraham & Hendershott, 1992). 
Labonte (2003) examined the movement of the U.S. housing price index (HPI) with other economic 
fundamental factors such as income, inflation and interest rates. The study shows evidence of bubbles 
in different regions, such as housing bubbles in California and New England between 1997 and 2002. 
Mankiw and Weil (1989) found that demographic changes had important effects on U.S. house prices, 
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while Cappozza et al. (2002) study shows that city size, real income growth, population growth and 
real construction costs have stable relationships with house prices. According to Goodman and 
Thibodeau (2008), house prices in some Californian cities increased by more than 15 percent annually, 
during the same period that house prices in Texas cities increased by only four percent per year. 
Garino and Sarno (2004) used co-integration and the Markov-regime switching model to test U.K. 
house prices with fundamental factors such as mortgage rates, real personal disposable income per 
capita, treasury bill interest rates, and the consumption expenditure deflator, over the period 1983 to 
2002. The authors’ results reveal the presence of explosive bubbles in U.K. house prices over the 
sample period. Similarly an OECD (2005) study of 17 international house prices, points to 30 percent 
overvaluation in U.K. house prices in 2003 to 2004, as evidence of house price bubbles. 
Levin and Wright (1997) show that speculation is a significant factor in determining house prices in the 
U.K. between the years 1972 and 1974. The figures in Levin and Wright’s study suggests that the 
speculative component impacts most strongly in those regions which have greater price volatility, such 
as London city, the south east and the south west of the U.K. Brooks et al. (2001) applied variance-
bound tests to test for bubbles in U.K. property house prices from January 1986 to January 1998. Both 
studies indicate the existence of irrational speculative bubbles in the property market of the U.K. The 
authors used co-integration analysis to provide further evidence on the presence of bubbles, and 
concluded the existence of real estate bubbles in the mid to late 1990s. 
The Paris housing bubble that started in 1984 burst between 1990 and 1991. Roehner (1999) examined 
20 districts in Paris and described the price movement of house prices in different districts by 
characterising each district in terms of the relative strength of speculative trading versus price-supply 
inelasticity. Roehner’s finding points to the transmission of speculative behaviour which plays a major 
economic role in the increase in prices, in those areas with lower incomes and comparatively poor 
housing standards.  
In the study of the Australian housing market, Hatzvi and Otto (2008) use the asset pricing model and 
quarterly data to explain the behaviour of 36 local government areas (LGAs) with regard to property 
prices and rents in metropolitan Sydney from 1991 to 2006. Hatzvi and Otto’s (2008) study shows the 
presence of speculative bubbles on the property prices of LGAs in the outer western suburbs of Sydney. 
The property prices of LGAs in the outer suburbs of Sydney exhibited 60 percent of the variation in 
house prices, which cannot be explained by the variation in the fundamentals (rent ratios). 
During the last 15 years, Australian real estate house prices have increased by 35 percent in the capital 
city, with Canberra, Brisbane, and Sydney experiencing an increase of 48 percent to 61 percent; and 
20 percent in Adelaide, Melbourne and Perth (Bourassa & Hendershott, 1995). Bourassa and 
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Hendershott (1995) estimates that six of the Australian state capital cities use growth in employment, 
growth in real construction costs, after tax real interest rates, real income growth, and population 
growth, to explain the house price behaviour. The authors conclude that speculative bubbles did exist 
in the Australian housing market from 1979 to 1993.      
With regard to the Asian housing market bubbles, Glindro et al. (2007) explored housing bubbles by 
investigating house price overvaluations in nine Asia-Pacific countries over the period from 1993 to 
2006. The study uses a wider set of fundamental variables in the model such as equity prices and 
exchange rates, and institutional factors such as corruption, financial sector factors and property 
rights. Their results suggest that speculative housing bubbles may exist in Seoul, Beijing and Shanghai 
for the period 1993 to 2006. There have been quite a number of studies on the real estate price bubble 
in South Korea. Kim and Suh (1993) applied standard rational expectation models and suggested a 
bubble existed in both Korea and Japan during the period 1974 to1989. Lee (1997) tested a bubble in 
Korean land prices for the period 1964 and 1994. The study used a structural model with GNP, interest 
rates and money supply as the fundamental variables. Lee found evidence to reject the hypothesis that 
only market fundamental variables drove the land prices in Korea. Kim (2004) uses two approaches: 
first, linear regression in a time series analysis; and second, the concept of discounted cash flow (DCF) 
for examining the presence of bubbles in the real estate market in Korea. Kim (2004) includes interest 
rates, income, inflation and real GDP growth rates from 1980:Q1 to 2002:Q4. Using the first approach, 
Kim’s study shows evidence of housing bubbles occurring in two periods; from 1991:Q1 to 1993:Q4 
and from 2001:Q3 to 2002:Q4. In the second approach, the results indicate a greater likelihood of 
bubbles occurring in the Gangnam district in Seoul. This finding is consistent with the property prices 
in Gangnam district which is the most expensive and speculative area in Seoul (Kang, 2007). 
The large swing in property prices in Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s has intrigued many 
researchers. Ito and Iwaisako (1995) examined Japanese property prices to determine whether the 
variations in property price could be attributed to the fundamental factors. The results suggest that 
during the early 1980s rational explanations and fundamental factors could not be used to explain the 
changes in house prices in Japan. Basile and Joyce (2001) used the same method to measure the size 
of the asset price bubble, which is the difference between the ‘ex post’ returns of an asset and the 
required return. Their study shows that the housing market bubble grow evenly through mid-1990s 
before declining.  
The housing market in Hong Kong has been studied extensively presumably because of the high 
volatility. Chan et al. (2001) used a signal extraction approach and a standard present value model to 
detect rational bubbles in the Hong Kong housing market. The study assumes that current housing 
prices are determined by the present value of current rental income, and the expected market price 
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for the next period. The study investigated bubbles in Hong Kong (Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and New 
Kowloon) for the periods 1990 to 1992 and 1995 to 1997. The evidence of the existence of a bubble is 
caused by a misspecification error. 
Xiao and Tan (2007) found similar bubbles in the Hong Kong housing prices. The study used a set of 
recursive equations to study housing price bubbles in Hong Kong. Their sample includes monthly data 
stretching from December 1980 to January 2003. Their results show that speculative bubbles collapse 
periodically in Hong Kong; the housing bubbles were in the stage of collapsing during the first half of 
the 1980s, the bubbles appeared again in 1997, and then collapsed after the Asian financial crisis of 
1997. Kalra et al. (2000) used time series analysis techniques to examine the determinants of 
residential property prices in Hong Kong for the period 1980 to 1998. The study shows that half of the 
movements in Hong Kong property prices are explained by macroeconomic fundamental variables, 
and the other half are explained by the inflating of bubbles, followed by the bursting of bubbles.  
Over the last two decades, China has achieved rapid economic growth, accompanied by rapid 
development of the real estate market. For example, the Shanghai Housing Price Index (SHHPI) in the 
China Real Estate Index System (CREIS) was 656 points in January 200, but increased by 63 percent (to 
1,084 points) in December 2003 (Yue & Hui, 2006). Yue and Hui (2006) use a combination of standard 
econometric methods (such as Granger causality tests and generalised impulse response analysis) to 
investigate whether there was a housing price bubble in Hong Kong, Beijing and Shanghai for the 
period 1990 to 2003. The authors found that Hong Kong experienced the formation and then the 
bursting of a huge housing bubble around 1997, and found that a bubble appeared in Shanghai in 2003. 
Qi and Li (2004) built a model to explain the increase in China’s real estate prices by examining the 
relationship between real estate prices and bubbles. The results of their study show that three main 
factors contribute to the increase of real estate prices and the formation of real estate bubbles in 
China. These factors include an increase in market demand for real estate assets, more opportunities 
for credit from financial institutions, and an oligopoly competitive market (Qi & Li, 2004). 
Hou (2010) used a combination of different quantitative indicators (a comparison of housing market 
prices with the rational expectation prices, mortgage loans, and the price to income ratio and the price 
to rent ratio) to examine whether housing price bubbles exist in Beijing and Shanghai. Hou’s result 
shows that Beijing appeared to exhibit a housing price bubble between 2005 and 2008, and that a 
housing bubble perhaps existed in Shanghai from 2003 to 2004. 
3.4 Conclusion  
The world economy is currently facing its worst global crisis since the 1930s Great Depressions. The 
global financial crisis erupted from the 2007 U.S. subprime loan crisis which has spill over effects 
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globally such as the Eurozone crisis. The crisis havoc in many financial markets that have yet to fully 
recover.  A wide consensus among analysts and commentators has emerged on the central role of the 
bursting of the housing bubble played in the U.S. and other developed economies, in the unfolding of 
the current crisis (Arce & Salido, 2011). Wyss (2007) reports that between 1997 and 2005, house prices 
in the U.S. on average increased by 75 percent, by 160 percent in the U.K., by 130 percent in Australia, 
by 65 percent in New Zealand, by 145 percent in Spain, by 80 percent in Sweden and by 185 percent 
in Ireland. Japan and Hong Kong are still reeling from their own property bubbles bursting over a 
decade ago. The sharp increase in house prices in several industrialized economies such as the U.S., 
U.K., Australia and Spain (Glindro et al., 2007) has attracted much attention due to the negative impact 
created by the bursting of bubbles in those economies (Labonte, 2003; IMF, 2005; Gyntelberg & 
Remolona, 2006). Governments and organisations such as the Bank of International Settlement (BIS), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) have raised concerns about the issue of asset price instability (overshooting the 
fundamental variables) in the housing market (Gyntelberg & Remolona, 2006). Therefore, it is 
important to understand the theoretical and conceptual framework underlying housing bubbles 
before suggesting any monetary or fiscal policies to prevent future housing bubble crises.  
In the real estate market, bubbles occur when property values increase rapidly and reach levels that 
are unsustainable given the current economic conditions (Knight, 2002). The housing bubble 
phenomena can be argued in terms of rational expectation equilibrium in which homeowners, who 
extract utility from their houses, coexist with investors, who hold houses only for resale purposes and 
do not expect to receive any dividend in the form of rent or utility from occupancy (Case & Shiller, 
2003). A bubble in house prices starts when the appreciation of house prices becomes irrational, and 
does not depend on economic fundamental factors such as inflation and interest rates (Malpezzi & 
Wachter, 2005). Shiller (2008) states that the cause of the recent housing bubble that happened in the 
U.S. in 2007, is actually a social contagion in housing boom thinking, mediated by the common 
observation of rapidly rising prices. This social contagion appears to justify the belief that the boom 
will continue. This idea occurs when a price rise or fall is expected to continue to rise or fall; hence in 
an “up” market buyers will push prices up even further encouraging other buyers to do likewise (Shiller, 
1984).  
Case and Shiller (1988) also suggest that an exogenous increase in house prices tends to induce 
potential buyers to purchase houses before prices rise too much, and the increase in demand 
accelerates the pace of the price increases. The general definition of a bubble in relation to the housing 
market can be summarized as follows: the observable characteristic of a bubble in the housing market 
is an increase in the price level due to the expectation on the part of market participants of a future 
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increase in the asset price. This increase in house price is not caused by macroeconomic factors 
(Coleman, 2008). 
It is also important to understand the difference between the recent housing bubbles and previous 
ones. According to Shiller (2008), the recent housing bubble was one where economic pressures raised 
the price of every available piece of real estate, so the bubble became a nationwide or even a 
worldwide phenomenon. Real estate bubbles from other times have always been relatively local. For 
instance, the Florida land bubble took place between 1921 and 1925, but nevertheless had a relatively 
modest effect on urban home prices nationwide. The recent housing bubbles in Asia (in 1997) and the 
U.S. (in 2006) had a huge impact on urban house prices worldwide (Shiller, 2008). 
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Froot and Obstfeld (1991) posit that deviations in asset prices from fundamental values can be 
explained by the presence of a particular type of rational bubble that depends exclusively on 
aggregated values of fundamentals, such as real disposable income. Fraser et al. (2008) modelled the 
housing bubble component related to fundamentals such as the house price index, interest rates, the 
consumer price index and real disposable income. Giussani and Hadimatheou (1991), Milne (1991) and 
Chen and Patel (1998) show a positive relationship between income and house prices in their studies. 
The authors used a co-integration test to determine the significance of the relevance between house 
prices and the fundamental variables, and concluded that a relationship between house prices and 
income exist in a long-run equilibrium situation. Kim and Lee’s (2000) study also shows an equilibrium 
relationship between income and house prices. Capozza et al. (2004), Sutton (2002), Case and Shiller 
(2003) and Farlow (2004) point out that real income and interest rates are important determinants of 
real house prices. 
Bjorklud and Soderberg (1999) examined the 1985-1994 property cycles in the Swedish property 
market and concluded that a housing bubble may exist if the ratio of property values to rent increases 
too much. Lee (1997) tested the presence of a bubble in land prices in Korea between 1964 and 1994. 
Lee (1997) used a structural model with gross national product, interest rates and money supply as the 
fundamentals, and consequently rejected the hypothesis that only the market fundamentals drive land 
prices in Korea. The author suggests that other factors such as income should also be taken into 
consideration. For instance, people demand higher quality accommodation when their income rises 
(Tse & Love, 2000). Other studies on real estate bubbles also suggest incorporating income into the 
bubble analysis (Giussani & Hadjimatheou, 1991; Milne, 1991; Case & Shiller, 2003). Holly and Jones 
(1997) used a data set gathered from 1939 to 1994 to investigate house price behaviour in the U.K., 
and found the single most important determinant of real house prices to be disposable income; where 
over the last 60 years real house prices have increased broadly in line with income in the U.K. 
McQuinn and O’Reilly (2006) examined the behaviour of housing prices in Ireland for the period 1980 
to 2005. The authors used an intuitive theoretical model of house prices where the demand for housing 
is driven by how much individuals can borrow from financial institutions. Their result shows that 
disposable income and interest rates accurately describe house prices for most of the study period. 
Malzubris (2008) found that much of the increase in house prices in Ireland from 1992 to 2006 can be 
explained by demographic factors; an increase in disposable incomes, very low interest rates, tax 
treatment of house ownership, and an increase in the purchase of houses for investment purposes. 
Further information on the theoretical background used to determine various determinants of house 
prices can be found in Poterba’s (1984) study and Gallin’s (2006) study. Table 4.1 shows several housing 
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market studies, which use fundamental variables to explain housing market behaviour. These variables 
help to explain the variation in the housing market across different countries. 
The changes in financial and monetary regulations in China may have influenced China’s house prices. 
For example, interest rates and inflation variables are used to explain the impact of credit market 
liberalization on the demand for housing in China. Most of the studies listed in Table 4.1 show 
significant relationships between house price index and macroeconomic fundamental variables such 
as the construction costs, incomes, employment, interest rates and inflation.  
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Table 4.1 Common Variables used to Determine House Prices 
Researchers HPI* Interest 
rates 
Money supply Income Construction 
costs  
Employment rates After tax 
Interest 
rates 
Rents Inflation 
Kim & Suh (1993) √         
Lee (1997)         √       √      √      √   
Chen & Patel (1998) √        √      
Case & Shiller (2003)         √       √     √        √    √            √ 
Ayuso & Restoy (2003)         √       √      √     √         √ 
Himmerlberg et al. (2005)         √       √     √            √ 
Gallin (2006)         √      
Fraser et al. (2008) √        √       √                  √ 
Lai et al. (2009) √        √      √                   √ 
Zhao & Gao (2010) √        √                     √ 
* HPI=house price index 
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4.2 Housing Market and Interrelated Sectors/Markets 
The selected supply and demand factors have been widely used to test the impact of house prices with 
different compositions of the factors (Hui & Gu, 2009). For example, a decrease in housing demand 
against fixed housing supply will cause a downward movement in house prices, and the developers are 
more likely to supply fewer houses (Porchockchai, 2007). Hui and Yue (2006) used the interactions of 
the housing demand and supply equation to predict house prices, and compared the equation with 
the real house prices in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong, to test for the presence of housing bubbles 
in the three major cities in China. Housing demand is a function of house price, disposable income and 
local GDP; and house supply is a function of house price and vacant new dwellings. The findings of the 
study suggest that Hong Kong experienced a huge housing bubble around the year 1997; there 
appeared a bubble in Shanghai in 2003; but Beijing had no sign of a bubble in the same period. 
Tsai (2012) used the vector error correction model (VECM) to examine long-term and short-term 
correlations among housing prices with supply and demand factors in the Taiwan housing market. The 
study indicates that construction costs are an important supply side factor affecting house prices. 
Construction costs are subject to the effect of the derived demand for housing as they represent the 
raw materials pertaining to the housing market. Rental prices are a demand side factor in the housing 
market because the rental and homeownership markets are intimately connected. Empirical results 
show that house prices stimulate changes in the construction costs and rent prices.  
The market price for a house is jointly determined by a demand and supply function where the equality 
of demand and supply results in the equilibrium of housing prices (Tsai, 2012). The demand factors 
affect the ability to purchase; the demand factors are used to analyse and estimates the house prices 
(e.g. income, interest rates and inflation) (Tsatsaronis & Zhu, 2004). Housing supply factors consist of 
the cost of land and construction costs (Malpezzi, 1996). The housing supply factors are used to 
differentiate between the factors, which affect investment in the existing housing supply, and the 
factors which determine the new supply of housing. Thus, most studies consider only the demand side 
factors (DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1992; Follain, Hendershott & Ling, 1992; Malpezzi, 1996).    
4.2.1 Financial Sector and Mortgage Market Factors 
The real estate market is sensitive to interest rates and bank lending. Banks increasing mortgage 
lending to households to buy houses, could cause a boost in house prices (Kim & Min, 2011). For 
example, the Bank of Korea (2003) reported that the ration of collateralized household lending to the 
total household lending was 56.1 percent at the end of 2002, implying that households switched their 
strategy from “buying a house by saving” to “buying a house by borrowing” which usually causes great 
speculative increases in house prices. 
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Bank lending could fuel financial crises, especially in those countries where banks play a dominant role, 
such as Japan where the banks hold 75 percent of the total social assets (Herring & Wachter, 1999). 
Issing (2002) shows that surplus monetary liquidity from bank lending is an indispensable factor in 
explaining the real estate price bubbles. Asset prices increase because mortgage lending constraints 
are relaxed and supply of credit increases. Borrowers will optimally choose to buy rather than rent, 
and this aggressive lending will cause demand shocks of assets (Pavlov & Wachter, 2011). The supply 
of credit by the banks will increase during the house price boom, and lead to an increase in the price 
of real estate; which increases the economic value of bank capital and the value of loans collateral, 
leading to a decline in the perceived risk of real estate lending. Consequently, an increase in real estate 
prices will increase the supply of credit to the real estate industry. These factors are likely to further 
encourage the increase in credit supply and further increase house prices (Herring & Wachter, 1999). 
In the case of the Japanese bubble economy in the late 1980s, the Japanese government expanded 
bank lending during the yen appreciation, which resulted in stock and real estate bubbles (Okina & 
Shiratsuka, 2004). 
In the 1990’s, house prices in China were rather low at the beginning of the real estate market 
privatization process and the Chinese government wanted to boost the economic growth process with 
a high price strategy in the real estate market. The banks had a goal imposed by the government to 
increase loans by 15 percent per year. As the banks had to meet this goal they offered loans to 
speculators and this in turn led to speculative behaviour (Wang, 2012). Deng and Fei (2008) show that 
the ratio of mortgage loan balances to total bank loans increased from 0.5 percent in 1998 to more 
than 10 percent in 2004. Therefore, banks play an important role in encouraging speculative behaviour 
in the real estate market (Wang, 2012).   
4.2.2 Consumption Factors 
An increase in house prices will stimulate consumers’ house consumption. An increase in household 
income or wealth causes an increase in purchasing power and leads to higher consumption for a better 
house (Ofori, 1990). Individuals with higher income are more willing to pursue bigger homes to 
improve their living conditions, or purchase an investment house to benefit from the housing inflation 
in the future (Yang & Shen, 2008). With the progress of urbanization accelerated, Chinese real estate 
is developing very quickly and house prices are trending upwards. Thus, investors increase their 
investment in the housing market, because they have the expectancy that the house prices will 
increase. The expectancy of price growth could be the reason the housing bubble forms (Sato, 1995).  
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Consumers who are optimistic about economic prospects are likely to increase their consumption of 
housing and non-housing goods. House price booms also increase the volume of housing transactions 
(Stein, 1995). For example, during a housing market boom, people are very optimistic about the future 
increases in house prices. This optimism about house prices will increase people’s consumption 
(Herring & Wachter, 1999). A bubble is believed to be caused by excess consumption (Grimes & 
Chressanthis, 1997). This over optimism and excess consumption in the housing market can be 
explained by the herd behaviour, which describes the tendency of people’s actions to follow those 
actions taken by others, so that they will not be left behind. Herding can take the extreme form where 
people make decisions simply based on the observed actions of others, rather than on their  own 
private information (Wong, 2001).  
Herding behaviour can be defined as “the elusive phenomenon that individuals prefer to follow others 
in thinking, feeling, and taking action, while ignoring their own original decisions” (Lan, 2014 Pg. 115). 
Herding behaviour is an obvious intent by investors to imitate the other investors’ behaviour 
(Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000). In the real estate market, the house price fluctuations are no longer 
solely based on movements of fundamental economic variables, but also depends on the interaction 
of the trading group psychology and behaviours of real estate market (Wang, 2013). Hott (2012) study 
calculates the fundamental house price and compares it to the actual price for seven European and 
three non-European OECD countries between 1975 and 2011. The comparison indicates that house 
prices fluctuate more than fundamental justifies. The study then incorporates herding approach with 
the house-price model and found the calibration of the herding behaviour can explain fluctuations of 
actual house prices. Lan (2014) study applied the least square method and quantile regression method 
to test the herding effect of Chinese housing market at both national and cities levels for the period of 
1998 to 2013. The results show the investors in Chinese residential housing markets tend to herd 
before the financial crisis in 2008, and there is no herding behaviour during and after the financial 
crisis.  
4.2.3 Construction Factors 
Construction costs are an important factor affecting house prices. Construction costs are subject to 
the effect of the derived demand for housing, and are the raw materials pertaining to the housing 
market (Tsai, 2012). Glaeser and Gyourko’s (2005) study shows that house prices are determined by 
construction costs, even when growth in demand for housing is high. In some fast-growing southern 
U.S. markets such as Houston, Atlanta, and Charlotte in 1980 and in 1990, the easy availability of land 
explains why the population can grow but house prices remain flat. When demand rises, builders 
acquire land and build new houses. In this case, construction costs determine the prices of houses in 
those markets (Gyourko & Saiz, 2004).  
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Muth (1960) shows that if the long-run supply of housing were perfectly elastic, then house prices 
would be determined solely by construction costs. The expectation of house price appreciation would 
mean the expectation of growth rate in real construction costs. Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) 
found that house prices grew relative to construction costs in most of the metropolitan areas of the 
U.S. (e.g. Boston, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco). Changes in construction costs explain neither 
the overall rise in real house prices nor the cross-sectional differences in appreciation rates across 
markets. 
4.2.4 Economic Factors 
Housing price bubbles have important implications for the domestic and global economy. The real 
estate sector is closely interrelated with other sectors of a country’s economy. For example, the 
forward businesses of the real estate market include property sales, mortgages, insurance, 
maintenance, improvements and management, while the backward businesses comprise cement, 
steel and timber (Mak, Choy & Ho, 2012). Kim and Min (2011) state that house price bubbles not only 
negatively impact the domestic economy through a negative wealth effect and inefficient wealth 
allocation, but could also cause global recession. When a house price bubble bursts, it causes serious 
negative effects on the financial system and the economy. In addition, asset price decline has stronger 
effects on the economy than asset price increase, as the collapse of asset prices hurts the stability of 
the financial system (Kim & Min, 2011). Further, the problems in the financial system could spread to 
other sectors in the economy and result in a banking crisis, currency crisis, and stock market crisis 
(Kallberg et al., 2002). 
Liu and Shen (2005) identified a number of potential ways in which real estate prices affect the macro 
economy. For example, changes in real estate prices can lead to changes in consumption through the 
wealth effect, to a boom or recession in the construction industry, to expansion or shrinkage in the 
credit supply, and to the increase or decrease in investment by the construction companies (Kim, 
2000). Because real estate prices affect consumption and investment, any changes in house prices will 
have a significant effect on economic fundamentals (Liu & Shen, 2005). Liu and Shen (2005) used the 
Granger causality test to confirm that unemployment rate, total population, changes in construction 
costs, and changes in the consumer price index, are all Granger causalities of house prices.  
4.3 Models of House Prices  
Traditionally, the house price cycle played an important role in understanding a country’s business 
cycle. Since homes imbed much individual wealth, the movements of house prices provide important 
signals for consumption, output, inflation and investment (Topel & Rosen, 1988). Changes in the real 
estate cycle are often linked with changes in macroeconomic fundamentals, such as interest rates and 
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economic growth. Gupta, Kabundi and Miller (2011) compared the performance of the dynamic 
structural general equilibrium model (DSGE) to a series of time-series models (standard vector-
autoregressive and Bayesian vector autoregressive) to forecast the U.S. real house-price index, and the 
turning point in 2006. The authors found the DSGE model actually could accurately forecast a turning 
point of house prices. Gupta, Jurgilas and Kabundi’s (2010) study shows that the models used to 
forecast real house price inflation not only can provide policy makers with an idea about the future 
direction of the overall macro-economy, but can also provide important information for designing 
better and more appropriate policies for controlling the housing prices. 
Roche (2001) used quarterly data on new house prices in Dublin for the period of January 1976 to 
January 1999 and applied a regime-switching model to estimate a non-linear relationship between 
house prices and macroeconomic fundamental variables. The findings from the regime-switching 
model indicate the presence of speculative bubbles in house prices in Dublin. Chan et al. (2001) used 
the GMM (generalized method of moments) method to test for the existence of bubbles. They found 
evidence of house price bubbles in Hong Kong during the period of 1985 to 1997. Hui and Yue (2006) 
applied the Granger causality test and the generalized impulse response analysis and found that 
Shanghai had a house price bubble in 2003. 
Lecat and Mossonnier (2005) suggest two theoretical approaches for examining the level of house 
prices: structural models and the asset pricing approach. The supply and demand for property is 
examined in the structural model by capturing both the returns from residential investment and the 
utility of the property. The investment in a property is examined in the asset pricing approach. 
Economic and finance based approaches are alternative models for determining house prices. The 
econometric models include the asset market, reduced form, and error correction models. These 
models are determined by an underlying set of housing demand and supply fundamental 
determinants. Many researchers have used these models to analyze house prices (Poterba, 1984; 
Muth, 1988; Dipasquale, 1999; Oikarinen, 2009) 
4.3.1 Asset-Market (User-Cost Approach) Model 
The housing market is defined as a market for housing services allocated by the supply and demand 
mechanism. The inelasticity of housing supply is the most important characteristic that differentiate 
the housing market from goods and services market. (Selim, 2009). Selim (2009) study used hedonic 
regression and artificial neural network (ANN) and found that the water system, pool, type of house, 
number of rooms, house size, locational characteristics and type of the building are the most significant 
variables that affect the house services and influence the house prices in Turkey in 2004.  Houses 
provide housing services that are consumed daily and are considered a long term investment asset. 
House prices can be influenced by an interaction of taxes and inflation (Manchester, 1987). 
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Hendershott (1980) emphasizes the interaction of inflation and income tax as one of the major factors 
that influences the demand for housing. Schwab (1983) suggests that the changes in the inflation rate 
could be caused by the changes in real interest rates. In this case, a fully anticipated increase in the 
rate of inflation will be reflected in the nominal interest rates, and will reduce house prices.  
The asset-market model determines house prices by distinguishing the relationship between the 
quantity of housing services and the real estate user cost of housing services (Poterba, 1984). Housing 
services are an important component of consumption expenditure. In 2006, National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA) reported that housing services represent 15 percent of aggregate consumer 
consumption expenditure in the U.S. Thus, it is important to pay attention to the valuation of housing 
services (Diaz & Luengo-Prado, 2008). Housing services can be defined as the rental service from 
housing, which consists of houses purchased or rented for occupancy (Dipasquale & Wheaton, 1996).   
The underlying framework of the asset market model is based on the capital theory equation where 
the equilibrium price of an asset is equal to the present discount value of future net income derived 
from owning the asset (Diewert et al., 2009). The asset market model also assumes the price of a house 
equals the present discounted value of its net future service flow (rental of the house) (Poterba, 1984). 
 
Equation (4.1) describes the general asset market model: 
                   p hsg hsgHsg QD UC= +      (4.1) 
Where; 
 pHsg = the price of the house 
hsgQD  = the quantity demanded for housing services (real rental service) 
hsgUC  = the user costs which consist of ( rM ) the mortgage rates, ( tP ) the property   taxes, ( tIn  ) 
income tax, ( cMR ) maintenance and repair cost and ( gEC  ) expected capital gain. 
 
         ,( , , , )hsg r t t c cgUC f M P In MR E=    (4.2) 
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The quantity of housing services is defined as the real rental price of housing, which is the amount paid 
by the consumer in consuming house stock (Pain & Westaway, 1997) (see equation 4.3) 
             
        
( )
1
1
hsg tQD
R
 
 =
 + 
                    (4.3) 
 
Where  ( )1/ 1 tR+  is the discounted real rental price (future inflow of housing services), with R as the 
rental price. The unobservable of the real rental price causes many researchers (Ayuso & Restoy, 2006; 
Diewert et al., 2009) to use proxies such as disposable income, demographic indicators, and real 
interest rates, to determine the demand for housing services (Pain & Westaway, 1997). Therefore, the 
real rental price of housing services ( tR ) is the proxy with the following observable determinants 
shown in the following equation (Meen, 1990); 
 
    ( , , , )t sR f Y P Hsg W=      (4.4) 
Where Y = real disposable income 
             P = population 
     sHsg = supply of houses 
          W = consumers’ asset wealth 
In equilibrium, the user cost and real rental price should be equal. According to Poterba (1984), people 
use housing services until the marginal value of the housing services, which is  hsgQD  (rental price) is 
equal to their cost.      
The house price in the asset market model is determined by combining the housing services demanded 
(equation 4.3) and the real estate user cost (equation 4.2) as follows: 
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Where   tHsg = house price at time t 
                    tR = real rental of housing services at time t 
                    tE = expected capital gain at time t 
                   1ti + = discount rate 
                    δ = constant rate of depreciation  
The asset market model provides new insight on how credit availability determines the quantity of 
housing services demanded. This approach focuses on the interaction between inflation, taxes and 
house prices (Deleeuw & Ozanne, 1981). Poterba (1984) employs the asset market method to examine 
the impact of inflation on tax subsidies to owner occupied housing. The estimated results suggest that 
inflation on tax induced house prices increased by as much as 30 percent in U.S. house prices in the 
1970s, and this was attributed to tax provisions for mortgage interest deductibility.  
Meen (1990) uses the user-cost approach to examine the impact on the housing market that the 
rationing system of mortgage supplies used in the early eighties in the U.K., caused. The study also 
examines the effect of inflation on real house prices with and without rationing. Meen’s (1990) study 
shows that the mortgage demand and supply can be identified from a direct estimation of excess 
mortgage demand or mortgage rationing by the user-cost approach, and that inflation leads to an 
increase in house prices.    
4.3.2 Reduced-Form Housing Equation Model 
The standard housing market model consists of demand and supply equations. The demand equation 
includes variables such as housing stock, real income, interest rates and other fundamental variables 
that determine house prices. The supply equation which determines the supply of new houses shows 
how the stock of houses changes over time as new houses are completed (Cameron et al., 2006).  
The reduced-form housing equation model can be applied to a demand equation only or demand and 
supply equations. However, the supply of housing equation is far less convincing than that of the 
demand for housing equation (Dipasquale, 1999). The use of the reduced demand form equation 
model assumes short run housing supply is inelastic and ignores supply side factors (Dipasquale, 1999). 
The reduced-form housing equation derived from Glaeser et al. (2004) study is given as follows: 
   ( , , , , )DHsg f Y P W UC N=               (4.6) 
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Where DHsg  is the demand for houses, Y is the real disposable income, P is the price of houses, W is 
the wealth, UC is the cost of housing capital, and N is the user cost; (equation 4.6 is similar to equation 
4.2). The house supply is explained in equation (4.7) below. 
                  ( , , )SHsg f P C Z=                (4.7) 
Where  SHsg   is the supply of houses, P is the price of houses, C is the construction costs, and Z is the 
restriction or constraint which causes a shift in supply. 
In a reduced-form, the equilibrium house price ( EHsg ) equation is given as follows: 
          ( ) ( , , , , ) ( , , )E D SHsg Hsg Y P W UC N Hsg P C Z= +  
          ( , , , , )EHsg f Y W N C Z=                  (4.8) 
The estimated values from the equilibrium house prices (equation 4.8) are compared with the market 
values of house prices. Any deviation from the equilibrium price is considered to be a house price 
bubble. 
House prices are subject to the impacts of supply as well as demand. While supply is affected by 
construction costs, demand is determined by the renting/buying considerations of the public. The 
supply and demand models are used to investigate the movements of house prices. These models 
incorporate factors that affect housing supply and demand. The equality of supply and demand model 
makes it possible to predict the equilibrium house price, whereby the models are used to determine 
whether house prices deviate from economic fundamentals (Muth, 1988; Hendry, 1984; Meen, 2002; 
Tsai, 2012). Muth (1988) uses the reduced-form model to examine the dynamic behaviour of the 
housing market and whether the housing market dynamic behaviour is caused by changes in the stock 
of the housing supply. The study concludes that a strong cyclical component appeared in the U.S. 
housing market. Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) used a reduced-form equation to estimate supply 
elasticity of houses in the U.S. and the U.K from 1914 to 1947. The results show that the house price 
elasticity of the U.S. was between four and 10 before the Second World War while in the same period 
the price elasticity was between one and four in the U.K.  
Ozanne and Thibodeau (1983) used the long run supply and demand model (reduced-form) to analyze 
the variation in house prices in the entire metropolitan housing sector in the U.S. The model divides 
the metropolitan housing sector into renters and homeowners in 54 metropolitan areas in the U.S., 
from 1974 to 1976. The results suggest that the reduced form equations can explain 90 percent of the 
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variation in the rent index and 60 percent of the variation in the house price index. Ozanne and 
Thibodeau (1983) used several exogenous variables in their model, such as average tenant income, 
mortgage rates, expected appreciation in rental prices, number of renters, demographic 
characteristics of renters, price of rental properties, real estate taxes, land prices and non-land prices 
(building materials and labour).  
A limitation of the reduced-form model is the difficulty of evaluating rational expectation, as many 
studies employ a backward-looking expectation (Oikarinen, 2009). Further, the supply and demand 
model cannot completely capture the dynamic movements in house prices. Theoretical models 
constructed by Chen and Tsai (2007) posit that housing supply exhibits a lag, where the lead and lag 
relationships among the variables should be considered. For example, house prices should affect 
future housing supply because developers decide whether to increase housing supply based on current 
house prices (Tsai, 2012).  
4.3.3 Vector Error Correction Model 
One of the most popular econometric frameworks for dealing with multiple time series is the vector 
error correction model (VECM). VECM is a restricted vector autoregressive model (VAR) designed for 
non-stationary series that are known to be co-integrated. The VECM has co-integration relationships 
built into the specification so that it restricts the long-run behaviour of the endogenous variables to 
converge to their co-integrating relationships, while allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics. The 
co-integration term is known as the error correction term since the deviation from long-run 
equilibrium is corrected gradually through a series of partial short-run adjustments (Tumbarello & 
Wang, 2010). 
VECM is a reduced form linear dynamic simultaneous equation model in which all variables are treated 
as endogenous. A reduced form representation can be consistently estimated by regressing each 
variable on a number of lags of all endogenous variables. The VECM has proved to be a convenient 
method of summarizing the dynamic relationships among economic variables.  
The VECM used by Sing et al. (2006) and Oikarinen (2009) is given as: 
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Where  , , , 1p t p t p thsg hsg hsg −∆ = − , 
               1te − = the lagged value of house price deviation estimated from the long-run  
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                         relationship and  ( 0δ ≠  ) suggesting a co-integrating vector in the model 
pα   and qβ = coefficient matrix jointly to be estimated in the VECM with p and q lags 
                tχ  = a vector consisting of macroeconomic variables 
                tε = independently and identically distributed random error terms 
One of the advantages of VECM is that it can provide short and long-term explanations of the 
behaviour of house prices (Wang et al., 2008). The VECM allows us to examine how much consumption 
will change in response to a change in the explanatory variable, as well as the speed of change (Hill et 
al., 2011). In addition, each variable in VECM is treated as endogenous and associates with its own past 
values and the past values of other variables (Tuluca et al., 2000).  
The VECM has been used by several researchers to determine the long-run and short-run relationships 
of house prices, household borrowing (Oikarinen, 2009), and household mobility (Sing et al., 2006). 
Oikarinen (2009) uses the VECM method to examine the long-run relationships and short-run dynamics 
between household borrowings and house prices in Finland. Oikarinen’s study shows there are co-
integrating long-run relationships between household borrowings, house prices and GDP. The analysis 
indicates that house prices substantially influence the number of housing loans. Furthermore, the 
study findings suggest that the effects of housing wealth on the boom-bust cycles in the overall 
economy are greater than that of the stock market. 
Sing et al. (2006) tested the house price dynamics associated with the mobility of households in the 
public resale and private housing markets in Singapore. The authors use various kinds of house price 
index (such as apartment price index, resale house prices, house price index, detached house price 
index, semi-detached house price index, and condominium price index) as endogenous variables in 
their model. The macroeconomic variables (such as consumer price index, gross domestic product, 
prime lending, exchange all-share index of Singapore, and unexpected inflation rate) are used as 
exogenous variables in the model. The VECM result shows the error correction terms are significant in 
explaining the price variations in the Singapore housing market. 
The VECM has some limitations however. First, the candidate variables or terms to be selected can not 
be large, because the VECM model can only handle up to eight or twelve variables (Gupta et al., 2010). 
Second, the VECM model has an important deficiency in selecting explanatory variables and may face 
an over-fitting problem (Zhang, Hua & Zhao, 2011). 
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4.3.4 Ratio Approach Model 
The price-to-rent ratio is an indicator that is frequently used to assess whether house prices are rising 
at unsustainable rates and thereby creating a bubble (Barth, Lea & Li, 2012). For instance, Clark (1995) 
showed that the price-to-rent ratio could be reflected by the expected future increase in rent. The 
existence of housing market efficiency implies that the current price-to-rent ratio can be used to 
predict a future increase in rent. Bjorklund and Soderberg (1999) use the value of the gross income 
multiplier to examine the 1985 to 1994 cycles in the Swedish property market and conclude that if the 
ratio of property value to rent increases too much, a bubble would exist.  
The price-to-rent ratio measures the relative costs of owning or renting a house. The volatility of price-
to-rent and price-to-income ratios is often interpreted as evidence of inefficiency in real estate markets 
(Scherbina & Schlusche, 2012). The value of the price-to-rent ratio measures how much the buyers pay 
for the property for every unit of received rent. Rents are very closely related to supply and demand, 
and are therefore supposed to be stable. If price-to-rent ratios start increasing and rents remain 
constant, this can be a reliable signal for a housing bubble (Wu et al., 2010). 
The house price-to-income ratio and the house price-to-rent ratio can be described in the following 
equation: 
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    (4.10) 
Where    PY = house price-to-income ratio 
         pHsg  = house price 
                Y   = income 
              PR = house price-to-rent ratio 
               R  = rent values 
Other transaction costs, such as tax advantages to the homeowner and depreciation of housing are 
significant determinants of rental supply and housing demand. Hence, the inclusion of these 
transaction costs can be described in the following equilibrium house price-to-income ratio; 
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where  infrf  is a risk-free rate, pr  is a risk premium,  tx  is the tax rate, dp is depreciation costs and 
gw is anticipated depreciation. 
The ratios of house price-to-income ratio and house price-to-rent ratio are two basic indicators 
measuring housing affordability. Low values of the price-to-income ratio indicate a low share of 
housing consumption in the consumer’s budget, which will improve housing affordability for the 
consumer. A high price-to-income ratio implies there exists considerable risk in the housing market 
(Hou, 2010).  
The price-to-rent ratio contributes to the diagnosis of the rent equation. The ratio indicates the time 
it takes to regain the original amount the consumer has invested, reflecting the return of housing as 
an investment. If the rent remains steady, the returns will lower if the house prices keep increasing. 
The higher the ratio, the larger the risk is for falling house prices. In summary, a large deviation of 
house prices from rent could be used as a typical characteristic of a housing bubble (Hou, 2010). Liu 
(2014) used the housing price-to-income ratio and housing price-to-rent ratio of 35 cities in China for 
the period 1998 to 2010, with the panel KSS unit root test, to examine whether a bubble was present 
in the housing market of China. The study found that the housing bubbles were not a serious problem 
in China at the time. The housing price-to-income ratio was found to be stationary in 34 cities out of 
the 35 cities examined, in China.  
There are different arguments about the proper values of the price-to-income ratio and the price-to-
rent ratio, depending on the openness of the economy or the various regulations of the time, in the 
housing market. However, a typical sign of a bubble is that the rental fee or the disposable income 
experiences a large deviation from the house prices. This shows that the price-to-income ratio and the 
price-to-rent ratio are not adequate for modelling bubbles in house prices. Both ratios are more likely 
to ignore the changes in different market fundamental variables; for example, demographic changes, 
asset prices and house-building credit conditions (Cameron et al., 2006). The ratio approaches cannot 
determine whether the increases in house prices are caused by economic fundamental variables or 
speculation activities during the house price bubble period (Cameron et al., 2006). This suggests that 
the two ratios are not designed to efficiently capture housing bubbles. Himmelberg et al. (2005) 
attempted to measure the annual cost of single family housing for 46 metropolitan areas in the U.S. 
and found that the price-to-rent ratio and the price-to-income ratio can be misleading as they fail to 
account both for the time series pattern of long-term interest rates and the predictable differences in 
the house price long-run growth rates. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of related housing market theories and the previous 
models. The housing market literature reveals several empirical models used by researchers to 
determine house prices. These include the asset-market model (4.3.1), the reduced form model (4.3.2), 
the vector error correction model (4.3.3) and the ratio model (4.3.4). Each of these models produces 
different results regarding the existence of housing price bubbles.   
House price is determined by housing supply and demand. Thus, fundamental variables composed of 
supply and demand factors, are relevant in modelling the determinants of house prices (Quigley, 1999). 
The literature on forecasting house prices considers that economic fundamentals provide sufficient 
information on house price movements. The commonly used variables in the housing market studies 
are interest rates, income, and inflation. These variables can act as potential predictors of house price 
bubbles (Abraham & Hendershott, 1996; Cho, 1996; Johnes & Hyclak, 1999; Rapach & Strauss, 2009). 
In this study the price income ratio and VAR/VECM techniques are employed to investigate housing 
bubbles in the Chinese real estate market. 
 
 
 68 

The proposed housing bubble model used in this current study adopts a general-to-specific approach 
with price-to-income ratio, vector autoregressive model and vector error correction model. This 
current study employs several assumptions as follows: 
• Secondary data used in this study are assumed to represent the “true condition” of the 
              Chinese housing market.                 
• The insufficient data such as employment, construction sector and other housing supply 
              factors are excluded from this study. The housing supply variables are assumed to have a less  
              significant effect on the movement of house prices in China’s housing market. 
• The scope of this study focuses on eight Chinese cities from three different house price  
              growth rate groups and covers three tiers of Chinese cities. 
• The term “house price” used in this study refers to the asset price of houses, not the land 
              prices they are associated with. 
5.1.1 Housing Affordability Measures 
The surge in property prices and the rise in real estate investments in China has caused concern about 
housing affordability for Chinese people. In particular, there is a heated debate over whether a 
property bubble has developed in China (Shen, 2012). The price-to-income ratio is regarded as an 
affordability measure. It is an indicator that measures whether housing is affordable for the people. If 
house prices start to increase and substantially property becomes unaffordable, then it indicates an 
overpriced housing market (Shen, 2012). A low value of the price-to-income ratio means a low share 
of housing consumption in the consumer’s total disposable income, which improves housing 
affordability (Hou, 2010). Ding (2012) defines the housing price-to-income ratio as being based on the 
house price and the resident’s disposable income. The housing price-to-income ratio is different 
between regions, because the housing price-to-income ratio in China is influenced by local economic 
development and local governments’ policies on the real estate industry. 
The formula for the price-to-income ratio is given as follows (Wu et al., 2010): 
Price-to-income ratio 
= average house price per sq.m floor area × housing size per person 
                   average per person’s disposable income  
Both the average unit sale prices of houses in Renminbi (RMB) per square metre, and the per person’s 
disposable income, are reported by the Nation Bureau of Statistics in China. The unit size used in the 
calculation is presumed to be 30 square metres per person in the household (Wu, Gyourko & Deng, 
2012). According to Wu et al. (2012), the 30 square metres assumption is based on: (1) the statistics 
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published by China’s Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, which lists per capita living 
space in urban China. Per capita living space in urban China increased from 20.3 square metres in 2000 
to 27.1 square metres in 2006. Based on the positive trend yields, Wu et al. (2012) assumed that the 
per capita living space increased to 30 square metres in 2010; and (2) since 2006, the state requires 
that no less than 70 percent of newly built private housing units in China be larger than 90 square 
metres, for an average household size of about three people. 
Direct comparison of the price-to-income ratio to the bench-mark ratio to investigate the housing 
bubble in China is inconclusive. For example, some households may purchase a house of less than 30 
square metres, which means that the price-to-income ratio overestimates the share of disposable 
income in housing (Wu et al., 2012). Unreported income is another reason why the price-to-income 
ratio can overstate the share of income in housing. According to Credit Suisse’s (2010) research, 
unreported income in China amounts to 30 percent of the country’s GDP. In order to determine the 
economic fundamental factors that influence house prices and housing bubbles, other econometric 
techniques are used in this current study.  
5.1.2 Integration Properties of Time Series Data 
Time series variables are stationary when their means and variances are constant over time, and the 
covariance between the means and variances from the series depends only on the length of time and 
not on the actual times. In contrast, non-stationary variables have time dependent means and 
covariances. A random process time series is integrated in the order d; in the series the random process 
requires a difference of d time in order to achieve stationarity (Engle & Granger, 1987). If the time 
series  tY  is stationary at the level denoted by ~ I(0)tY ; if its level series tY   is non-stationary but its 
first difference series  tY∆  is stationary, denoted as ~ (1)tY I∆ .  
The order integration of a time series variable can be determined by the number of autoregressive unit 
roots that the time series contains. For example, the autoregressive model of order one is given as 
follows (Hill, Griffiths & Lim, 2011): 
                             1t t tY Y vρ −= +               (5.1) 
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Where  0Y  is a fixed initial value,  ρ  is the autocorrelation coefficient and  tv  is ‘white noise’. When
1ρ < , the series tY   is stationary since it has a constant mean and variance that are independent of 
time. The properties of the stationary  tY  are: 
Mean:  ( )tE Y µ=  
Variance:  2 2( ) ( )t tVar Y E Y µ σ= − =  
Covariance:  [ ]( )( )t t kk E Y Yγ µ µ+= − −  
Where kγ is the covariance between the values of tY   and  t kY + . In contrast, when 1ρ = ,  tY  is non-
stationary and both its mean and variance are time dependent. The properties of nonstationary  tY  
are: 
Mean:  0 0( ) ( )t tE Y E Y v Y= + =∑  
Variance:  2( )tVar Y tσ=  
The autoregressive model of order one AR (1) is an important univariate time series model for 
explaining the differences between stationary and non-stationary series. It is given by: 
                  1t t tY Y vρ −= +     (5.2) 
Let  L  be the lag operator where 1
i
t tLY Y −= , then the AR (1) equation can be written as: 
                  (1 ) t tL Y vρ− =      (5.3) 
The stationarity is associated with the root of the equation  1 0zρ− =  which is 
1
z
ρ
= . If the root of 
the equation is more than one in absolute value, then 1ρ <  and hence tY  is stationary. On the other 
hand, if the root of the equation equals one, 1ρ =  which indicates tY  , then it has a unit root and is 
non-stationary (Hayashi, 2000).  
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Suppose a time series variable is non-stationary with zero drift and no deterministic trend 1t t tY Y v−= +
However, the first difference series t tY v∆ =  is stationary since the shock is defined as ‘white noise’. 
Thus, a single unit root non-stationary series only needs to be differenced once in order to achieve 
stationarity. The definition of the order of integration of a time series variable can be explained as a 
non-stationary series integration of order one or (1)I . This could extend to the more general case 
where a non-stationary time series tY   containing d unit roots is said to be ( )I d , since  tY  needs to 
be differenced, d time, to become stationary (Hayashi, 2000).  
The major reason to test for stationarity in time series data before running a regression analysis is 
because if the non-stationary time series variables are estimated by traditional regression analysis, it 
will result in spurious regression results (Granger & Newbold, 1974). A spurious regression result has 
a high 2R   and t statistics that appear to be significant, but the results are without any economic 
meaning. The output looks significant because the least squares estimates are not consistent and the 
t statistics do not follow the t distribution. Thus, the integration properties of data should be tested 
before the regression analysis is performed. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is applied to test 
the unit roots of the data in this current study. 
5.1.3 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
While intended for a unit root in a time series variable, an ADF test is a scaled up version of the Dickey-
Fuller test for a larger and more complicated set of time series models. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests (1981) for the autoregressive unit root test are based on the following ordinary least square 
regression equations: 
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Where  ty∆  denotes the first order difference of the logarithmic series;  0α  is a constant; t refers to 
a time trend; m is the lag term; γ , λ , and sα  denote the coefficients; and  tε  represents a white 
noise term. The first model is a pure random walk model, the second model adds an interceptor drift 
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term, and the third includes both a drift and a linear time trend. The null hypothesis of the above model 
is to test whether the time series variables contain unit roots. 
Another important issue regarding the implementation of the ADF test is the selection of the number 
of lagged first-difference terms  t sy −∆  which are needed to induce an appropriate white noise error 
structure in the estimated ADF test regression equation. As documented by Enders (2004), the Dickey-
Fuller test is sensitive to the number of lags in the estimated equation. Too few lags may cause the 
test to over-reject a true null hypothesis of a unit root at any chosen significance level, and too many 
lags may reduce the power of the test as more parameters are estimated, and the number of effective 
observations is reduced. More lags could cause a high probability of falsely rejecting a true null of a 
unit root against a false stationary. In this study, the Bartlett criteria is used to determine the lags for 
the ADF test, the equation of Bartlett criteria is written as int(12(T/100)1/4), where T is sample size, 
and this criteria result is adopted in the Eviews 8.0 software used to estimate the stationarity for our 
data. 
5.1.4 Econometric Analysis 
This section explains the techniques used to model the Chinese house price index (CHPI), which is 
conditioned on the macroeconomic variables such as income, mortgage rates and inflation. The 
underlying assumption in this model is that house prices in China do not react asymmetrically to 
different economic shocks. This current study uses the VAR and VECM model to determine the short-
run and long-run relationships between the macroeconomic fundamental variables and the CHPI. The 
co-integration approach of Johansen and Juselius (1990) was conducted to test the long-run co-
integration relationships between macroeconomic fundamental variables and the CHPI. If co-
integration relationships exist between the macroeconomic fundamental variables and the house price 
index, then the VECM model is applied to investigate the short-run and long-run effects from the 
macroeconomic fundamental variables to the CHPI and the equilibrium house price indices. If there 
are no co-integration relationships, the VAR model is retained to estimate the short-run relationships 
between the macroeconomic fundamental variables and the house price index. 
5.1.4a Vector Autoregressive Model and Co-integration Test:  
 
The VAR model is a general framework used to describe the short-run dynamic relationships between 
stationary variables (Hill, Griffiths & Lim, 2011). The VAR model has been widely used in 
macroeconomic research because it allows the direct estimation of the joint stochastic processes that 
describe the variables under consideration. The VAR method also allows the researchers to treat all 
variables as jointly endogenous (Sun, Gan & Hu, 2010). Researchers who have applied the VAR model 
to identify macroeconomic factors that influence house prices include MacDonald and Stokes (2013) 
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and Gupta, Jurgilas, Kabundi and Miller (2011) for the United States; and Aye, Balcilar, Bosch and Gupta 
(2014) for South Africa. MacDonald and Stokes (2013) applied the VAR model to examine the 
relationship between economic factors (federal fund rates, unemployment rates and mortgage 
interest rates) and house prices in the U.S. MacDonald and Stokes’s (2013) study found a negative 
relationship between the federal fund rates and house prices. Gupta, Jurgilas, Kabundi and Miller 
(2011) tested the influence of change in monetary policy on the U.S. housing sector over the period 
1986 to 2003. The study found that national level housing status, housing permits, and housing sales, 
fell in response to the tightening of monetary policy.  
The VAR model is applied to examine the interrelationships between variables, while dependent 
variables and independent variables are stationary and not co-integrated. However, if dependent and 
independent variables are stationary and co-integrated, then the VECM model is used to examine the 
interrelationships between the variables. Therefore, the co-integration test is required before 
determining the model to use to examine the interrelationships between the variables.  
In the housing market studies, the co-integration technique can be used to estimate the long-run 
relationships between house prices and macroeconomic variables, and the speed of adjustment for 
the real house prices to return to the equilibrium price (Lee & Gholami, 2002). The co-integration 
relationship can be explained as the non-stationary variables that become stationary through linear 
combination with one another in the long-run, which means the non-stationary variables could have 
long-term equilibrium relationships (Wang et al., 2013). Even if the equilibrium relationships among 
the variables are disrupted in the short-term, the degree of variation of the variables will eventually 
decrease and return to the equilibrium in the long-run (Wang et al., 2013; Stohldreier, 2012).  
Ender (1995) notes that co-integration occurs when the variable data indicates no stationarity 
individually, but stationary if the variables are combined together. The maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE) of the Johansen (1988) test is used in this current study’s model to test the existence of co-
integration relationships between the Chinese house price index (CHPI), income, mortgage rates and 
inflation, as well as to determine the number of co-integration vector groups.  
The co-integration test starts by selecting an appropriate number of lags to include in the vector 
autoregressive model. The lag length is determined using standard model selection criteria which 
minimize Aikake Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criterion (HQ) (Sun, Gan & Hu, 2012). Since the sample size is not large in this current 
study, only small lag-lengths are included in the VAR model. The standard VAR equation is adopted 
from Pollakoswki and Ray’s (1997) model and is given in the equation below: 
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                    1(A)t tX L X −=         (5.5)       
Where tX   is the vector of change in CHPI, income, mortgage rates and inflation; and (A)L  is the lag 
order polynomial. 
Thus, the process  tX  is integrated of order of I (1) with the co-integrating rank r, and follows a vector 
autoregressive process of order p, VAR (p),  
                     1 1 2 2...At t t p t p tX A X A X X µ ε− − −= + + +    (5.6) 
Where  
 tX = A vector of 4 variables each of which is I (1) 
A= 4×4 matric of short-run parameter for CHPI, interest rates, inflation and income 
tµ  = a (4×1) vector of constants 
~ (0, )t MVNε Ω  i.e. “well behaved” random disturbances 
In the unrestricted VAR equation (5.6), each variable is regressed on its own lag and on the lags of 
other variables. In addition, the Π  matrix (4x4) holds the information on the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the variables of concern; the rank in the Π  matrix describes the number of co-
integration relationships. Furthermore, the  Π  matrix is used to test whether this current study can 
reject the restriction implied by the reduced rank  Π  (Johansen, 1988; Johansen & Juselius, 1990).  
In the VAR equation (5.6), no restriction is imposed on possible co-integrating relationships. According 
to Bourassa et al. (2001), the VAR model only contains information on the short-run and ignores the 
long-run relationships that may exist among the variables. This condition in the VAR model is regarded 
as a specification mistake that can be corrected by imposing restrictions. With regard to the differences 
between the short-run dynamics and long-run equilibrium relationships, the VECM model is derived 
from the restrictions imposed on the VAR equation (5.6). 
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           11 11
p
t t i t ti
X X X µ ε−− −=∆ = Π + Γ ∆ + +∑                  (5.7) 
Equation (5.7) contains two important matrices, Γ  and Π ,
1
p
ii
I
=
Π = Γ −∑ ; 12( )
p
i ii
A
−
=
Γ = − ∑ , p is 
the lagged term, and I is an identity matrix. The matrix Γ  is used in the first difference of the variable 
in  2tX −  and it contains contemporaneous short-run adjustment parameters. Matrix Π  is a matrix for 
the levels variables in 1tX −  and it contains information about the long-run equilibrium relationships. 
Furthermore the rank of the matrix Π  gives the number of co-integrating vectors (Hu & Chien, 2014). 
Consider the following three possible cases of the rank of Π : 
1) Π  = q; all variables in the system are I (0) 
2) Π  = 0; all variables in the system are stationary in the first difference (I (1)). 
3) Π  = r is between 0 and q, indicating that the variables are co-integrated. 
Johansen (1991) showed that the number of distinct stationary co-integration relationships r among 
the variables tX   is given by the rank of Π , where 0 < rank ( Π ) = r ≤ p-1. The reduced rank condition 
permits the null hypothesis of at most the r distinct stationary co-integrating vectors to be formulated 
as: 
                                   
'αβΠ =  
Where the parameter  α  measures the speed of adjustment of the tX∆  with the lag in the error 
correction term and β , which is the co-integrating matrix, which contains the long-run equilibrium 
parameter of r. The error correction terms in the ' t kXβ −  are stationary. 
This current study determined the number of co-integration vectors (r) that exist among the CHPI, 
income, mortgage rates and inflation (i.e. the rank of Π ) using two Johansen tests, the Trace Test
Traceλ  ) and the Maximum-Eigenvalue Test ( Maxλ  ). The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis 0r r≤
against the alternative  r  > 0r   for 0r  = (0, 1,…, p) and is defined as:  
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Where rΠ >  = the estimated values of the characteristics roots obtained from the  
             estimated Π  matrix  
             T= the number of usable observations        
The major difference between the maximal eigenvalue statistic test and the trace statistic test is that 
the maximal eigenvalue statistic tests against a specific alternative, whereas the trace statistic tests 
against a general alternative. Since the co-integrating relationships are associated with non-zero 
eigenvalues testing, the null of the r co-integrating vectors is equivalent to testing; how many of the 
largest order eigenvalues are significantly different from zero, and how many of the smallest ordered 
eigenvalues are not significantly different from zero (Sun, Gan & Hu, 2012). 
This current study uses the trace test as Lutkepohl et al. (2001) suggest that the powers of the 
corresponding trace and maximum eigenvalue tests are very similar. In general, the trace statistic 
tends to have greater power than the maximal eigenvalue statistic when  
iλ
∧
 are evenly distributed. 
The maximal eigenvalue statistic has greater power when the 
iλ
∧
 are either too large or too small.  
Based on the log likelihood ratio ln[L max( r)/Lmax(q)] the trace test is conducted sequentially for r = 
q-1,…1,0. The test examines the null hypothesis that the co-integration rank equals r against the 
alterative that the rank equals q. The hypotheses are (Hu & Chien, 2014): 
0H  : rΠ ≤ , for the r group of co-integration vectors 
1H : rΠ > , for the least r group of co-integration vectors 
 
 
 
 78 
The trace test statistics are calculated as follows: 
                      
1
ln(1 )
n
trace t q
Tλ λ
∧
= +
= − −∑  
Where  traceλ  denotes the statistical value of the Johansen trace test;  tλ
∧
 presents the estimated value 
of the ith eigenvalues; T refers to the number of samples, and n numbers of eigenvalues that obey the 
chi-square distribution under the test (Hu & Chien, 2014).  
The above Johansen co-integration tests allow us to find out how many co-integration relationships 
exist between the CHPI and macroeconomic fundamental variables. If more than one co-integration 
relationship exists, then we can identify the relationships between the CHPI and the macroeconomic 
fundamental variables simultaneously, by imposing restrictions on these co-integration relationships 
based on China’s economic conditions (Johansen, 1995). The VECM model also allows us to test the 
short-run dynamic relationships among the related variables without losing the long-run relationships.  
5.1.4b Vector Error Correction Model 
 
Often there are strong long-run relationships between macroeconomic fundamental variables. 
However, these long-run equilibrium relationships can be defective in the short-run due to cyclical 
shocks. Following cyclical deviations, the variables tend to return to equilibrium over time. For 
example, a vector error correction model tests whether the economic relationship is in equilibrium or 
not. If the relationship is not in equilibrium then the question remains as to how long it will take to 
reach equilibrium again (Stohldreier, 2012).  
The common dynamic model is the VECM, used to test the price movements in the short-run and long-
run. Following the analysis on the long run impact on the macroeconomic variables in China’s housing 
market, the VECM model is used to determine the time it would take for the housing market to reach 
the equilibrium position, once it has deviated from equilibrium due to an exogenous shock to the 
economy (Adams & Fuss, 2010). 
The VECM model incorporates both short-run and long-run relationships. It is based on the lag of the 
CHPI and the residuals estimated from the co-integration relationships between all the variables used 
in this current study based on equation (5.7) assuming the rank ( ) 1Π = . The standard VECM model in 
the Johansen approach can be shown in a scalar form as follows (Harris, 1995): 
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hpi e hpi Xδ α β ε− − −
= =
∆ = + ∆ + +∑ ∑            (5.8) 
 
Where ,p thpi∆  = is the change in the house price index  , , 1( )p t p thpi hpi −−  
              1te − = the lagged value of the house price index deviation estimated from the          
                          long-run relation and  ( 0)δ ≠ suggests a co-integrating vector in the model 
              p qandα β = coefficient matrixes jointly to be estimated in the VECM with p and  
                                     q lags 
              tX = a vector consisting of macroeconomic variables (income, mortgage  
                       rates and inflation) 
              tε  = independently and identically distributed random error term vectors 
The VECM model can be used to identify significant co-integration relationships between house prices 
and fundamental variables (Ashworth & Parker, 1997). The model explains the short-run changes in 
the house price index based on changes in the co-integrated variables, and shows a long-run 
equilibrium between the house price index and the repressors. In the VECM model, if house prices are 
too high as reflected by a positive error term, the negative coefficient reduces house prices in the 
following period until they are in equilibrium (Adams & Fuss, 2010). The error correction mechanism 
of the VECM model reveals a highly significant adjustment. For example, if the coefficient of the error 
correction term is -0.5, it implies that an economic disequilibrium in the market will resolve after two 
years. 
Numerous studies in the housing market have found significant co-integration between house prices 
and fundamental factors (Kenny, 1998; Song & Gao, 2007). Kenny (1998) applied the co-integration 
analysis and vector error correction model to test the long-run and short-run dynamic relationships 
between economic factors (house stocks, income, mortgage rates) and house prices in Ireland. The 
author discovered the long-run demand for housing responds negatively and proportionately to the 
increase in the price of housing while mortgage interest rates show negative effects on the long-run 
housing demand. Song and Gao (2007) used the Johansen test to examine whether co-integration 
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relationships exist among international capital flows, land prices, and the inflation rates of the Chinese 
housing market. The authors’ results show the presence of two co-integrations at the five percent 
significant level, which exhibit long-run equilibrium relationships among these variables.  
Tsai’s (2012) study applied the vector error correction model to investigate the long-run and short-run 
relationships between the house price index (HPI), construction cost index (CCI), and the rental price 
index (RPI), of the Taiwan housing market. Tsai’s results show the relationships among the three 
indices are nonlinear. The housing price index stimulated changes in the CCI and the RPI. This 
phenomenon can be explained, as the deviations of the CCI and RPI from the HPI are greater. Song and 
Gao (2007) used the VECM model and Granger causality test to examine the relationships between 
house prices and international capital flows. Their empirical results show that foreign capital helps to 
boost the rise in house prices in the long-run, and the increase in house prices attracts foreign capital 
inflows in the short-run.  
5.1.4c Equilibrium House Prices  
 
After the co-integration tests, the VECM model was applied to examine the adjustment of the CHPI 
from the changes in the Chinese macroeconomic conditions. However, Hendry’s (1984) study argues 
that ‘equilibrium correction’ is a better description for VECM than ‘error correction’. This is because 
the random drift variables tend to converge in the long-run through a linear combination of co-
integration (Harris, 1995). Therefore, the deviation from the equilibrium price is only temporary and 
will be corrected in the long-run.  
Assuming a linear relationship, the equilibrium house price equation, *tHPI  during period t, is 
described by income (Inc), mortgage rates (Mtr), and inflation (Inf), as follows:  
                            * 0 1 2 3t t t tHPI Inc Mtr Infα α α α= + + +                                      (5.9) 
                            *t t tHPI HPI θ= +  
If all variables (income, mortgage rates and inflation) are constant, the real house price index 
appreciation would be constant and equal to *tHPI . The adjustment term tθ  represents adjustment 
dynamics and error term. The HPI* is to be estimated from the co-integrating equation (5.8). The 
extent of the deviation of China’s house price index from the actual price index is computed using the 
estimated values from the vector error correction equation (5.8). Empirically, this current study 
estimated equation (5.8), obtained the coefficients equation (5.8), and then plugged the estimated 
coefficients (α0, α1, α2, α3) into equation (5.9) to get the estimated HPI. The comparison of real HPI 
and estimated HPI will reveal some signs of boom and bust in the Chinese housing market.  
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The objective of the VECM is to uncover stationary relationships among a set of non-stationary data. 
These relationships have a natural interpretation as long-run equilibrium relationships in the economic 
sense. Simultaneously, the VECM procedure estimates the speed at which the variables adjust in order 
to re-establish any equilibrium (Hill, Griffiths & Lim, 2011). This estimate could provide a particularly 
useful guide to housing market authorities (Kenny, 1998).  
The concept of long-run equilibrium has been tested in the housing market by many researchers such 
as Miles (1994), Chen and Patel (1998), Jud and Winkler (2002) and Grimes, Aitken and Kerr (2004). 
Grimes, Aitken and Kerr (2004) use quarterly regional panel data drawn from 14 regions in New 
Zealand from 1981 to 2002. Their tests indicate the regional housing markets converge to an 
equilibrium which is the long-run efficiency of the market. The authors’ result shows that the price 
dynamics are influenced by past regional house sales activities, and that the dynamic adjustment 
process depends on whether the house prices are above or below their long-run equilibrium. Chen and 
Patel (1998) applied the VECM model to examine the dynamic relationships between house prices and 
income, short-run interest rates, stock price index, construction costs and house completions. The 
authors’ findings reveal long-run equilibrium relationships between house prices and the five 
macroeconomic fundamental variables. Their study explains that the long-run relationships between 
house prices and macroeconomic fundamental variables can drift away momentarily, but will return 
to their long-run equilibrium.  
5.1.4d Size of House Price Bubbles 
 
The standard size of the bubble can be an important indicator for measuring the housing market 
bubble. This current study focuses not only on analysing the house price rise, but also the importance 
of reporting the standard size of the bubble. Previous housing market studies report various sizes of 
price deviations between real house prices and their long-run equilibrium prices, as the indicator for 
the housing bubble (Abraham & Hendershott, 1992; Hui & Yue, 2006; Hui & Gu, 2009).  
 
In China, Hui and Yue (2006) used the VECM model and impulse response function to show that the 
pattern and magnitude of the estimated bubbles conform quite well to the discrepancies between the 
actual and predicted house prices. The authors’ finding indicates that the size of the house price 
deviation from the equilibrium house price, departed by 22 percent in Shanghai at the end of 2003, 
which can be attributed to a housing bubble. Hui and Gu (2009) used the household income of 
Guangzhou as the main factor, and applied the VAR model to estimate the house price bubble and 
analyze the size of the bubble at different times. The authors use a state-space model (SSM) to 
estimate the bubble price which is regarded as the unobservable variable (bubble price). The 
parameters of the SSM model consists of two equations, one is a measurement equation which 
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expresses the relations between observable variables (income) and unobservable variable (bubble 
price); while the other is a transition equation which mainly describes the dynamic of house price. The 
real estate bubble price fluctuation is observed if the transition equation result is statistically 
significantly different from zero (Hui & Gu, 2009).  Hui and Gu’s study shows the variation in household 
income can affect the growth of housing price, and the size of the bubble is explained by the actual 
price deviation from 20 percent to 43 percent, compared to the equilibrium price, for the period of 
April 2006 to October 2007. 
In Korea, Kim’s (2004) study paid particular attention to the debate of house price bubbles. The 
author’s study reveals that the well accepted standard to define a house price bubble is when the 
movement of house prices deviates from the long-run equilibrium price. Kim applied the long-run 
average of the ratio between the median price of existing houses and the per capita personal income 
(PPI) as a proxy for long-run equilibrium relationships; a bubble exists during a particular period if the 
observed PPI exceeds the threshold defined as the long-run average PPI price. Kim’s (2004) study 
reveals a house price increase from 44 percent to 50 percent for the period of 1999 to 2003, which 
indicates the existence of a house price bubble. The excess or deviation of house prices from 
fundamental variables by eight percent to 28 percent is an indication of the existence of house price 
bubbles in Spain (Martinez-Pages & Maza, 2003). In Thailand, several provinces recorded a 30 percent 
appreciation in the house price index, providing evidence of housing bubbles (Calhoun, 2003). 
As discussed above, the deviation or overvaluation in house prices is between 20 percent and 50 
percent. Due to the lack of standardization and the lack of an acceptable percentage of deviation which 
can substantiate the existence of a housing bubble, this current study uses the 22 percent deviation or 
overvaluation of the CHPI from its long-run equilibrium price, as an indicator for the existence of a 
housing bubble in the Chinese housing market. This figure is consistent with previous studies. 
According to the report from the World Economic Outlook (2000), house price bubbles occur when 
there is a 10 percent to 20 percent deviations in house prices from fundamental factors such as interest 
rate and income.  Shen et al. (2005) examined housing markets in Beijing and Shanghai housing using 
a Granger causality test and generalized impulse response analysis. The economic fundamentals 
utilised in their model included disposable income, GDP and the stock price indices for both cities.  The 
study found a 22 percent deviation from the actual house price index, and the predicted house price 
index, as a sign of a housing bubble in Shanghai in 2003. By contrast, Beijing exhibits no sign of a bubble 
in the same year; the actual house price index in Beijing is below the equilibrium house price index.  
Dreger and Zhang (2010) applied panel co-integration method to test the housing bubble of 35 major 
Chinese cities. The authors compared the long-run equilibrium house prices and the real house prices 
for the period of 2008 and 2009. Their showed the average size of the bubble deviates by about 23 
percent of the real house prices from the long-run equilibrium house prices.  
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According to Abraham and Hendershott (1996) and Hui and Yue (2006), the increase discrepancy 
between the actual house price level and the fundamental price level indicates the trend of house 
price bubbles; that is, the larger the deviation of house prices from their fundamental values, the more 
likely a bubble exists in the market. Hui and Yue (2006) describe the difference between equilibrium 
and the actual house price level as the bubble indicator. Using a similar argument to Hui and Yue 
(2006), this current study estimates the excess price of China’s House Price Index (CHPI) from its 
equilibrium price, using equation (5.10) as follows: 
         House price  texcess  =  [ ]CHPI CHPIR LR−       (5.10) 
Where House price texcess   is a proportion of the bubble that exists in China’s housing market, CHPIR  
is the real value of CHPI and  CHPILR  is the estimated long-run equilibrium price of CHPI. The value of 
CHPILR   is estimated using the VECM technique via Eviews 8.0 software. The percentage change in 
the equilibrium house price is calculated by inserting the value obtained from the VECM into the 
equation (5.10). 
5.1.4e Impulse Response Function and Variance Decomposition 
 
The standard practice in a VAR analysis is to report the results from the co-integration tests, impulse 
response and forecast error variance decompositions (Stock & Watson, 2001). These statistics are 
more informative than the estimated VAR regression coefficients or 2R . An impulse response function 
refers to the reaction of any dynamic system in response to an external change involving an 
endogenous variable. It describes how a parameter reacts to previous shocks in itself or other 
parameters. Compared to the Granger causality test, this method offers an advantage that indicates 
whether the impacts are positive or negative, and whether they are a temporary jump or a long-run 
persistence (Shen, Hui & Liu, 2005). This current study applied the impulse response function to 
investigate how changes in the macroeconomic fundamental variables affect the house price index. 
The results could be helpful to policy-makers making future housing market policies.   
Following the VAR (p) model, the impulse response function is given as: 
                         
1
P
t i t i ti
X A X µ ε−== + +∑                   (5.11) 
According to Sims (1980) and Keating (1996), the Cholesky decomposition can identify the partially 
recursive structural model. Equation (5.11) can be transformed to a vector moving average 
representation (VMAR) form as follows: 
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Hence,      
1t i t ii
X Cα ε∞ −== + ∑                   (5.12) 
Where α  is a constant vector of (nx1); C denotes the matrix of (nxn), t iξ −   0C I=   (identity matrix); 
L represents the lagged factor. 
Equation (5.12) assumes that each of the parameters will be affected by the standard error shock of 
the current and the lagged terms. According to Hu and Chien (2014), either orthogonalizing the 
disturbance or preventing the elements of  tε  from correlation, means the Cholesky decomposition 
will take the squared root of a positive definite matrix. Furthermore, the Cholesky decomposition 
decomposes a positive definite matrix into the product of a lower triangular matrix and its conjugate 
transposition.  
The lower triangular matrix, V (i.e. VV’=I) is incorporated into the Cholesky decomposition as follows:  
                               '
1
( ) ( )t i t iiX C V Vα ε
∞
−=
= + × × ×∑                (5.13) 
If                            i iD C V= ×      and  
'
t i t iVξ ε− −= ×  
Then           
1t i t ii
X Dα ξ∞ −== + ∑                   (5.14) 
Where t iξ −  denotes a series of random shocks which are irrelevant to the current terms.  
An impulse response function traces the effect of one standard deviation shock, to one of the 
innovations on the current and future values of the endogenous variables in the VAR model. Thus, the 
impulse response function can be used to describe the dynamic response of the system, which helps 
to analyze two-way dynamic relationships of the variables (Hui & Yue, 2006). The size of the change in 
the random shock of a specific parameter that impacts other parameters, can be observed by the 
impulse response function (Hu & Chien, 2014). Chen and Patel (1998) estimated the impulse response 
function for six years (twenty-four quarters) in Taiwan. Their study found in response to a one standard 
deviation disturbance originating from interest rate increases, that house prices in the first quarter 
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increased by 0.4 percent; but decreased by 0.1 percent and 0.25 percent between the second to fourth 
quarters, respectively. This implies that higher interest costs could both increase house prices and 
reduce demand, and consequently decrease house prices.    
Another way to disentangle the effects of various shocks is to consider the contribution of each type 
of shock to the forecast error variance. Similar to the impulse response function, the variance 
decomposition demonstrates the extent and importance to which the variance of a particular shock 
variable can be accounted for by a shock in another variable (Hill, Griffiths & Lim, 2011). Equation (5.14) 
can be written as follows (Hu & Chien, 2014):   
                            0 1 1 1...t t s t t t s t sX E X D D Dξ ξ ξ− − − +− = + + +                (5.15)     
Where  t s tE X−   denotes the possible forecast error of the t-s-th term when forecasting the t-th term. 
The variance matrix of the t-s-th term forecast error can be observed as   
                     
'
' ' ' ' ' '
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( )( )
( ) ( ) ... ( )
t t s t t t s t
t t t t s s s s
E X E X X E X
D E D D E D D E Dξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
− −
− − − − − −
− − =
+ + +
               (5.16) 
Equation (5.16) indicates that the variance of each variable can be expressed as the sum of all the 
variables, which can be used to evaluate the explanatory power of a specific variable in itself and to 
other variables (Hu & Chien, 2014). 
5.2 Data 
This study covers the period from January 1999 to December 2013 (15 years) using quarterly time 
series data, which comprises China’s house price index (CHPI) and macroeconomic variables such as 
income, mortgage rates and inflation.  The house price growth can be explained by the demand and 
supply factors. The demand factors include real GDP, mortgage rate and the mortgage credit-to-GDP 
ratio, while supply factors consist of the land supply index and real construction cost (Case & Shiller, 
2003; Hui & Yue, 2006; Glindro et al., 2011). However, the supply factors often assumed that the long-
run relationship in the house price is non-existence (Oikarinen, 2009). Compare with the supply factors, 
the growth of housing prices is more closely related to demand variables, such as increases in 
household income (Chen and Li, 2011). Due to the limitation of data, this study includes three demand 
macroeconomic fundamental variables (such as, income, mortgage rates and inflation) to estimate the 
short-run and long-run relationships in the house prices. The data for CHPI, income, mortgage rates 
and inflation were obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, and the People’s Bank of 
China.  
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To standardize the data into similar time frequencies, monthly data of mortgage rates and inflation 
rates were converted into quarterly frequencies. The conversion of data into quarterly frequencies 
was undertaken for several reasons. First, the main housing market data such as China’s house price 
index is reported in quarterly frequency. Therefore, to avoid any distortion in these variables, other 
data were also converted into quarterly frequency. Second, the use of quarterly data is consistent with 
many other housing market studies. For example, Zhao and Gao (2010) analysed the factors which 
impact on Chinese house price fluctuations, using quarterly data of interest rates, inflation rates, stock 
price index, and house price index, from 1994 to 2006. Ghent and Owyang (2009) used quarterly data 
of mortgage rates, inflation (CPI), and T-bills, from 1982:Q1 to 2008:Q4 to examine the relationships 
between macroeconomic variables and house prices in 51 states in the U.S. The authors found that the 
decline in U.S. house prices did not cause a decrease in employment in the U.S. 
In order to complement previous studies which are based either on cross-sectional regressions or the 
panel data approach with city-fixed effects, this current study attempts to test the cities separately. 
Separate testing allows the relationships among house prices and economic fundamental variables to 
vary across the different cities. These cities differ in terms of culture, economic development, and 
other infrastructure, which could affect the estimated coefficients (Leung, Chow, Yiu & Tam, 2010). 
Fang, Zhang and Fan (2002) and Lu (2002) indicate that Chinese urban development has large regional 
differences. Housing reform in urban China is decentralised, with central government implementing 
the housing reform framework and local government implementing housing policies and reform 
programmes. Thus, the housing market environment varies significantly between cities. This current 
study observed the house price bubble at the city level. In order to provide a better overview of China’s 
real estate market, eight Chinese cities were chosen from three different groups based on three years 
of house price growth rates (from 2010 to 2012 inclusive) and the differences in the city tier levels (see 
Table 5.1). According to Jone Lang LaSalle (2009), Chinese cities are divided into different tiers based 
on their GDP levels and population sizes. Table 5.1 shows high growth rates generally in house prices 
per square metre for second and third tier central inner cities with lower house prices (except for 
Fuzhou)1.The low or negative increases in per square metre house price cities are mainly the first and 
second tier cities with higher house prices. 
Table 5.1 House Price Growth Rate of Chinese Major Cities (2010 to 2012 inclusive) 
City Growth rate (2010-2012) Tier of city  House prices (2012) 
per square metre 
(RMB) 
Group one   
Kunming 58.7% T3 5404 
1 The average house price for group one is 5988 RMB per square metre; group two is 6223 RMB per square 
metre; and group three is 9045 RMB per square metre. 
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Nanchang 35.8% T3 5879 
Fuzhou 35.1% T3 10643 
Xining 34.7% T3 4304 
Xi’an 33.4% T2 6224 
Lanzhou 33.3% T3 5420 
Huhehot 31.5% T3 4798 
Changsha 30.1% T3 5602 
Wuhan 24.2% T2 6895 
Shijiazhuang 23.8% T3 4713 
Group two   
Urumqi 23.2% T3 5255 
Zhengzhou 22.8% T3 5643 
Qingdao 18.9% T2 7583 
Chongqing 18.1% T2 4804 
Shenyang 17.2% T2 5989 
Yinchuan 16% T3 4187 
Chengdu 14.9% T2 6678 
Nanning 13.7% T3 5619 
Guangzhou 13.1% T1 12000 
Guiyang 5.7% T3 4472 
Group three   
Nanjing 4.9% T2 9674 
Changchun 4.6% T3 5273 
Hefei 3.5% T3 5754 
Tianjin 0.9% T2 8009 
Ha’erbin -1.6% T3 5113 
Beijing -3% T1 16553 
Shanghai -3.5% T1 13869 
Hangzhou -6.8% T2 13292 
Taiyuan -9.6% T3 6404 
Haikou -19.3% T3 6512 
  
Our study focuses on eight Chinese cities, namely, Kunming, Xi’an, Urumqi, Zhengzhou, Guangzhou, 
Nanjing, Changchun and Beijing based on the house price growth rates and the tier levels of the cities. 
These cities are in the top house price growth rate brackets in each of the city groups, which cover the 
first tier, second tier and third tier cities. For example, Kunming (T3) is a third tier city with the fastest 
house price growth rate in group one, making it the leading city in group one. Xi’an (T2) has the fastest 
growing house prices of the second tier cities in group one, making it the leading second tier city in 
group one. These cities were chosen to provide a better understanding of local housing markets and 
differences of housing market status between first tier, second tier and third tier cities. 
5.2.1 Chinese House Price Index (CHPI) 
House price index is an important index for academic researchers to use in order to gain a better 
understanding of the determinants of house prices, the efficiency of housing markets, analyses of 
housing affordability, and to test whether housing bubbles exist (Bourassa, Hoesli & Sun, 2006). Kim 
and Suh (1993) use the house price index to measure changes in house prices, and to investigate the 
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possibility that speculation caused the prices of houses to deviate from their given long-run equilibrium 
levels in Korea and Japan. The authors’ results suggest that a growing rational bubble existed in Korea 
and Japan for the period of 1974 to 1989. A house price index could be used to measure the changes 
in house prices that influence the current value of houses (Lum, 2004). For instance, an increase in 
purchase prices leads to an increase in the expected asset prices of houses in the future. The increase 
in house prices tends to induce potential buyers to purchase houses before the prices increase too 
much, and the resulting increase in demand tends to accelerate the pace of the price increases (Case 
& Shiller, 1988; Yoo & Nelson, 1990; Kim & Suh, 1993). The National Bureau Statistics (NBS) of China 
started to construct quarterly housing price indices for 35 large- and medium-size cities in 1997. The 
construction of the “NBS 35-City Index” is derived from raw information on housing transaction prices 
collected from the sample housing complexes and send to the NBS by the local authorities. The average 
transaction price is calculated in each month and compared with the same month in the previous year 
(Fang et al., 2015).  
The Chinese real estate market is relatively new. It was established in 1998 when the government 
abandoned the welfare housing system and allowed people to purchase their own houses. Thus, the 
time length of the real estate market data is rather limited. The China Statistics Bureau (SBC) provides 
data for the house price indices of 30 Chinese cities from 1998 to 2013. The indices are recorded on a 
quarterly basis. The house price index (residential commercial house price index) is calculated with 
respect to the previous year quarterly data, and only the growth rates of the house prices are reported, 
and not the actual price levels for the quarterly data. 
Levin and Wright (1997) suggest that the most common factors used to study house price movements 
are income, inflation and mortgage rates. This is consistent with other studies which show the 
development of the Chinese housing market has been influenced by rising incomes, rapid pace of 
urbanisation, and expansion of the mortgage business by commercial banks (Peng, Tam & Yiu, 2005; 
Yang & Shen, 2008; Shih, Li & Qin, 2014). In order to capture the effects of the determinants on Chinese 
house prices, the exogenous factors such as income, mortgage rates and inflation are used as 
fundamental variables in this current study. 
5.2.2 Income Variables 
Income is a commonly used proxy of the borrower’ financial wealth and the borrower’s ability to 
purchase a house (Dinh & Kleimeiter, 2007). There is no doubt that income is an important factor 
influencing the consumption of housing (Hou, 2010). Case and Shiller (2003) investigated the 
relationship between house prices and personal income using quarterly data, from 1985:Q1 to 
2002:Q3 covering 50 states in the U.S. The authors’ finding reveals a positive relationship between 
income and house prices; whereby an increase in income levels leads to higher house prices. Ortalo-
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Magne and Rady (2006) argue that a change in personal income will induce changes in monetary 
liquidity, which in turn influences housing demand and real estate prices. 
Black et al. (2006) indicate that disposable income is the key factor for constructing a time-variable 
present-value model for studying house price bubbles. This is consistent with the studies of Case and 
Shiller (2003), Black et al. (2006), and Bischoff (2012). For example, Case and Shiller’s (2003) study 
reveals income alone almost completely explains house price increases in the vast majority of the 
states of the U.S. The authors’ findings report that a lagged appreciation in the housing fundamentals 
(such as income, employment and interest rates) with a coefficient of 0.3 is considered a bubble 
builder. Bischoff’s (2012) study combined the real estate model with the spatial equilibrium approach 
to investigate the interdependency of house prices, rental prices, building and land prices, and income, 
in one simultaneous equilibrium analysis. The author used the cross-sectional data in a study of a 
majority of German cities in 2005. The result shows that the interaction of real estate prices and 
income is predominantly significant and positive. 
5.2.3 Mortgage Rate Variables 
Mortgage rates have been widely used to estimate house prices. Bank mortgage rates affect the 
potential borrowers’ borrowing decisions and the actions of the borrowers; the mortgage rates 
charged by the bank could determine the demand for capital by the borrowers (Petersen & Rajan, 
1994). Himmelberg et al. (2005) point out that house prices are predictably more volatile in fast-
growing locations where house prices are especially sensitive to changes in mortgage rates. The 
authors argue that low mortgage rates lead to higher housing demand and that this contributed to the 
U.S. subprime loan crisis in 2007. Hubbard and Mayer (2009) point out that declining mortgage rates 
are the common factor with booming house prices. The authors’ results show that house prices across 
the U.S. cities adjusted upwards 85 percent due to the changes in the after-tax costs, which is driven 
by changes in the mortgage rates. For instance, a decline in mortgage rates from six percent to five 
percent could reduce the cost of owning a house by up to 16 percent, and an increase in house prices 
of 13.6 percent. McDonald and Stokes (2013) used the Granger causality analysis, and monthly housing 
price index for the period 1987 to 2010, for 10 American cities, to determine the causes of the housing 
bubble in the U.S. Their results indicate that the interest rate policies of the Federal Reserve from 2001 
to 2004, which pushed down the mortgage rates, as one of the important causes of the housing bubble. 
The mortgage rate is an important factor that influences the Chinese house price index. House prices 
in China have surged rapidly over the last decade particularly in the first-tier cities such as Beijing and 
Shanghai. Rising house prices lead to a large gap between house prices and people’s incomes, which 
implies that the increase in people’s incomes cannot keep up with the rise in house prices. For example, 
in 2003, the national average annual earnings for a couple was about 22,304 RMB, and the time 
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required to purchase a 300,000 RMB apartment with 30 percent of the household’s total earnings is 
44.7 years (Burell, 2006). The gap between house prices and people’s incomes leads to an increase in 
demand for mortgage loans. Thus, the mortgage rate has a close relationship with housing demand 
and future house prices. 
5.2.4 Inflation (Consumer Price Index) 
The consumer price index (CPI) captures the general price increases due to the inflationary 
mechanisms. A positive relationship is hypothesized with the CHPI and the CPI, as housing is one of the 
largest expenditures for the Chinese people. House prices are expected to be in line with general price 
increases (Leung et al., 2010). 
Development in the housing market also has an impact on the consumer price index. According to 
Meltzer (1995), there is a connection between monetary growth and the consumer price index with 
house prices being the intermediary, which means that any rise in house prices may eventually be 
transmitted to consumer price inflation. Zhang (2013) used a standard multivariate dynamic model to 
examine the relationships between money, house prices and the consumer price index (inflation) in 
China from 1998 to 2010. The author reveals that when construction goods’ prices are sticky, monetary 
growth initially changes the house prices; the changes in house prices are then transmitted to 
consumer price inflation in China. The results indicate that the recent real estate market boom 
dominates the underlying pattern of inflation behaviour in China. In addition, the development of the 
housing market may increase the consumer price inflation because the housing market has become 
an important real capital market in China. Rising house prices may transmit to the goods market and 
eventually lead to increases in consumer price inflation (Meltzer, 1995; Zhang, 2013).   
5.3 Conclusion  
This chapter has explained the models used to investigate the existence of house price bubbles in the 
Chinese housing market. This current study uses time-series data of the CHPI, income, mortgage rates, 
and inflation, from 1999:Q1 to 2013:Q4. This current study also uses price to income ratio and VECM 
techniques to test for the existence of house price bubbles, whereas previous studies have relied on 
only one technique.  
The co-integration test of VAR was applied to investigate the long co-integration relationships between 
the CHPI and the macroeconomic fundamental variables. Where there were no co-integration 
relationships, the VAR model was used to estimate the short-run relationships between 
macroeconomic fundamental variables and the CHPI. Otherwise, the VECM model was applied to 
investigate the short-run and long-run relationships between the CHPI and the macroeconomic 
fundamental variables. The long-run equilibrium values were also obtained from the VECM estimation 
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results. In addition, the deviation or overvaluation of the CHPI from its long-run equilibrium price by 
22 percent is regarded as a house price bubble in this current study. 
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                tax to 1% from 1.5% and stamp tax waived 
           3. 2010 April: down payment on second home increased to 50% from 40%; increase in down 
                payments on first home larger than 90 square metres to 30% from 20% 
           4. These figures are based on the calculation from the annual growth rates of the real house prices. 
               For example, the annual growth rate for year 2004 equal to the real house price of 2004 minus 
               the real house price of 2003, and over the real house price of 2003. 
           5. The data shows changes in 2008 is relatively bigger than other changes within the whole sample  
                period. This could be due to the restrictive policy introduced by China’s central bank to cool down the  
                the heat in the housing market in 2008. But this is not new in the sample period. Chinese government  
                introduced many policies prior to 2008 and at best we can say the 2008 policy is more effective or 
                more stronger than others policies. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 shows that house price growth movements for the period 2002 to 2013 among the eight 
Chinese cities in which the house price growth exhibits volatility, are similar. Figure 6.1 shows a 
continuous increase in the house price growth rates from 2002 to 2007. The annual house price growth 
rates reached its peak in 2007 and abruptly declined in 2008, and the negative house price growth 
rates appeared in Nanjing and Qingdao in 2008. House prices increased rapidly in 2009, reached a new 
high in 2011 and fell in 2012. The overall trend of the house price growth rates move in similar 
direction. However, there is heterogeneity of house price growth rates across different Chinese cities. 
The reaction speed to the government policies vary among Chinese cities, and land prices across 
Chinese cities are different. The house price growth rates in China are not driven by construction costs 
alone, but also by the rising land prices. The gap in land prices is large between Chinese cities. For 
example, in 2011, the residential land prices in the most expensive market was RMB 5,470 per square 
metre in Shanghai, and RMB 222 per square meter in the least expensive city such as Urumqi (Deng et 
al., 2012). The national real land values have risen around 10% per year on average. In Beijing, the land 
prices was 27.5% per annum since 2004 (Wu et al., 2015).The land price in Urumqi exhibits negative 
land price growth from 2007 to 2011 (Deng et al., 2012).   
Figure 6.1 shows that house prices exhibit large swings with cyclical downturns from macroeconomic 
conditions, and that the government attempts to curb either the overheating or overcooling housing 
market. Government policies tend to prevent either price appreciation or depreciation, and to avoid 
the excessive speculation and to avoid the housing bubble bursting in China’s housing market (Liu, 
2014).  
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Figure 6.2 Comparison between Disposable Income Growth Rate and the Property  
                   Price Growth Rate in Beijing from 2000 to 2012 (in percentage) 
 
 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Figure 6.3 Comparison between the Mortgage Rate Growth Rate and the Property 
                   Price Growth Rate in Beijing from 2000 to 2012 (in percentage) 
 
 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China and Bank of China 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the growth rate movement of house prices in Beijing2. The trend between 
the average annual growth rate and the house price growth rate of other Chinese cities are similar 
with Beijing. However, the disparity of the growth rate of income and the growth rate of house prices 
is smaller in second-tier and third-tier Chinese cities.  For example, the average annual growth rate of 
per capita disposable income for urban residents was 11.7 percent in the second-tier cities, and the 
house price growth in the second–tier cities grew on average by 16.8 percent from 2003 to 2007 ( Fang 
et al., 2015). The figures show the growth rates of income and mortgage rates in a nonlinear trend. 
2 Due to the limitation of data availability (no national data available for house prices and disposable income) 
this current study uses Beijing as an example to compare the growth rates between house prices, disposable 
income and mortgage rates. 
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The growth rate of house prices in Beijing (dotted line) is different from the macroeconomic 
fundamental variables such as income and mortgage rates, particularly for the period 2008 to 2010 
(U.S. post-subprime crisis period). According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics, housing sales 
prices in 70 Chinese cities rose by 12.4 percent per year from 2009 to May 2010. During the same 
period, nationwide sales prices for commercial and residential real estate increased 22 percent and 
19.5 percent, respectively (Yurichuk, 2011). However, the growth rate of disposable income is much 
slower and the mortgage growth rate is negative. Disposable income increased from 6490.2 RMB to 
7064.2 RMB annually; the income growth rate is 8.84 percent for the period 2008 to 2009. The 
mortgage rate decreased from 7.83 percent in 2008:Q1 to 5.94 percent in 2009:Q1. Thus, house prices 
in Beijing heavily out-grew disposable income and the mortgage rate in the two periods (2008 and 
2010). Both figures also show a positive relationship between house prices and disposable income. 
This relationship is consistent with housing market theory; more houses are purchased when 
households’ incomes increase (Barot & Takala, 1998).  
Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 show Chinese house price movements rely heavily on government policies and 
macroeconomic conditions. Chinese house prices exhibited an increasing trend from 2002 to 2007, 
until the government intervened by tightening loan policies and raising mortgage interest rates 
throughout 2007; the mortgage rate increased from 6.12 percent in early 2006 to 7.83 percent at the 
end of 2007 (Ahuja et al., 2010). The down payment for first time homeowners increased to 20 percent 
while for second home owners it increased to 40 percent from 30 percent (Barth, Lea & Li, 2012). The 
Chinese government imposed restrictive policies to bring house prices down to a ‘reasonable level’. 
The property sector made up about 12 percent of the GDP in 2012; a collapse in house prices would 
have a significant negative spillover effect on the overall economy (Chen & Funke, 2012). To maintain 
stability in the economy, reasonable growth in house prices is necessary. Wang and Liu’s (2007) study 
identified three Chinese government intervention objectives in the housing market: (1) to stabilize 
house prices, (2) to restrain investment in housing development, and (3) to improve the efficiency of 
the housing market.   
House prices dropped rapidly during 2007 to 2008 in response to the subprime loan crisis (Zhang & 
Cheng, 2010; Guan, Jiao, Zhu & Ren, 2013; Ning & Hoon, 2012). The crisis affected China’s economy 
through both trade and financial channels. For example, China’s exports to the U.S. decreased 12.3 
percent in 2008 (Yurichuk, 2011). The Shanghai Stock Exchange plunged more than 60 percent in mid-
2008. The Chinese economy registered one of its slowest growth rates of 6.8 percent in the last quarter 
of 2008. Economic growth in 2008 was nine percent, which ended China’s nearly four years of double 
digit growth (Tong & Zheng, 2010). To address the global financial crisis, the state council of China 
announced in October 2008, a four trillion Renminbi (RMB) stimulus package to boost the economy. 
The government also encouraged banks to issue 9.5 trillion RMB in new loans in 2009, and 7.95 trillion 
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RMB in new loans in 2010. This massive capital injection was critical for achieving its GDP growth 
target, but the excess liquidity triggered a huge surge in house prices in China (Yao, Luo & Loh, 2011). 
House prices growth rates in the four first-tier cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen) rose 
from 24 percent to 42 percent in 2010 (EIU Views Wire, 2010). Rising house prices during 2008 to 2010 
in China was caused not only by excess liquidity but also by the irrational behaviour of consumers and 
investors; where investors take excessive risk when house prices rise, but become overcautious when 
prices decline (Yao & Luo, 2009). Chinese people purchase a house as an investment, with an over-
optimistic behaviour and believe that house prices will increase in the future. According to Glaeser et 
al. (2008) a housing market with over-optimistic home-buyers is inelastic. The speculation behaviour 
left many vacant houses for a long period of time in China; about 20 percent to 30 percent vacancy 
rate in major Chinese cities in 2006 (Mak, Choy & Ho, 2007). At the beginning of 2010, the State Council 
of China issued two policies to control the irrational demand in houses. The first policy issued in April 
2010 revealed that the down-payment required on a second home was raise to 50 percent from 40 
percent; and the down-payment for the first home larger than 90 square metres increased to 30 
percent from 20 percent (Barth, Lea and Li, 2012). The second policy issued by the People’s Bank of 
China was to adjust the reserve rates from 15.5 percent to 17.0 percent at the beginning of 2010 to 
cool down the housing market. The government intervened in the housing market because house 
prices in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai more than tripled between 1999 and 2010. The 
stability of the housing market is important for China’s economy, as the total value of China’s 
residential housing market reached 91.5 trillion RMB at the end of 2009, nearly three times the  
nominal GDP of the same year (Zhang, Hua & Zhao, 2011).  
Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 provide some information on the behaviour of the Chinese housing price index, 
and macroeconomic fundamental variables such as income and mortgage rates, but the figures are 
insufficient to draw conclusive evidence about the existence of house price bubbles in China. The main 
objective of this current study is to test whether the Chinese housing market experienced a house price 
bubble between 1999:Q1 to 2013:Q4 using several econometric methods. This includes the simple 
price-to-income ratio method, the vector autoregressive model, the co-integration test, and the vector 
error correction model (VECM). This current study also examines the relationships between the 
Chinese house price index and the macroeconomic fundamental variables such as inflation, income 
and mortgage rates. 
6.2 Results of Econometric Methods 
6.2.1 Housing Affordability Measures 
The price-to-income ratio is the most common indicator used to provide evidence of the existence of 
a housing bubble in the Chinese housing market. The ratio is an index of price to income, which 
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represents the consumers’ payment capacity. A higher house price-to-income ratio means lower 
payment capacity. Internationally, the benchmark index of house price-to-income ratio in developing 
countries is “7”, which means no bubble exists in the market if the price-to-income ratio is below “7”. 
Because of the characteristic of the housing system and the unreported income, the benchmark index 
used in China studies is “8” (Ning & Hoon, 2012). Shen (2012) reveals the average price-to-income ratio 
was 9.1 for urban residents in China in 2009. Lin, Chang and Chen (2014) suggest that a benchmark 
value for price-to-income ratio is more than 10. Thus, a household with a price-to-income ratio over 
10 would have a serious housing affordability problem. When we compare the price-to-income ratio 
with other nations, such the U.S. (2.9) and U.K. (5.1), it is easy to conclude that houses are much less 
affordable in China. The price-to-income ratio reveals the home-buyers payment capacity, and by 
comparing the ratio with the “benchmark index” this study can test whether the house price is rational 
and whether a housing bubble exists in the market. The national average annual growth rate of house 
price was 10.5 percent for the period of 2009 to 2013 (National Bureau Statistics of China, 2014). Thus, 
this current study uses “11”3  as the benchmark index to indicate the presence of housing bubbles in 
China. The housing Price to Income Ratio (PIR) in Chinese cities is higher than that in Europe and 
America may be the result of the cultural background. Many Chinese people believe that land is the 
only thing in the world worth working for. Chinese homebuyers who purchased houses as investments, 
had high budgets and low income; purchased houses that were newly constructed or located 
downtown exhibit relatively high PIR (Lin et al., 2014). Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) used the price to 
income ratio (PIR) data from 51 countries to analyse the various countries’ housing affordability, and 
the study shows that the housing PIR in Beijing (14.8) is much higher than in Europe and America (such 
as Munich 9.6, Toronto 4.2 and Washington D.C. 3.9). To provide further descriptive evidence of the 
existence of housing bubbles in the Chinese housing market, this current study calculated the price-
to-income ratio among the eight Chinese cities for the period 2002 to 2012 (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 Price-to-Income Ratio of Eight Chinese Cities 
 Beijing  Changchun Qingdao Nanjing Guangzhou Kunming Xian Urumqi 
2002 9.83 9.73 8.23 9.79 9.79 8.83 9.64 7.63 
2003 9.63 8.45 8.20 9.37 9.75 8.36 8.47 7.79 
2004 8.93 8.01 8.56 8.72 9.37 8.09 9.53 7.14 
2005 10.47 7.84 10.04 9.37 10.24 8.14 9.74 7.21 
2006 11.08 7.39 9.84 9.10 11.52 8.14 9.95 6.83 
2007 14.55 8.29 10.74 9.18 14.30 7.81 8.96 7.35 
2008 14.13 7.82 8.81 7.72 13.35 7.92 8.79 7.95 
2009 14.84 8.59 9.07 10.06 12.50 7.46 7.96 8.04 
3 Previous studies use different price-to-income ratio benchmarks to indicate housing bubbles. For example, the 
price-to-income ratio benchmark is “8” in Ning and Hoon’s (2012) study, “9.1” in Shen’s (2012) study, and 
more than “10” in Lin, Chang and Chen’s (2014) study. Thus, there is no consensus on which is the best price-
to-income ratio benchmark. 
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2010 17.70 9.92 9.66 10.93 13.33 6.36 8.30 9.38 
2011 14.15 10.06 9.43 9.58 12.19 7.35 9.59 9.61 
2012 13.62 7.83 8.91 9.78 11.91 7.69 9.01 8.80 
*Note: The price income ratio is calculated based on equation (5.1) (see section 5.1.1) 
 
Table 6.1 summarises the annual price-to-income ratios of eight Chinese cities, from 2002 to 2012. The 
results show the price-to-income ratios of Beijing and Guangzhou are above the benchmark index, for 
the period 2006 to 2012. The ratios of the other cities are under the benchmark index (Changchun, 
Qingdao, Nanjing, Kunming, Xian and Urumqi), for the period 2002 to 2012. The results show that a 
housing bubble exists in Beijing and Guangzhou. The results are consistent with Ning and Hoon’s (2012) 
estimation, based on the price-to-income ratio, who investigated the housing price bubble in Beijing 
and Shanghai, for the period 2001 to 2010. The authors’ results show the price-to-income ratio of 
Beijing is above the benchmark index from 2001 to 2010, and that the ratio reached its peak in 2010. 
The results reveal the presence of a housing bubble in Beijing from 2001 to 2010, and the housing 
bubble boom during most of 2010.  
Table 6.1 shows a clear upward trend of price-to-income ratios in Beijing and Guangzhou from 2003 to 
2010 (the ratio reaches its peak of 17.70 in 2010 in Beijing, and 14.30 in Guangzhou in 2007). In 
contrast, house prices in Tokyo were 15 times the income, and U.S. house prices were five to six times 
the income, when the Japanese and U.S. housing bubbles burst in 1990 and 2006, respectively (Fawley 
& Wen, 2013). However, the conditions in China are quite difference with the U.S. and other developed 
countries because of the following reasons: (1) the substantial unreported income (‘grey’ income) 
caused the biased of the price-to-income ratio, (2) Chinese commercial banks typically consider 50% 
as the upper bound for the ratio of monthly debt service to monthly disposable income. Given the 
current mortgage with a 30 year term, this results in a 30 percent down payment and a 6.55 percent 
mortgage rate. (3) the lack of proper taxes in China has contributed to the high price-to-income ratio 
observed in China compare to that in the U.S., whereby homeowners in the U.S. pay one percent to 
two percent annual property tax of home values to local townships, while homeowners in China do 
not pay any property tax (Wang & Woo, 2011, Deng, Wei and Wu, 2015, Fang et al., 2015, Wu, Gyourko 
& Deng, 2015). The high price-to-income ratio in Beijing and Guangzhou is consistent with the standard 
Chinese underwriting, which presumes continuous high income growth in first tier cities (Fang et al., 
2015, Wu, Gyourko & Deng,2015). Therefore, the price-to-income ratio 4  is an inadequate 
measurement of house prices in China (Wang, 2012). Income is one of the drivers of house prices; 
however, population, land prices and mortgage rates should also be included in the analysis (Dreger & 
4 The price-to-income ratio overestimates the share of income in housing; (1) there is large amount of 
unreported income in China; (2) some households may purchase a house less than 30 square metres (Wu et al., 
2012). 
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Zhang, 2010). According to Mak, Choy and Ho’s (2007) study, the wealth of the Chinese people is 
obtained from various sources, including income received from primary and secondary jobs, and 
investing in stocks and private businesses. Fang et al. (2015) studies 120 Chinese cities and find that 
households from the lower end of the income distribution still are able to access financing and 
purchase homes, even in cities with high house price appreciation. Hence, salary should not be the 
sole determinant when testing for housing bubbles. In order to determine the macroeconomic 
fundamental factors that influence house prices and housing bubbles in China, this current study used 
other econometric techniques. 
6.2.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Prior to estimating a regression with time series data, it is necessary to verify that all variables are 
stationary; if not the empirical results can be spurious. The apparently significant regression results 
could be obtained from unrelated data when non-stationary series are used in the regression analysis, 
which means the results may spuriously indicate a significant relationship when there is none. The ADF 
test is therefore, carried out to eliminate any spurious regression problem in the time series data 
(Chinese house price index, income, mortgage rates and inflation) and to determine the order of 
integration of all the data. The lag length is based on the Bartlett criteria int(12(T/100)1/4) where T is 
the sample size. This current study uses quarterly data from 1999:Q1 to 2013:Q4. Thus, the sample 
size is 60, and based on the Bartlett criteria a lag length of 10 was obtained by the study. Table 6.2 
reports the ADF test results for the levels and for the first differences of the time series data 
(macroeconomic fundamental variables included in this study). The results show that all the variables 
are non-stationary in levels, but are stationary in their first differences (integrated of order one), 
denoted I (1) at the 5% significance level. 
Table 6.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test (for Eight Chinese Cities) 
Variable  LEVELs FIRST DIFFERENCEs 
ADF t-stat P-value  ADF t-stat P-value 
Kunming 
CHPI -3.837779 0.0004 -7.049849 0.0000 
Inflation (CPI) -1.916979 0.6323 -7.840017 0.0000 
Income 0.145349 0.9970 -4.551202 0.0031 
Mortgage rate -2.530264 0.1136 -6.685334 0.0000 
Xian 
CHPI -4.930294 0.0009 -5.650543 0.0001 
Inflation (CPI) -4.270371 0.0067 -6.846267 0.0000 
Income -0.228730 0.9908 -4.122674 0.0103 
Mortgage rate -2.530264 0.1136 -6.685334 0.0000 
Urumqi 
CHPI -4.096173 0.0108 -4.599330 0.0026 
Inflation (CPI) -5.298965 0.0003 -4.691249 0.0020 
Income -0.004058 0.9953 -15.65499 0.0000 
Mortgage rate -2.530264 0.1136 -6.685334 0.0000 
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Qingdao 
CHPI -2.210316 0.4751 -7.658580 0.0000 
Inflation (CPI) -3.489358 0.0498 -5.246472 0.0004 
Income -0.237197 0.9906 -3.668366 0.0331 
Mortgage rate -2.530264 0.1136 -6.685334 0.0000 
Guangzhou 
CHPI -1.561014 0.4959 -7.031190 0.0000 
Inflation (CPI) -3.517046 0.0110 -5.256271 0.0000 
Income 0.696428 0.9995 -3.574231 0.0422 
Mortgage rate -2.530264 0.1136 -6.685334 0.0000 
Nanjing 
CHPI -1.749946 0.7161 -7.019041 0.0000 
Inflation (CPI) -4.919647 0.0010 -5.501889 0.0002 
Income -0.801243 0.9591 -3.534463 0.0455 
Mortgage rate -2.530264 0.1136 -6.685334 0.0000 
Changchun 
CHPI -3.470122 0.0521 -6.522935 0.0000 
Inflation (CPI) -4.132798 0.0098 -6.810372 0.0000 
Income -0.028007 0.9949 -3.536072 0.0453 
Mortgage rate -2.530264 0.1136 -6.685334 0.0000 
Beijing 
CHPI -2.695749 0.0809 -5.799803 0.0000 
Inflation (CPI) -4.367431 0.0009 -5.735619 0.0000 
Income -0.992805 0.9365 -4.320567 0.0060 
Mortgage rate -2.530264 0.1136 -6.685334 0.0000 
Source: Author’s calculations 
6.2.3 Co-integration Test and Vector Error Correction Model 
The unit root test results discussed in section 6.2.2 show all the series are integrated of the same order 
at the first differences. These stable linear combinations possibly exist between the variables, which 
reflect the long-term equilibrium relationships between the variables, namely the co-integration 
relationships (Wu & Duan, 2012). The Johansen and Juselius test (1990) is applied to identify the long-
run relationships (co-integration) between the Chinese house price indices and the macroeconomic 
fundamental variables. The co-integration tests are conducted with the vector autoregressive model 
(VAR), followed by vector error correction model (VECM) to test for the long-run relationships. The 
VAR model is used to determine the number of co-integration relationships among the series. If co-
integration relationships exist between the macroeconomic fundamental variables and the house price 
indices, the VECM model is applied to investigate the short-run and long-run relationships. Otherwise, 
the VAR model is retained to examine the short-run relationships between the macroeconomic 
fundamental variables and the house price indices.  
The choice of lag is important for estimating the VAR model. In choosing the lag length, one must weigh 
two opposing considerations; the curse of dimensionality and the correct specification of the model 
(Canova, 1995). This current study chooses two lag-lengths for the VAR model specification. According 
to Belke et al. (2008) and Wu and Duan (2012, p.16), the two lags for VAR are considered sufficient to 
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avoid any serial correlation among the residuals. This current study used the Schwarz (SC) and Akaike 
(AIC) criteria to select the optimal VAR lag length (Campbell & Perron, 1991; Braum & Mittnik, 1993; 
Diebold et al., 1994; Ventzislar & Lutz, 2005). The results of the lag length criteria for the eight Chinese 
cities are summarised in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 The VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for the Eight Chinese Cities 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
Kunming 
0 -805.2629 NA 15465492 27.90562 28.04772 27.96097 
1 -656.4083 272.0446* 158677.8* 23.32442* 24.03492* 23.60118* 
2 -643.4615 21.87556 177781.2 23.42971 24.70860 23.92786 
Xian 
0 -801.5427 NA 13603531 27.77733 27.91943 27.83269 
1 -648.1221 280.3894 119240.9 23.03869 23.74919 23.31545 
2 -626.2333 36.98450* 98148.15* 22.83563* 23.11453* 23.31269* 
Urumqi 
0 -799.7440 NA 12785417 27.71531 27.85741 27.77066 
1 -652.7794 268.5905 140013.8 23.19929 23.90979 23.47604 
2 -629.9190 38.62620* 111449.2* 22.96272* 23.24162* 23.46088* 
Qingdao 
0 -849.0162 NA  69919632  29.41435  29.55645  29.46970 
1 -670.7820 325.7383* 260479.2* 23.82007* 24.53057* 24.09682* 
2 -657.4950  22.45055  288434.0  23.91362  25.19252  24.41178 
Guangzhou 
0 -850.7304 NA 74177149 29.47346 29.61556 29.52881 
1 -715.0929 24.78892* 1200489.* 25.34803* 26.05853* 25.62478* 
2 -699.3777 26.55335 1222553. 25.35785 26.63675 25.85601 
Nanjing 
0 -858.7484 NA 97801495 29.74995 29.89204 29.80530 
1 -714.1374 26.42891* 1161578.* 25.31508* 26.02558* 25.59184* 
2 -698.4845 26.44804 1185472. 25.32705 26.60595 25.82521 
Changchun 
0 -812.7606 NA 20028476 28.16416 28.30626 28.21951 
1 -626.0805 34.11741 55761.82 22.27864 22.98913 22.55539 
2 -604.9420 35.71670* 47101.04* 22.10145* 22.38034* 22.53271* 
Beijing 
0 -871.7905 NA 1.53e+08 30.19967 30.34177 30.25502 
1 -681.6908 347.4236 379436.4 24.19623 25.90673 24.47299 
2 -663.4172 30.87605* 353782.2* 24.11784* 25.39673* 24.13267* 
Note: *indicates the identified lag number by different criteria 
 
The results in Table 6.3 report that both SC and AIC criteria suggest the inclusion of one lag for 
Kunming, Qingdao, Guangzhou and Nanjing, and two lags for Xian, Urumqi, Changchun and Beijing. 
This current study chose one lag length for the VECM model specification for Kunming, Qingdao, 
Guangzhou and Nanjing, and two lag lengths for Xian, Urumqi, Changchun and Beijing. 
In this current study, the restriction imposed in the VAR model led to the formation of a VECM model. 
The VECM model is a VAR model in the first difference with a vector of co-integrating residuals. Prior 
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to estimating the VECM model, this current study employed the Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
procedure and the Trace Test ( Traceλ  ) to select an appropriate model and to select lags. Table 6.4 
shows that the trace statistics tests reveal the existence of co-integration relationships between the 
variables for the eight Chinese cities (with no trend included in the co-integration and in the VAR 
model). The trace test suggests one co-integration relationship in six cities and no co-integration 
relationships between the house price indices and macroeconomic fundamental variables in Qingdao 
and Nanjing. 
Table 6.4 Model Selection for VECM of Eight Chinese Cities 
H0 Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 5% P value 
Kunming 
r = 0  0.357745  51.59579  47.85613  0.0214** 
r ≤1  0.239455  25.91517  29.79707  0.1313 
r ≤2  0.148761  10.03944  15.49471  0.2777 
Xian 
r = 0  0.382789  53.96778  47.85613  0.0120** 
r ≤1  0.299653  26.46273  29.79707  0.1155 
r ≤2  0.099131  6.160515  15.49471  0.6766 
Urumqi 
r = 0  0.382524  55.50255  47.85613  0.0081*** 
r ≤ 1  0.241392  28.02197  29.79707  0.0790 
r ≤2  0.128597  12.27461  15.49471  0.1442 
Qingdao  
r = 0  0.352730  46.21742  47.85613  0.0707 
r ≤1  0.214591  20.98789  29.79707  0.3584 
r ≤2  0.087580  6.977967  15.49471  0.5802 
Guangzhou 
r = 0  0.495715  59.95551  47.85613  0.0025*** 
r ≤1  0.214062  20.24786 29.79707  0.4062 
r ≤2  0.101274  6.276949 15.49471  0.6628 
Nanjing 
r = 0  0.330723  43.63451  47.85613  0.1179 
r ≤ 1  0.221809  20.34415  29.79707  0.3998 
r ≤2  0.090557  5.798757  15.49471  0.7192 
Changchun 
r = 0  0.459706  63.00485  47.85613  0.0010*** 
r ≤ 1  0.293894  27.91330  29.79707  0.0812 
r ≤ 2  0.091654  8.077895  15.49471  0.4571 
Beijing 
r = 0  0.476176  58.01238  47.85613  0.0042*** 
r ≤1  0.203789  21.15617  29.79707  0.3480 
r ≤2  0.094260  8.166373  15.49471  0.4478 
Note: **and ***indicate significant at the 5% level, and at the 1% level. Mackinnon-Haug-Michelis  
(1999) p-values 
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Based on the co-integration test criteria results, the VAR model was determined to no longer be 
appropriate to test the relationships among the variables for Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Guangzhou, 
Changchun and Beijing. Thus, the VECM model was computed to determine if the house price indices 
deviates from the actual house price indices. The results in Table 6.4 show no co-integration 
relationships among the variables in Nanjing and Qingdao, which indicates there are no long-run co-
integration relationships between the house price indices and the macroeconomic fundamental 
variables of the two cities. Thus, the VAR model is retained to estimate the short-run relationships 
between the macroeconomic fundamental variables and the house price indices in Qingdao and 
Nanjing.   
A further restricted VECM test was conducted to test for the weak exogeneity on income, mortgage 
rates and inflation. These restrictions on the variables in the restricted VECM model are jointly 
estimated against the variables in the unrestricted VECM model with the 23χ  test statistic. A non-
rejection of these restrictions if the p-value of 23χ   is more than the 5% significance level, implies that 
the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity is accepted in this study, and the restricted VECM model is 
therefore used. Otherwise the unrestricted model is retained. 
Table 6.5 reports the summary of the results of  23χ  obtained from the restricted VECM model via 
Eviews 8.0 software. The results show the P-values are less than 5% in most of the cities except for 
Xian, which implies rejection of the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity in Kunming, Urumqi, 
Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing, but acceptance of the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity in Xian. 
Thus, this current study applied the restricted VECM model for Xian and retained the unrestricted 
VECM model for the other five cities. 
Table 6.5 Results for Weak Exogeneity Test (from restricted VECM) 
 Kunming Xian Urumqi Guangzhou Changchun Beijing 
2
3χ  1.762 5.872 8.0701 27.5924 10.6482 12.5527 
P-value 0.023 0.118 0.0446 0.0004 0.0138 0.0057 
 
6.2.4 Short-run Relationships between House Price Indices and Macroeconomic 
Fundamentals 
The results of the short-run relationships between the macroeconomic fundamental variables and the 
house price indices of the eight Chinese cities estimated by the VAR model, and the unrestricted and 
restricted VECM model, are reported in Appendix One. These estimated results confirm that the 
Chinese housing markets are regional specific. The short-run relationships between the 
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macroeconomic fundamental variables and the house price indices are different among the eight 
cities. The results further show that different cities’ house prices respond differently to the changes in 
macroeconomic fundamental factors.  
The results shown in Appendix One reveal that in the short-run, inflation and the house price indices 
are significant and positively correlated in Xian, Changchun and Qingdao. The coefficients of inflation 
are negative and insignificant in Guangzhou, Beijing and Nanjing. The significant and positive 
relationships between inflation and house prices can be explained in the short-run, where the house 
buyers are over-optimistic and expect the asset price to grow rapidly along with the land price and 
construction costs. House buyers expect to gain profits from the houses they invest in. The results are 
consistent with Qiu’s (2011) study, which shows positive relationships between inflation and the house 
price indices. The author’s study examines the relationships between house price dynamics and 
inflation in China using the autoregressive distribution lag model, with data covering the period from 
2004 to 2010. The study investigated the relationships between inflation and house price indices in 
the short-run.  
This current study results show that Chinese house prices are not sensitive to changes in income and 
mortgage rates in the short-run. The income and mortgage rate coefficients are insignificant in seven 
cities, except there is a significant and positive relationship between the mortgage rate and the house 
price index in Kunming. The mixed relationship between disposable income and house price is 
insignificant among the eight cities in the short-run. These results imply that the magnitude of income 
that influences house prices could be relatively small in China. According to Huang’s (2004) study, the 
average Chinese household’s income is much lower than the house price, thus income is not a major 
determinant of housing demand. Further, Yang and Shen (2008) and Ahujia et al. (2010) point out that 
house prices in Beijing increased at an average rate of 25 percent per year since 2004, while the 
average household disposable income has increased at a stable annual rate of 12 percent per year in 
the same period.  
In the short-run, mortgage rates exhibit mixed effects on the house price index. The result shows a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between mortgage rates and the house price index in 
Kunming, but negative and insignificant in Qingdao. The mortgage rate has been two percent below 
the inflation rate since 2005, and coupled with low interest, high savings, and a lack of alternative 
investment opportunities has led to the positive relationship between house prices and mortgage rates 
(Ahuja et al., 2010). In China, the increase in mortgage rates and house prices is due to the irrational 
behaviour of house buyers, because when mortgage rates rise, house buyers increase their demand 
for houses, thereby pushing up house prices. This is because the real estate market is considered to be 
an investment channel and homebuyers in China are optimistic about housing market growth (Ahuja 
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et al., 2010). On the other hand, the interest rate variable not only negatively impacts on the house 
price index by increasing the borrowing costs for buyers, but also positively affects house prices with 
an increase in costs for developers (Huang & Wang, 2007). This pushes up future house prices and 
enlarges the profit in real estate investment.  
6.2.5 The Co-integration Relationships between the House Price Index and 
Macroeconomic Fundamentals 
Table 6.6 shows the long-run equilibrium equations, based on the co-integration model results from 
the unrestricted and restricted VECM model shown in Appendix One. Both the short-run and long-run 
results confirm that regional development in China is unbalanced; thus, the macroeconomic 
fundamental variables have different signs and levels of influence on the house price indices (Ren, 
Xiong & Yuan, 2012). Housing market reform in China is decentralized; that is, local governments 
design the actual reform programmes and determine the degrees of reform. With large regional 
differences in China, it is likely that housing reform will be carried out differently across cities, which 
may lead to different patterns of housing behaviour (Huang, 2004). Peng, Tam and Yiu (2005) applied 
the generalized least squares (GLS) method to estimate the effect of the macro economy of China’s 
property market, for the period 1998 to 2004. Their study reveals that land price is a significant variable 
in explaining differences in property prices across the provinces. The effect of land price increases on 
property prices is much larger in coastal cities than in other parts of the country. 
Table 6.6 The Long-Run Equilibrium Coefficients Derived from VECM Model 
Kunming 
* 66.975 0.380 0.0007 0.946t t t tHPI Inf Inc Mtr= + + −  
                                    (2.350)         (1.993)            (-1.267) 
Xian 
* 95.281 0.024 0.0007 1.351t t t tHPI Inf Inc Mtr= − + +  
                                    (-0.078)        (1.703)           (1.231) 
Urumqi 
* 87.127 0.103 0.0009 3.837t t t tHPI Inf Inc Mtr= − + +  
                                    (-0.305)        (1.459)           (2.680) 
Guangzhou 
* 451.315 4.390 0.002 13.642t t t tHPI Inf Inc Mtr= − + +  
                                    (-5.887)        (2.442)           (4.751) 
Changchun 
* 235.051 1.606 0.0009 4.517t t t tHPI Inf Inc Mtr= − + +  
                                     (-4.708)        (1.825)           (4.081) 
Beijing 
* 331.664 2.698 0.0016 6.209t t t tHPI Inf Inc Mtr= − + +  
                                     (-5.043)        (3.523)           (3.052) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 6.6 results report that the inflation coefficients display significant and negative relationships with 
the Chinese house price indices (CHPI) in Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing (-4.39, -1.61 and -2.70, 
respectively). However, there is no statistically significant relationship between CHPI and inflation in 
Xian and Urumqi. The relationship is positive and significant in Kunming (0.38), but the magnitude of 
the relationship is small which indicates that the influence of inflation on the house price index in 
Kunming is small. Inflation measures the price factor that impacts house prices, such as the price of 
raw materials and labour. Raw materials and labour are an estimator for the cost of housing supply. 
For example, Coleman et al. (2008) used inflation (CPI) to model the changes in construction cost in 
their VECM model. In the authors’ model, CPI was treated as a proxy for the cost of housing supply. 
Housing developers tend to use CPI to estimate the total costs of housing supply, and focus on the 
supply cost (construction costs) to make their decisions about house prices (Chen, Gan, Hu & Cohen, 
2013). According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the raw materials and labour for house 
building and rent count for 13 percent of the total CPI. Thus, increasing CPI pushes up the costs of real 
estate projects. In the long-run, a rise in house prices will lead to lower housing demand, thereby 
causing house prices to decline. Chen, Gan, Hu and Cohen’s (2013) study found the cost of house 
supply (construction costs and operating costs) significantly impact house prices in the long-run. Peng, 
Tam and Yiu’s (2005) study applied the generalized least squares estimation to test the macroeconomic 
factors (GDP, CPI and interest rates) that influence the growth of house prices in major cities (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou) and 31 provinces in China, for the period 1998 to 2004. The study found a 
negative relationship between property prices and CPI in the coastal provinces of China (e.g. Zhejiang 
and Jiangsu).  
Land price is also a major factor that significantly influences the house prices in China (Yu, 2010). Land 
in China’s cities and towns is state-owned while rural area land is collectively owned. Further, land 
ownership cannot be transferred and circulated. Someone wanting to purchase land can only purchase 
the land-use rights for a certain number of years (Yu, 2010). According to Zhang, Hua and Zhao’s (2011) 
study, the house price boom in China occurred because the local governments have strong incentives 
and capabilities to generate significant revenue from the sale of ‘land-use rights’. The soaring land 
prices push up house prices. For instance, Chinese land value increased eight fold for the period 2003 
to 2010. From 2003 to 2009, the ratio of land to house values hovered between 30 percent and 40 
percent. Beijing’s land price nearly tripled subsequent to the end of the 2008 Olympic Games (Wu, 
Gyourko & Deng, 2012). Thus, the house price index increases while inflation decreases.  
Income measures households’ affordability to buy houses. This current study’s results show that the 
income variables are positively related to CHPI in six cities. Prevalent literature confirms income to be 
positively related to house prices in a stable long-run relationship (Abraham & Hendershott, 1996; 
Malpezzi, 1999; Capozza et al., 2002; Meen, 2002; Gallin, 2003). The growth of income will increase 
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housing affordability, which will positively impact the demand for houses. Zhang et al. (2007) show 
that per capita disposable personal income has a significant positive impact on the estimated 
equilibrium house prices from 2000 to 2004 in China. Yang and Shen (2008) investigated the factors 
that influence house prices in the Beijing housing market, for the period 1990 to 2005. The authors 
report that income is one of the most important determinants of housing affordability in Beijing. Yang 
and Shen’s (2008) study discovered that the impact of income on housing affordability is very large, 
especially for first-time house buyers. An increase in income does not necessarily cause an instant 
increase in housing demand because the timing of a house purchase is a long-term decision (Chen, Tsai 
& Chang, 2007). House prices and income are linked in the long-run with housing affordability and tend 
to return to their long-run equilibrium relationship eventually (Gallin, 2003). 
These income coefficients are the smallest values among the other macroeconomic fundamental 
variables in this current study. This implies that the income variable has marginal influence in 
determining the house price index in China. This is because the Chinese average household income is 
much lower than the housing market price, thus income has limited power to determine house 
demand (Huang, 2004). For example, according to data from the Statistics Bureau of China, the 
national average annual income for a couple is 22,304 RMB in 2003; the duration for a couple to 
purchase a house valued 300,000 RMB with 30 percent of their annual earnings is 44.7 years (Burell, 
2006). Thus, there is a large disparity between household income and house price (Yang & Shen, 2008; 
Ahuja et al., 2010). The majority of homebuyers still rely heavily on personal savings and parental 
contributions to purchase their homes (Li, 2010). 
The estimated mortgage rate coefficients are statistically significant and positively related to house 
price indices in Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing. However, the mortgage rate negatively 
influences the house price index in Kunming. The general expectation is that house prices should react 
negatively to an increase in the mortgage rate. Such an expectation implies that an increase in 
mortgage rates increases the costs of house purchasing. This finding is consistent with Iacoviello and 
Minetti’s (2003) study which focuses on factors that influence house prices in Finland, Sweden and the 
U.K. The authors’ results show an instant and significant decrease in real house prices (about 0.75 
percent to 2 percent) following a rise in mortgage rates. Similarly, Negro and Otrok (2005), Sliva (2008) 
and Carstensen et al. (2009) studies exhibit similar results for the U.S. housing market although the fall 
in house prices has been as large as 13 percent following an increase in the mortgage rate.  
In China, the irrational behaviour of house buyers causes simultaneous increases in mortgage rates 
and house prices, which further fuels house buyers to buy houses even when the mortgage rate 
increases. This behaviour pushes house prices up further (Yao, Luo & Loh, 2011). Empirical results show 
that mortgage rate movements have little immediate effect on house prices, which suggests that 
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Chinese investors could be ‘irrational’ and ‘speculative’. Instead of running away from the market, 
investors rush to buy houses or shares when monetary policy-makers announce restrictive policy 
actions. This irrational behaviour can be explained by market imperfections, lack of investment 
channels, cultural traditions, urbanization and demographic changes (Yao, Luo & Loh, 2011).  
Mortgage rates in China are not determined by the market but by the People’s Bank of China (PBC). 
The PBC predominantly decides deposit rates, loan rates and mortgage loan rates. The interest rate 
policy can be used as a monetary policy tool by the central government to influence house prices (Allen 
& Carletti, 2010). The PBC tends to increase mortgage rates when the economy is “hot”. In other 
words, an increase in the mortgage rate simply represents an underlying strong demand for housing 
(Leung, Chow, Yu & Tam, 2010). Mortgage rates are the major monetary tool used by the Chinese 
government to eliminate house price bubbles (Allen & Carletti, 2010).  
According to Chinese culture and traditions, a house is not just a place to live in but a symbol of social 
status. In most parts of the country, having a house is a pre-requisite for a man to get married (Jia & 
Liu, 2007). Consequently, the purchasing of a house by young people is determined by the timing of 
marriage, not by changes in interest rates. Many Chinese families tend to buy houses for their children 
who are moving to cities, by taking out savings from three generations. When mortgage rates go up, 
families are more likely to bring forward their planned purchase, rather than suspend or postpone it 
until interest rates come down (Jia & Liu, 2007). The positive relationship between mortgage rates and 
house prices is consistent with previous studies (Wong, Hui & Seabrook, 2003; Gao & Wang, 2009; 
Wang & Zhao, 2010 and Chen et al., 2013). Wong, Hui and Seabrook (2003) investigated the role of 
interest rates on house prices from 1981 to 2001 in Hong Kong. The authors’ study shows a positive 
relationship between house prices and interest rates in the Hong Kong housing market. Chen et al. 
(2013) study applied the vector error correction model to examine the long-run and short-run 
dynamics of Beijing house prices for the period 1998 to 2010, and found a positive relationship 
between interest rates and house prices. Interest rates positively affect house prices because an 
increase in interest rates leads to an increase in the borrowing costs for real estate developers. Thus, 
house prices rise with an increase on interest rates (Huang and Wang, 2007). 
6.2.6 Efficiency in the Housing Market 
The error correction mechanism of the VECM model reveals a significant adjustment speed by the 
error correction term (Adams & Fuss, 2010). In this current study, the efficiency of the Chinese housing 
market is analyzed by observing the speed of the adjustment factors obtained from the VECM 
estimation result (see Appendix One). The coefficient value of  α  (equation 5.8) which determines 
the speed of adjustment are -0.509 for Kunming; -0.383 for Xian; -0.473 for Urumqi; -0.083 for 
Guangzhou; -0.476 for Changchun; and -0.270 for Beijing. For example, the house price in Guangzhou 
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adjusts slowly to the equilibrium price by 8.3 percent, which means that an economic disequilibrium 
in the Guangzhou market will be resolved after 12 quarters (3 years). The slow adjustment indicates 
the housing market in Guangzhou is not efficient due to the slow adjustment towards the market 
equilibrium price. The efficient markets are Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Changchun and Beijing, where 
housing markets respond faster to changes in economic conditions such as expansion or recession. For 
example, an economic disequilibrium in the Kunming housing market will be resolved in almost two 
quarters (0.5 year). 
Expectation could be a possible factor that contributes to the slow adjustment of Chinese house prices 
to real economic conditions. Glaeser et al. (2008) suggest that any over-optimism about future 
appreciation by home buyers is more likely to be sustained in inefficient markets. Any positive demand 
shock will lead to greater price increases that validate the over-optimism behaviour of house buyers. 
Fluctuations in house prices will not influence optimistic house buyers to adjust their expectations 
downward (Wu, Gyourko & Deng, 2012). Experienced buyers and sellers tend to follow the market 
trend with knowledge and understanding of the real conditions of the housing market, which are the 
rapid adjustments of house prices to real economic conditions. 
In conclusion, Johansen and Juseliu’s (1990) co-integration test determines the co-integration 
relationships between China’s house price index (CHPI), inflation, income and mortgage rates. In 
addition, the VECM model results show that CHPI is positively related to inflation, income and 
mortgage rates in Kunming. CHPI is negatively related to inflation, and positively related to income and 
mortgage rates in Xian, Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing. In this current study the speed of 
adjustment of the Chinese house price index represented in the error correction term is negative. The 
housing market of Guangzhou is found to be inefficient which means the adjustment of house prices 
to equilibrium is slow. The housing markets in Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Changchun and Beijing are 
efficient, due to the fast speed of adjustment towards market equilibrium house prices, which reveals 
that buyers and sellers response faster to changes in economic conditions such as an expansion or a 
recession.  
6.2.7 Evidence of Housing Bubble and Size of House Price Bubbles 
Hott and Monnin (2008) suggest that to test the existence of a housing bubble one should address the 
deviation (gap) between real house prices and fundamental house prices. The deviation of the 
movement between these two factors can be used to test for the presence of housing bubbles in a 
housing market. The measure of price deviation from fundamental factors should give us an early 
warning indicator of an over-booming house market (Dreger & Zhang, 2010).  
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Based on the unrestricted VECM results, the estimated coefficients were inserted into equation (5.9) 
to estimate the long-run equilibrium Chinese house price indices of six cities (Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, 
Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing). According to Blanchard and Watson (1982) if house prices deviate 
considerably from their fundamental values or expected prices, it is very likely that a bubble exists. The 
larger the deviation, the bigger the bubble becomes. Thomsett and Kahr (2007) theoretically analyzed 
the sub-prime loan crisis in the U.S. and suggested that the larger the gap between house prices and 
the equilibrium price, then the more important is the signal of the existence of a house price bubble.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, this current study uses a 22 percent deviation or overvaluation of CHPI from 
its long-run equilibrium price as an indicator for the existence of a housing bubble in China’s housing 
market. This figure is consistent with previous studies (Shen et al., 2005; Hui & Yue, 2006; Dreger & 
Zhang, 2010), which use a 22 percent deviation from the actual house price index and the predicted 
house price index, as a sign for a housing bubble. 
Table 6.7 Percentage Deviation of the House Price Index of Six Cities from their   
                 Long-Run Equilibrium Price  
Period % of  
deviation 
(Kunming) 
% of  
deviation 
(Xian) 
% of  
deviation 
(Urumqi) 
% of  
deviation 
(Guangzhou) 
% of  
deviation 
(Changchun) 
% of  
deviation 
(Beijing) 
1999Q1 3.51  -4.60 -4.00  -7.80 -10.85 -9.04 
1999Q2 6.90  -4.16 -6.22  -15.50 -10.23 -11.70 
1999Q3 1.76  -1.21 -1.58  -5.80 -3.01 -3.64 
1999Q4 0.57  -0.84 -0.82  -2.63 6.55 -5.35 
2000Q1 0.48  -0.46 -0.19  2.42 -5.77 -1.80 
2000Q2 0.28  -0.42 0.63  5.74 -1.78 0.68 
2000Q3 2.90  -0.80 0.66  15.56 -2.01 13.23 
2000Q4 1.01  -1.08 1.03  2.39 5.54 12.42 
2001Q1 -0.46  -1.10 -0.46  -8.21 4.18 10.99 
2001Q2 -2.26  -0.53 0.01  -0.83 5.74 9.69 
2001Q3 0.84  1.12 -1.04  -9.57 3.73 -3.73 
2001Q4 -0.45  -0.98 -1.17  -11.90 -3.17 -8.29 
2002Q1 1.16  -0.77 -1.95  -3.49 -1.72 -10.00 
2002Q2 -1.02  -0.61 -1.36  -14.44 -1.75 -4.19 
2002Q3 -2.02  -0.64 -0.92  -8.09 -6.09 -6.75 
2002Q4 -0.53  -0.60 -1.73  -3.41 -3.89 -5.14 
2003Q1 -2.83  -0.60 -0.88  1.64 3.50 -1.76 
2003Q2 -2.11  -0.71 -0.69  5.84 -0.48 -4.80 
2003Q3 -2.86  -0.45 -0.73  4.45 -2.56 -3.55 
2003Q4 -1.87  -0.10 0.11  2.90 0.07 -1.49 
2004Q1 -2.68  2.33 -0.31  3.61 -2.09 -3.49 
2004Q2 -3.08  2.25 0.76  10.57 6.22 2.52 
2004Q3 0.82  4.21 -0.73  10.84 8.51 4.82 
2004Q4 0.54  2.46 -1.71  9.46 2.04 6.66 
2005Q1 2.96  1.82 -0.25  7.77 0.11 3.98 
2005Q2 1.53  1.19 -1.04  10.45 -0.76 3.89 
2005Q3 0.04  1.66 -1.54  -0.54 1.74 2.31 
2005Q4 0.08  2.02 -2.10  6.95 -0.63 3.35 
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2006Q1 0.73  0.33 -2.00  4.71 0.16 1.69 
2006Q2 0.56  0.51 -2.15  14.86 -2.10 3.59 
2006Q3 0.57  -0.09 -3.51  5.48 -5.52 -0.71 
2006Q4 -0.41  0.28 -3.06  0.76 -1.37 0.25 
2007Q1 0.51  -0.06 -4.21  -0.87 -3.22 -2.60 
2007Q2 1.87  0.58 -2.91  -5.62 -0.56 -3.97 
2007Q3 0.66  0.77 3.91  1.29 2.24 2.97 
2007Q4 2.25  4.93 9.25  -2.27 6.60 9.38 
2008Q1 1.95  5.50 15.88  1.81 12.10 9.31 
2008Q2 3.87  4.72 12.41  2.08 6.75 8.56 
2008Q3 0.14  2.73 3.13  -9.14 -3.22 3.24 
2008Q4 -2.99  -0.47 3.10  -2.30 -2.63 -2.81 
2009Q1 -4.17  -3.75 -0.05  -22.72 -6.13 -13.36 
2009Q2 -4.77  -4.64 -0.61  -24.58 -5.66 -14.82 
2009Q3 0.76  -3.91 -0.77  -16.56 -2.83 -14.67 
2009Q4 3.49  0.76 2.00  6.34 3.53 -5.10 
2010Q1 -1.07  -0.24 0.71  0.80 -0.57 -4.59 
2010Q2 -1.92  2.76 -0.49  13.19 -0.61 9.02 
2010Q3 -1.18  4.30 -2.36  10.32 0.29 12.08 
2010Q4 2.86  2.17 -4.00  11.35 -0.43 18.69 
2011Q1 4.19  -0.19 4.85  8.98 7.29 3.50 
2011Q2 3.24  -1.24 3.53  12.73 3.78 2.46 
2011Q3 1.63  -1.99 1.83  9.72 4.10 1.11 
2011Q4 -2.00  -2.09 -1.80  -0.36 -2.55 -6.64 
2012Q1 -3.80  -5.79 -5.60  -11.43 -5.27 -11.42 
2012Q2 -2.97  -5.63 -5.50  -11.35 -7.82 -11.93 
2012Q3 -2.35  -5.04 -4.53  -7.92 -7.27 -8.90 
2012Q4 -2.06  -4.48 -3.53  2.74 -5.33 -6.61 
2013Q1 -1.34  -2.29 -0.08  -2.01 -2.39 -0.37 
2013Q2 0.43  1.06 2.14  8.99 2.02 4.86 
2013Q3 1.56  3.33 2.38  14.84 4.32 7.30 
2013Q4 1.80  4.15 4.11  8.97 2.85 4.44 
 
Table 6.7 summarizes the percentage deviation of the house price index of the six cities, from their 
long-run equilibrium prices. The results show no evidence of house price bubbles in the six cities. As 
discussed previously, a house price bubble in China exists when the deviation of the real house price 
index is more than 22 percent from its long-run equilibrium price. Therefore, there is no evidence of a 
house price bubble in the real estate market of the six cities. Although the results indicate these six 
housing markets have not reached the bubble level, there are nevertheless some periods when the 
deviations are close to the critical value (see Table 6.7). For example, the deviation of the house price 
index from its equilibrium value is 15.88 in 2008:Q1 in Urumqi; 14.86 in 2006:Q2 in Guangzhou; 14.84 
in 2013:Q3 also in Guangzhou; and 18.69 in 2010:Q4 in Beijing. Thus, potential housing bubbles still 
exist, as the house price indices of the six cities are greater than the equilibrium house price indices in 
some periods. The overpriced real estate market could easily produce a bubble (Guo & Huang, 2010).  
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The results are similar to previous housing affordability measures (price-to-income ratio) (see section 
6.2.1). Housing affordability measures show that only Beijing and Guangzhou exhibit signs of house 
price bubbles for the period 2006 to 2012, based on the price-to-income ratio results; the other cities 
are free of a housing bubble. Previous studies confirm that the Chinese housing markets are free of 
housing bubbles. Xie (2004) analysed market irrational behaviour in Beijing based on local price rent 
ratios. The author’s study reveals the housing market in Beijing does not exhibit a strong speculative 
mode. Hui and Yue (2006) applied a combination of econometric estimation methods, such as the 
Granger causality tests and generalized impulse response analysis, to investigate whether there was a 
house price bubble in Beijing in 2003. The authors’ results show that Beijing exhibited no sign of a 
bubble in 2003. Also, Ahuja et al. (2010) believe that there is no evidence of a national level house 
price bubble in China. The Chinese government intervention policies in 2010 may have eliminated the 
overheating real estate market. Seki (2012) reviewed the Chinese real estate market for the decade to 
2012, and analysed the risk factors, such as the deposit reserve ratio that is associated with the collapse 
of a housing bubble. Seki’s study shows no clear sign of a housing bubble in China’s housing market, 
especially for the small and medium size cities. Chen and Funke (2013) employed the newly developed 
recursive unit root tests aimed at identifying explosive bubbles in China for the period 2003:Q1 to 
2011:Q4. Their results reveal the Chinese housing market does not display significant signs of a housing 
bubble.  
Although China has experienced a sharp increase in house prices in the past decade, the causes of 
China’s house price dynamics are not the same as those of other countries. On the surface, the increase 
in China’s house prices seems to share many features of the house price bubble of Japan in the 1980s. 
However, China has abundant room for driving its maturing export-driven economy into a more 
consumption driven economy. Furthermore, most Chinese banks are state owned and thus, 
government policies aimed at deflating a bubble are more effective in China than they would be in 
Japan (Chen & Funke, 2013). The following sections explain why the fears about China’s real estate 
market are most likely overblown. 
First, Chinese households’ average leverage ratio remains low. For example, the total urban real estate 
asset is five times the size of the equity market and 16.9 times the equity market assets held by 
households. However, China’s urban housing stock is only 2.6 times the value of household bank 
deposits. Thus, there is little debt carried by households in China (Liu, 2014). Moreover, Chinese home 
buyers are required to pay at least a 30 percent down payment to qualify for a mortgage loan. 
Mortgage loans account for only 14 percent of total bank loans (Liu, 2014). Therefore, banks are well 
cushioned from the effects of large property market corrections.  Gan, Li, Wang and Kao’s (2012) study 
confirm the Chinese banks do not heavily rely on the mortgage loan business. Their study employs the 
credit scoring model to investigate the determinants of default mortgage in China, and found the 
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significant relationship between the borrower’s rating, mortgage rate, mortgage duration, mortgage 
amount and the borrower’s default rate. These findings suggest that Chinese banks’ mortgage lending 
are based on commercial basis.  
Second, urbanization accelerates house price increases in China, which fuels the demand for housing 
in China’s major cities. This in turn accelerates house prices in urban cities. For example, between 1996 
and 2005, the urban population increased by over 50 percent from 373 million to just over 562 million. 
The urbanization rate has been growing by about 1.4 percent annually since 1996, which means more 
than 15 million new people enter urban areas each year (Wu, Gyourko & Deng, 2010). Strong 
urbanization will continue to drive the expansion of new demand for housing. China is reforming its 
residential registration system. There has been substantial migration from rural to urban areas and 
large numbers of people without urban residential registration now live in major Chinese cities. 
Between 2006 and 2009, China’s urban population grew by 44.8 million as a result of migration from 
rural to urban areas (Seki, 2012). The rapid urbanization process could fuel a large demand for housing. 
For example, Figure 6.4 shows the housing floor space sold, is greater than the floor space completed, 
in eight Chinese cities from 2005 (Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Qingdao, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Changchun 
and Beijing). The demand for housing has outstripped supply by over 20 million square metres each 
year with regard to rapid urbanisation (except 2008 and 2012), which drove house prices higher (Liu, 
2014). 
Figure 6.4 Average Floor Space Completed versus Floor Space Sold (in Eight  
                  Chinese Cities) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
Finally, China’s house prices are impacted heavily by government real estate policies. In response to 
rapid house price growth, the Chinese government carefully crafts and closely monitors its monetary 
policies to prevent real estate bubbles (Yurichuk, 2011). The Chinese economy has been transformed 
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from a state planned economy to a market oriented economy over the past three decades, but 
commercial banks are still primarily state owned or are state holdings. Thus, monetary policy plays a 
pivotal role in controlling the credit supply to the real estate sector (Xu & Chen, 2012). Government 
interventions give China the upper hand in engineering a gradual, controlled slowdown of the market 
economy so as not to burst the real estate bubble (Yurichuk, 2011). For example, on January 12, 2010, 
the People’s Bank of China announced that it would raise the deposit reserve requirement ratio by one 
half of a percent. This policy has been well regarded for cooling down the property market (Gao, 2010). 
Therefore, the dynamics of Chinese house prices are likely to be the result of both the macroeconomic 
fundamental variables and government policies. 
6.2.8 The Impulse Response Function and Variance Decomposition 
The impulse response function traces the response of current and future values for each of the 
variables, to a one unit increase in the current value of one of the VAR errors. It assumes that errors 
return to zero in subsequent periods and that all other errors are equal to zero (Stock & Watson, 2001; 
Sun, Gan & Hu, 2012). An impulse response function provides a different method for depicting the 
system dynamics by tracing the effects of the shock of an endogenous variable on the variables in the 
VAR. Compared with the Granger causality test, the impulse response function offers an advantage in 
that it can indicate whether the shock impacts are positive or negative, and whether the shock is 
temporary or for the long-run (Shen, Hui & Liu, 2005). The interpretation of the impulse response 
requires that the innovations in a VAR are correlated and may be viewed as having a common 
component that cannot be associated with a specific variable. Thus, this current study uses the inverse 
of the Cholesky factor of the residual covariance matrix to orthogonalize the impulses.   
The figures in Appendix Three present the impulse response function that documents the impact of a 
unit rise in the Chinese house price index, inflation, income, and mortgage rates, on CHPI. The dotted 
lines show the impact of a unit rise in the CHPI, inflation, income, and mortgage rates, on CHPI at a 
95% confidence levels.  
The VECM test determines the short-term and long-term relationships between house prices and 
fundamental variables; unfortunately this study is unable to trace the time paths of the effects of 
various economic shocks on house prices and other fundamental variables. Therefore, the generalized 
impulse response function is applied to trace the paths of different variables, whether they return to 
equilibrium after a shock is injected into the system (Guo & Huang, 2010). The shock to each equation 
is equal to one standard deviation of the equation residual, and the impulse response of all the 
variables to the shock are traced out for a period of three years (12 quarters).   
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The figures in Appendix Three display the multiple graphs of the impulse response function between 
house prices and three macroeconomic fundamental variables in the six cities. The CHPI responds 
similarly to its own shock in all eight cities. For example, a one standard deviation of the house price 
index itself decreases the future house price index in the first seven quarters; reaches the lowest point, 
negative 0.3 percent by the seventh quarter; and vanishes completely by the tenth quarter. This 
indicates that current changes in house prices do affect people’s expectations in the short-term in the 
eight cities. The response of house prices to one standard deviation of the three fundamental variables 
differs greatly. The increase in disposable income has a positive effect on house prices in six cities, but 
the impact from the shock of the income to house price index is relatively small. The findings suggest 
that the fluctuation in the response of CHPI to the shock of income, are between zero percent and 0.2 
percent for the 12 quarters, except the fluctuation is larger in Guangzhou which is between zero 
percent and one percent. The response of the house price index to the disposable income shock in 
Changchun and Qingdao appears to be insignificant.  
The response functions of CHPI to the shock of inflation (CPI) and mortgage rates are similar and 
consistent with what this current study expects to be the effects of house prices. The CHPI response is 
similar to the CPI shock in Kunming, Xian and Urumqi; the CHPI response fluctuated between zero 
percent and 0.5 percent, and peaked at 0.5 percent in the third quarter in Kunming and Xian, and 
peaked at one percent in Urumqi. The response of CHPI to CPI shocks deceases to below 0.2 percent 
by the sixth quarter in Kunming and Xian. The response of CHPI to the shock of CPI decreases and 
reaches the lowest point of 1.5 percent by the fifth quarter in Beijing, Guangzhou, Qingdao and 
Nanjing. The response of CHPI to the CPI shock does not last long since the effects vanish completely 
in all six cities by the 12th quarter.  
The response of CHPI to mortgage rates are similar to Kunming, Xian, Guangzhou and Beijing. The 
response of CHPI to mortgage rate shocks increases to 0.3 percent in about two quarters, after which 
it trails off with a downward trend to its long-run equilibrium level in another three quarters, and 
decreases to below negative 0.1 percent in Kunming, Xian, Beijing, Qingdao and Nanjing; decreasing 
to negative one percent in Guangzhou, Qingdao and Nanjing by the sixth quarter. The response of CHPI 
to mortgage rate shocks is longer in Urumqi, Qingdao and Nanjing (11 quarters). The response of CHPI 
to mortgage rates vanishes completely by the 12th quarter in all six cities. The impulse response 
function results indicate that there is only a short-term (about two quarters) impact from mortgage 
rate shocks to CHPI in Kunming, Xian, Guangzhou and Beijing, which reveals that the change in 
mortgage rates will only influence the house prices of these four cities in the short-run. The impact of 
the standard deviation of the mortgage rates to house prices is longer in Urumqi, Qingdao and Nanjing, 
and is 11 quarters. 
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6.2.9 Variance Decomposition 
The analysis of the forecast error variance decompositions, dissects the relative strengths of various 
shocks, to the innovations of house prices in China. The variance decomposition measures the relative 
importance of the fluctuation of Chinese house price indices in the macroeconomic fundamental 
variables. The forecast error decomposition is the percentage of the variance of the error obtained 
from the forecasting variables, due to a specific shock in a given horizon (Stock & Watson, 2001). Table 
6.8 reports the variance decomposition of the Chinese house price index covering 12 quarters. The 
second column in Table 6.8 shows the forecast errors of the variable for each forecast horizon. The 
remaining columns present the percentages of the variances that are due to the shocks of the variables 
(with each row adding up to 100).  
Table 6.8 Variance Decomposition (CHPI) 
      
      Kunming      
 Period S.E. CHPI CPI INCOME Mortgage rate 
      
       1 1.595436 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
 4 2.543013 76.00512 19.86432 0.532610 3.597953 
 8 2.822273 62.18014 32.77260 2.047900 2.999366 
 12 3.068432 53.82977 40.71425 2.853201 2.602773 
      Xian      
 Period S.E. CHPI CPI INCOME Mortgage rate 
      
         1 1.456023 100.0000 0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
   4 2.959370 92.85389 4.693430   0.564082   1.888599 
   8 3.070591 89.40250 5.063669   3.523310   2.010516 
   12 3.123883 87.07854 5.153157   5.725732   2.042568 
      Urumqi      
 Period S.E. CHPI CPI INCOME Mortgage rate 
      
       1 2.221814 100.0000 0.000000  0.000000   0.000000 
  4 4.621218 82.72068 5.265958  0.509818   11.50354 
  8 5.440656 62.59411 13.52752  1.515711   22.36266 
  12 5.531309 61.33109 13.33287  3.534691   21.80135 
      Guangzhou      
 Period S.E. CHPI CPI INCOME Mortgage rate 
      
       1 2.492660 100.0000 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4 4.495221 84.50091 6.144447  7.464639  1.889999 
 8 5.589988 60.27070 10.73387  24.16715  4.828279 
 12 6.048134 51.57998 9.482192  34.07753  4.860299 
      Changchun      
 Period S.E. CHPI CPI INCOME Mortgage rate 
      
       1 2.729872 100.0000 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4 3.380785 87.40560 2.951857  0.506454  9.136088 
 8 3.516841 82.88947 3.122565  0.503401  13.48456 
 12 3.539693 82.10844 3.294040  0.598970  13.99855 
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Beijing      
 Period S.E. CHPI CPI INCOME Mortgage rate 
      
       1 2.796196 100.0000 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4 5.087499 94.90880 1.421777  3.006520  0.662900 
 8 5.519864 83.05124 8.913405  6.871874  1.163479 
 12 5.654084 80.22660 8.873170  9.612879  1.287348 
      Qingdao      
 Period S.E. CHPI CPI INCOME Mortgage rate 
      
       1 2.634699 100.0000 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4 4.214912 94.58364 4.563320  0.190767  0.662273 
 8 5.109610 77.22045 14.34127  0.373536  8.034740 
 12 5.387857 70.31298 18.02274  0.967016  10.69727 
      Nanjing      
 Period S.E. CHPI CPI INCOME Mortgage rate 
      
       1 2.363318 100.0000 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4 4.113868 78.81593 15.41698  4.504533  1.262557 
 8 5.519956 50.06391 36.53389  7.415763  5.986434 
 12 5.768934 45.93270 39.43982  7.883524  6.743953 
        Source: Author’s calculations 
The results show that in the short-run (4 quarters), the innovations in the previous house price index 
account for around 80 percent variance of the fluctuation in CHPI (own shock) in all six cities (Kunming, 
Xian, Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing), which is caused by its own shock in the short-run. 
In the long-run (12 quarters), the shock to CHPI contributes to the fluctuations in the CHPI, which 
decreases from 100 percent to 54 percent in Kunming, 61 percent in Urumqi, 52 percent in Guangzhou 
and 46 percent in Nanjing. This means that in all six cities the fluctuations of CHPI are no longer solely 
caused by its own shock. Inflation (CPI) and income could also be dominant factors that cause 
fluctuations in the CHPI; such as the shock to CPI increases fluctuation in CHPI by 41 percent in Kunming 
and 39 percent in Nanjing. The shock to income contributes 34 percent fluctuation in the variance in 
CHPI in Guangzhou. 
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that of the interior cities (e.g. Xian). With large regional differences in China, it is likely that housing 
reform is carried out differently across cities, which may lead to different patterns of housing 
behaviour (Huang, 2004). By testing eight cities separately, this current study allows the house prices 
and the macroeconomic fundamental variables to vary across the different cities.  
In this current study, three macroeconomic fundamental variables are used in the VAR and VECM 
models, namely, income, mortgage rates and inflation. The scope of this current study focuses on eight 
Chinese cities (Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun, Beijing, Qingdao and Nanjing) from 
three different house price growth rate groups, and covers three tiers of Chinese cities. The tier levels 
of the eight Chinese cities are differentiated by their GDP level and population size based on Jone Lang 
LaSalle’s (2009) report. The main findings of this current study are discussed as below. 
First, the price-to-income ratio is calculated based on equation (5.1), and compared to a benchmark 
index of “11” for the period 2002 to 2012.  The results show the price-to-income ratio of Beijing and 
Guangzhou are above the benchmark indices for the period 2006 to 2012. Other cities exhibited below 
the benchmark index (Changchun, Qingdao, Nanjing, Kunming, Xian and Urumqi) for the same period. 
Thus, there are signs of house price bubbles in Beijing and Guangzhou for the period 2006 to 2012. As 
discussed in chapters five and six, Chinese people obtain a large amount of unreported income, making 
a direct comparison of the price-to-income ratio for investigating the housing bubble is inconclusive; 
meaning that income should not be the sole determinant for testing housing bubbles particularly in 
China’s housing market.  This current study uses other econometric techniques to test if the 
macroeconomic fundamental variables have any influence on house prices and if housing bubbles 
prevail in China’s housing market.  
Second, the study examines the effect of the macroeconomic fundamental variables on the house price 
index in China’s housing market. Prior to estimating regression with time series data, this current study 
examined the integration properties of the data using the ADF test to eliminate the spurious regression 
problem. The test results show that all the variables are non-stationary in levels, but are stationary in 
their first differences or are integrated of order one. Next the VAR  and VECM models were applied to 
test the short-run relationship between the three macroeconomic fundamental variables (inflation, 
income and mortgage rates) and house price indices in eight Chinese cities from 1999:Q1 to 2013:Q4. 
Table 7.1 shows a summary of the short-run estimated coefficients of inflation, income and mortgage 
rates from the VAR and VECM models.  
Table 7.1 Summary Results of Inflation, Income and Mortgage Rate Effects on  
                  the CHPI (Short-run)   
Model  Kun 
ming 
Xian Urumqi Guang 
zhou 
Chang 
chun 
Bei 
jing 
Qing 
dao 
Nan 
jing 
Inflation (+) (+)* (+) (-) (+)*** (-) (+)** (-) 
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VAR 
and 
VECM 
Income (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) 
Mortgage 
Rate 
(+)** (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (+) 
Note: * statistically significant at 0.1 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, *** statistically  
significant at 0.01 level. 
 
The results in Table 7.1 show that Chinese house prices are not sensitive to changes in macroeconomic 
fundamental variables in the short-run, since most of the macroeconomic fundamental variables are 
statistically insignificant to the house price indices. However, the results confirm that the Chinese 
housing market has regional specifics. The inflation, income and mortgage rates coefficients are region 
specific and affect the house price indices differently among the eight cities. The inflation coefficients 
are positive and statistically significant in Xian, Changchun and Qingdao. The results imply that higher 
inflation increased house price indices in the three cities. Income exhibits an insignificant relationship 
with the house price index among the eight cities. The result implies that the magnitude that income 
influences on house prices is relatively small in China. Income is not a major determinant for housing 
demand in the short-run, due to the large disparity between house price growth and income growth. 
It is very difficult for individuals to accumulate enough income (savings) to purchase a house in China 
(Deng, Shen & Wang, 2011). In the short-run, the mortgage rate coefficients exhibit a significant and 
positive relationship with the house price index of Kunming. 
Third,  the VECM model is used to test the long-run relationship between the three macroeconomic 
fundamental variables and house price indices of the eight Chinese cities from 1999:Q1 to 2013:Q4. 
However, the Johansen and Juselius (1990) co-integration tests showed no co-integration relationships 
between the macroeconomic fundamental variables and house price indices in Qingdao and Nanjing, 
therefore the VECM model does not apply between these two cities. The VECM model is used to test 
the long-run relationship between the macroeconomic fundamental variables and house price indices 
in Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing. The restricted VECM model is jointly 
estimated against the unrestricted VECM model to test for the weak exogeneity on income, mortgage 
rates and inflation. The results reject the weak exogeneity in Kunming, Urumqi, Guangzhou, 
Changchun and Beijing, but support weak exogeneity in Xian. Thus, this current study retained the 
restricted VECM model for Xian and the unrestricted VECM model for the other five cities.  
Table 7.2 Summary Results of Inflation, Income and Mortgage Rates Effects on  
                  the CHPI (long-run)     
Model  Kunming Xian Urumqi Guangzhou Changchun Beijing 
VECM Inflation (+)** (-) (-) (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Income (+)** (+)* (+) (+)** (+)* (+)*** 
Mortgage 
Rate 
(-) (+) (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
Note:  * statistically significant at 0.1 level, ** statistically significant at 0.05 level, *** statistically  
significant at 0.01 level. 
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The results in Table 7.2 show house prices in China’s housing markets are more sensitive to the changes 
in macroeconomic fundamental variables in the long-run. The inflation coefficient is positive and 
significantly increases the house price index in Kunming, and significantly decreases the house price 
indices in Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing. Inflation is a region-specific variable, whereby the 
variations in the inflation coefficients are different with regional markets (Wang & Liu, 2007). The rise 
in inflation does not only increases the nominal interest rate, but also increases the construction raw 
material costs. Thus, increase in inflation pushes up the costs of real estate projects, rise in house 
prices and lower the housing demand in the long-run.  Land price appreciation is another major factor 
that significantly influences the house prices in China (Yu, 2010). However, there is heterogeneity in 
the land price growth across markets. For example, Beijing and Guangzhou experienced land price 
annual growth rate above 20 percent in 2011 and the annual land price growth rate of Kunming is less 
than 10% for the same period (Deng, Gyourko & Wu, 2012). The inflation rise the costs of housing 
supply, however, the lower land price could maintain the house prices at a lower level compare with 
cities have fast land price growth rates. Thus, the demand for housing can still remain high in the long-
run. The estimated income coefficients positively influence the house price indices in six cities. The 
relationships between income and house price indices are statistically significant in Kunming, 
Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing but insignificant in Urumqi. The mortgage rate coefficient is 
positive and significantly influences the house price indices in Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun and 
Beijing. The mortgage rate has been one of the dominant tool used by the Chinese central government 
to stabilise the house price boom. For example, the average house price rose by 12.4 percent in 70 
Chinese cities during the period of 2009 to 2011 (Yurichuk, 2011). The Chinese government increases 
the mortgage rate from 5.94 percent to 7.05 percent from the first quarter of 2009 to the first quarter 
of 2012 to cool down the housing market (Bank of China, 2012). Thus, an increase in the mortgage rate 
represents an underlying strong demand for housing because both homebuyers and investors expect 
house prices to rise further in the future. Furthermore, with China’s increasing urbanisation rate and 
continue population growth, housing demand will continue to increase in most Chinese cities. 
Therefore, the irrational behaviour of Chinese homebuyers (for investment purposes) and increasing 
in housing demand simultaneously increases in mortgages and house prices in China (Wang & Liu 
2007).  
Fourth, the estimated coefficients from the VECM model are inserted into equation (5.9) to calculate 
the long-run equilibrium house price indices of Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun and 
Beijing. The presence of a housing bubble can be determined by comparing the deviation between the 
equilibrium house price indices and the actual house price indices. This current study used a 22 percent 
deviation of house price index from its long-run equilibrium price as a benchmark to test for the 
presence of housing bubbles in China’s housing market. The larger the deviation, the bigger the 
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bubbles (Blanchard and Watson, 1982). This current study’s results show no evidence of house price 
bubbles in six Chinese cities (Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing). Unlike 
housing crises that took place in developed countries (e.g. U.S. subprime crisis in 2007), China’s housing 
market is still less leveraged. For example, Chinese banks required a 30 percent down-payment for 
mortgage loans. This high down-payment substantially alleviates the household default risk and makes 
credit expansion to households an unlikely cause of Chinese house price bubbles. Furthermore, most 
Chinese banks are state owned. Thus, the government policies aimed at deflating a housing bubble are 
more effective in China than in developed countries (such as in Japan and the U.S.).  
The impulse response function figures show that the CHPI responds similarly to its own shock in all 
eight cities, and that current changes in housing prices do affect people’s expectations in the short-
term in the eight cities. The increase in disposable income has a positive effect on house prices in six 
cities, but the impact from the shock of the income to house price index is relatively small. The 
response of the house price index to disposable income shock in Changchun and Qingdao appears to 
be insignificant. The CHPI response is similar to the inflation (CPI) shock in Kunming, Xian and Urumqi, 
which fluctuated between zero and 0.5 percent. The response of CHPI to CPI shock fluctuated from 
zero to 1.5 percent in Beijing, Guangzhou, Qingdao and Nanjing. The response of CHPI to CPI did not 
last long and the effects vanished completely in all eight cities by the 12th quarter. The impulse 
response function results indicate a short-term impact (two quarters) from the mortgage rate shock 
to CHPI in Kunming, Xian, Guangzhou and Beijing. The impact of the standard deviation of the 
mortgage rates to house prices is longer in Urumqi, Qingdao and Nanjing (11 quarters).  
The variance decomposition results show that the fluctuations in CHPI are mainly caused by its own 
shocks in all eight cities (Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun, Beijing, Qingdao and 
Nanjing) in the short-run (4 quarters).  In the long-run (12 quarters), the fluctuations in CHPI are no 
longer solely caused by its own shock in eight cities. CPI and income could also be the dominant factors 
that cause the fluctuations in CHPI.  For example, the shock to inflation (CPI) increases the fluctuations 
in CHPI by 41 percent in Kunming and the shock to income contributes 34 percent of the fluctuation in 
the variance in the CHPI in Guangzhou.  
Fifth, the error correction term of the VECM model shows the speed of the market house price index 
adjustment back to economic equilibrium price (Adam & Fuss, 2010). In this current study, the 
efficiency of the Chinese housing market is analysed by observing the speed of adjustment factors 
obtained from the VECM estimated results (equation 5.8). The results show the speed of adjustments 
are -0.509 for Kunming, -0.383 for Xian; -0.473 for Urumqi, -0.083 for Guangzhou, -0.476 for 
Changchun and -0.270 for Beijing. The results imply that the housing markets are efficient in Kunming, 
Xian, Urumqi, Changchun and Beijing but inefficient in Guangzhou.  
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7.2 Policy Implications 
The Chinese government has used various policy tools to control house prices, such as larger down 
payments and higher mortgage interest rates to control the demand for houses. This current study 
identified several policy implications relevant to policy-makers based on the study findings for 
maintaining a balanced and sustainable housing market.  
First, this current study’s results show the house price indices respond differently to the changes in the 
macroeconomic fundamental variables in the eight Chinese cities. For example, the study’s results 
show inflation is positively and significantly related to house price indices of Xian, Changchun and 
Qingdao. However, the inflation coefficient is negative but insignificant in explaining house prices in 
Guangzhou, Beijing and Nanjing. This implies the Chinese housing market has regional differences.  
However, since 1999, the Chinese central government has announced many unified housing market 
policies in order to maintain a stable housing market. Under these unified housing policies, the central 
government heavily regulated interest rates, heavily regulated the state-influenced credit allocation, 
and frequently adjusted the reserve requirement to regulate the Chinese housing market (Huang & 
Wang, 2011). For example, in April 2010, the central government increased the down-payment 
requirement on a first home larger than 90 square metres to 30 percent from 20 percent, and 
increased the down-payment requirement on a second home to 50 percent from 40 percent. The 
policy aims to curb the rapid growing housing market. However, this housing market policy did not 
apply well to all Chinese cities. The house prices of some central and western cities (e.g. Kunming and 
Xian) were low and affordable. For example, in 2010, the price-to-income ratio of Beijing was 17.70 
which is much higher than the benchmark value (11), and indicates that housing affordability is low in 
Beijing. However, in the same period, the price-to-income ratio was only 6.36 in Kunming which is 
much less than the benchmark value (11).  
This current study’s results suggest that the regulatory policies for the housing market in China should 
be more decentralised, and that local governments should have more freedom to adjust the housing 
policies to adapt them better to the local housing market environment. This finding is consistent with 
previous studies such as Yang et al. (2010) which measured the effects of monetary policy on regional 
house prices in Sweden from 1991 to 2002. The authors’ results show significant effects of the regional 
monetary policy on the Swiss housing market. Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) studied the effects of 
monetary policy in the U.S. for the period 1966 to 1998. The study reported the response of housing 
investment to monetary policy varies by region. 
Second, the high price-to-income ratios show that housing affordability is low in Beijing and Guangzhou 
(first tier cities). The price-to-income ratios in Beijing and Guangzhou from 2006 to 2012 are higher 
than the benchmark value (11). For example, the highest price-to-income ratio is 17.70 in Beijing in 
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2010. The large price-to-income ratio suggests the possibility of a housing bubble. Policymakers should 
monitor closely the movements of the house price indices, and also the buying and selling activities in 
Beijing and Guangzhou.  
Third, the VECM results indicate that the housing market in Guangzhou is not efficient due to the slow 
adjustment towards market equilibrium price. Case and Shiller (1989) explain that the inefficiency of 
the housing market is due to the illiquidity characteristic caused by the high transaction costs. Financial 
institutions and banks can increase homebuyers’ liquidity and reduce housing transaction costs, by 
introducing the electronic trading system to the housing market, which is similar to the stock market. 
The transaction costs of purchasing a house can be reduced by using the internet to list and search for 
a house, avoiding traditional real estate agents’ costs (Fletcher, 1997c). For example, according to IBIS 
World (2015) report, there are about 36,790 real estate agents nationwide, which employed 464,327 
workers. Over the five years through 2014, the real estate agents in China made about U.S. $18.2 billion 
in revenue and the annual growth rate is 2.4 percent. These real estate agencies charge one percent 
to three percent of the traded house price as commission. 
Furthermore, the source fund for real estate developers can be diversified and therefore reduce the 
reliance on the Chinese banking system. For example, real estate investment trusts (REIT) can be 
introduced to real estate developers. A REIT is similar to mutual funds that invests in stocks ( Liu, 2014), 
and which can help real estate developers create liquidity by unlocking their capital that is tied up in 
the properties they hold, and the redeploy the capital to other high-yielding investments. The real 
estate electronic trading system and the real estate investment trust increase market liquidity and 
improve the financial stability in the Chinese financial market. These initiatives can also increase 
transparency of information to housing market players and policymakers, which can lead to higher 
efficiency in China’s housing market.   
7.3 Contributions of the study 
The findings of the VECM model show no house price bubble exists in six Chinese housing markets 
(Kunming, Xian, Urumqi, Guangzhou, Changchun and Beijing). It is worth noting that the 
macroeconomic fundamental variables can significantly capture any house price bubble. This current 
study’s results are important for economists, homebuyers, and banks and financial institutions in 
China. 
First, the use of the price-to-income ratio and the VECM model to investigate the existence of housing 
bubbles in the Chinese housing markets, differentiate this current study from previous studies which 
use only the ordinary least squares model (OLS) and the price-to-income ratio technique. For example, 
Chung and Kim (2004) applied the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to test the relationships 
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between house prices and macroeconomic fundamental variables (GDP and land prices) and the 
expected house prices, for the period 2000 to 2009 in South Korea. The authors’ result shows that land 
prices and expected house prices significantly and positively influence house prices in South Korea. 
However, their OLS model fails to capture the long-run effects of each of the variables on South Korea’s 
house price index (Hill, Griffiths & Lim, 2011). The OLS method also lacks the ability to indicate the 
economic equilibrium relationship and the speed of the adjustment, until the equilibrium is reached. 
Shen (2012) used the price-to-permanent income ratio to test the housing affordability in China for 
the period 2006 to 2010. The author found that the Chinese housing affordable rate closely resembled 
those of developed economies, such as Australia, New Zealand and the U.K. The study also reports that 
Chinese housing is still affordable compared to New Zealand and Australia, as the price-to-permanent-
income ratio is 0.21 in Australia, 0.26 in New Zealand and 0.097 in China. The price-to-income ratio 
approach fails to determine the relationships between house prices and other macroeconomic 
fundamental variables (e.g. inflation, GDP and mortgage rates) (Cameron et al., 2006). In addition, 
unreported income can cause the price-to-income ratio to overstate the share of income in housing, 
and lead to biased results. According to Credit Suisse’s (2010) research, unreported income in China 
amounts to 30 percent of the country’s GDP. 
This current study applied the price-to-income ratio approach and the VAR and VECM models, to test 
for the existence of house price bubbles, as well as to identify the size of any bubbles. This study 
provides an improved result compared to the previous studies discussed above. The estimated results 
help economists, homebuyers, banks and financial institutions to understand the existence of regional 
housing market bubbles and to clarify the size of any bubble in three different tier levels of Chinese 
cities. This current study’s results also identify the macroeconomic factors that influence house prices 
in the short-run and the long-run. Such information could help housing market players to adjust their 
expectations about house prices, and balance housing demand with housing supply. Furthermore, the 
long equilibrium prices which are calculated by the long-run equilibrium coefficients of the VECM 
model, can be used by the housing authorities and local government officers to monitor the future 
house price movements in China. The deviation (gap) between real house prices and long-run 
equilibrium house prices can give an early warning indicator to government officers, house-sellers, and 
house-buyers, of an over-booming housing market.  
Second, the study results show that most of the short-term macroeconomic fundamental variables 
have no significant influence on house prices. The results suggest that Chinese homebuyers did not 
consider inflation, mortgage rates and income in their purchase decisions in the short-term. The 
Chinese central bank should focus on the middle-term and long-term interest rates to stabilize house 
prices in China during housing price boom periods. Long-term mortgage rates significantly influence 
house prices, which implies that Chinese homebuyers’ borrowing decisions are influenced by medium-
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term and longer-term mortgage rates. The banks and financial institutions can use this information 
when designing mortgage financing packages for homebuyers. 
Third, this current study’s results show the significant long-run relationships between the 
macroeconomic fundamental variables and China’s house prices. Such information could enable 
homebuyers to make rational house purchasing decisions. “Rational” implies homebuyers use the 
available information to estimate future events or future economic conditions (Muth, 1960). For banks 
and financial institutions, the rational decisions of their customers could potentially reduce the 
mortgage loan default rate, and decrease their over-exposure to the real estate sector. Furthermore, 
the housing market would become more efficient with rational investment behaviour from 
homebuyers. In addition, it would be less possible to earn excess investment profits from an efficient 
housing market (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2002). Thus, speculation in the Chinese housing market would 
be reduced.  
7.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The following section discusses the limitations of this research and offers suggestions for future 
research.  
First, the duration of this current study is from 1999:Q1 to 2013:Q4 (15 years), but a suggested 
complete real estate cycle is about 18 years: seven years slow increase (recovery from last recession); 
five years rapid increase; winner’s curse (2 years of madness increases in house prices); and four years 
collapse in the housing market (Harrison, 2005; Chen, Gan, Hu & Cohen, 2013). However, the 
liberalization of the Chinese housing market to a private market with competitive bidding pricing of 
properties only started in 1998. Before 1998, private housing was treated as a social asset in China, 
produced, allocated and administrated by the state through work units. The short data duration is not 
long enough to capture house price movements in a complete real estate cycle. Effectively, the 
available time series is one of a boom period in the Chinese real estate cycle (Wu, Gyourko & Deng, 
2010).  
Second, this current study applied the Choleski decomposition method to investigate the effectiveness 
of the macroeconomic fundamental variables on the house price index, due to the innovation on the 
error term. However, innovation does require an ordering of the variables in the Choleski 
decomposition, but the ordering is not likely to be important if the correlation coefficients among the 
residuals are low. It is improbable that all correlations will be small in the VAR model. In some 
instances, innovation derived based on the Choleski decomposition method, is not a reasonable 
interpretation of the related economics relationships (Ender, 2010). 
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Third, this current study did not consider the effects of psychological variables in the house price 
bubble model. According to Keynes and Shiller theory (see Chapter Three), housing bubbles are 
fundamentally influenced by psychological factors, such as whether a buyer’s expectations are 
optimistic or pessimistic about the future direction of house prices. If homebuyers emotionally believe 
that house prices will continue to rise, then they will be willing to spend even more, and this drives 
house prices higher (Shiller, 2004). Shiller’s (2004) study explains that once homebuyers form a 
speculative expectation on house prices in one city, then this expectation tends to spread to other 
cities, creating a contagious effect in the housing market. This is consistent with Case and Shiller’s 
(2003) study which shows positive relationships between housing bubbles and consumer psychological 
factors. The study discovered  a housing bubble occurs when there is a sharp rise in housing prices and 
an expectation of future house price rises, which attracts new buyers (generally speculators) who are 
more interested in profits from trading than living in the house (Sun & Zhang,2008). Roehner’s (1999) 
study also found that this speculative behaviour results in an increase in house prices in Paris.  
Future  research should consider to study Chinese behaviour and attitudes such as herding behaviour 
toward housing purchase since the economic fundamentals yield inconclusive results. Herding 
behaviour is a psychological variable that can potentially explain the fluctuation of Chinese housing 
market. Herding behaviour refers to the investors’ irrational behaviour under the influence of other 
investors’ behaviour, imitating others’ decision, or excessive relying on public opinions without 
considering their own information (Wang, 2013).  Wang’s (2013) study applied the Generalised Capital 
Asset Pricing Model to measure the herding behaviour in Chinese housing market for the period of 
2002 to 2011. The study found herding behaviour exists in Chinese housing market and influences the 
housing price fluctuation.  
7.4.1 Recommendations for Future Research 
The qualitative data of homebuyers’ behavioural and psychological factors can be examined in future 
housing bubble studies. These factors are directly related to homebuyers’ expectations on future 
house price growth rates, and homebuyers’ expectations on price increases, which is one of the factors 
that causes housing bubbles. Furthermore, an analysis of the causality relationship between house 
prices and stock prices would be useful to better understand the household’s investment decisions, as 
the housing and stock markets are the two major investment vehicles for Chinese people. 
Future studies could include more macroeconomic fundamental variables in the empirical model, such 
as short-term factors (international hot money), institutional factors (tax policy) and long-term factors 
(regional economic growth) (Berry & Dalton, 2004). Furthermore, it would be interesting to apply the 
method and framework used in this study to other housing markets, which exhibit similar economic 
and housing market development characteristics, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. The cross regional 
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research between these cities could further enhance understanding of the behaviour of house prices 
and bubbles in the region. 
The spill-over effects could be estimated in a future study, which means that there is the possibility 
that house prices within the same potential contagion region could be co-integrated together. 
Costello, Fraser and Groenewold (2011) suggest that actual house prices often do not reflect the 
macroeconomic fundamental determinants; their study explored the spill-over effects of speculative 
activity in six Australian states. Their results show that New South Wales is relatively more susceptible 
to spill-over transmitted from other states, and that Western Australia is the most isolated from the 
other states of the country. Spill-over effects may exist in China due to housing purchase restrictions 
for high price regions, which may stimulate the flow of cash from rich regions to poor regions (Riddle, 
2011). Shih, Li and Qin’s (2014) study found that Beijing and Shanghai are contagion regions, and that 
house prices in these two cities can exogenously influence the house price long-term equilibrium 
systems of neighbouring provinces. 
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Appendix A 
 
A.1 Error Correction Model and VAR Model Results (Eight cities) 
 
 
 
Method 
VECM VAR 
 Kunming Xian Urumqi Guangzhou Changchun Beijing Qingdao Nanjing 
 Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Error 
correction 
-0.5087 
(-4.947)*** 
-0.3830 
(-4.709)*** 
-0.4728 
(-4.681)*** 
-0.0834 
(-2.305)** 
-0.4763 
(-4.654)*** 
-0.2702 
(-4.283)*** 
  
DCPI(-1) 
 
0.0249 
(0.260) 
0.2016 
(1.777)* 
0.0400 
(0.249) 
-0.0785 
(-0.326) 
0.6764 
(3.371)*** 
-0.1892 
(-0.665) 
0.5671 
(2.569)** 
-0.1084 
(-0.392) 
DINCOME(-
1) 
-0.0007 
(-1.019) 
-0.0003 
(-0.582) 
0.0003 
(0.234) 
0.0003 
(0.091) 
-0.0023 
(-0.926) 
0.0002 
(0.189) 
-0.0009 
(-0.626) 
0.0002 
(0.388) 
DMORTGAG
E RATE(-1) 
1.073 
(1.90)** 
0.2502 
(0.419) 
1.3051 
(1.208) 
1.3911 
(1.297) 
1.6879 
(1.538) 
0.4725 
(0.402) 
-0.0015 
(-0.001) 
0.1149 
(0.099) 
C 0.0617 
(0.284) 
0.0324 
(0.164) 
0.1232 
(0.392) 
0.4417 
(1.251) 
0.3842 
(0.825) 
0.0248 
(0.062) 
0.2142 
(0.494) 
0.1134 
(0.304) 
Note:*statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance 
 ** statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance 
     ***statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance 
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A.2 Co-integration Model Results (Six Cities) 
 Kunming Xian Urumqi Guangzhou Changchun Beijing 
 Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
CPI(-1) 0.3801 2.350** -0.0237 -0.078 -0.1030 -0.305 -4.3901 -5.887*** -1.6061 -4.708*** -2.6980 -5.043*** 
INCOME(-1) 0.0007 1.993** 0.0007 1.703* 0.0009 1.459 0.0022 2.442** 0.0009 1.825* 0.0016 3.523*** 
MORTGAGE 
RATE(-1) 
-0.9460 -1.267 1.3511 1.231 3.8374 2.680*** 13.6418 4.751*** 4.5174 4.081*** 6.2091 3.052*** 
C 66.9754  95.2818  87.1269  451.3146  235.0507  331.6638  
Note:*statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance 
 ** statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance 
 ***statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance  
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A.3 Impulse Response Functions of Eight Cities 
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Guangzhou 
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Qingdao 
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